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of	 Islām	 and	 Qur’ān.	 Names	 of	 personalities,	 organisations	 and	
foundations,	 as	 well	 as	 titles	 of	 books,	 journals	 and	 articles	 are	
rendered	 according	 to	 locally	 applied	 spellings	 and	 transliterations.	
For	 Arabic	 terms	 and	 names	 which	 are	 not	 part	 of	 the	 Indonesian	
language,	 I	 use	 the	 international	 standard	 of	 Arabic	 transliteration.	
With	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 term	 ‘ulamā’	 (singular	 ‘ālim),	 the	 plural	
forms	of	Arabic-influenced	terms	are	indicated	by	adding	an	s	to	the	



























Figure	 2.2.	 The	 structure	 of	 the	 regional	 and	 sub-district	 offices	 of	
religious	affairs	according	to	the	PMA	No.	42/2016	
Figure	2.3:	Penghulu’s	strike	to	voice	the	release	of	Romli	
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Octora.	 The	marriage	was	 a	 traditional	 one	 and	not	 registered.	 The	
reason	it	was	unregistered	because	it	was	a	polygynous	marriage	and	
Fikri	did	not	have	a	permission	from	the	local	Islamic	court	to	take	a	
second	 wife.	 The	 marriage	 lasted	 only	 four	 days	 and	 ended	 in	 a	
unilateral	 repudiation	 (talak)	which	attracted	extensive	 coverage	 in	




drew	 an	 analogy	 between	 his	 bride	 and	 an	 item	 of	 clothing.	 Most	
people	 found	 his	 analogy	 irritating	 and	 distasteful.	 The	 marriage	
elicited	a	wave	of	public	rumours	and	was	the	topic	of	legal	debates.	




1 Although his marriage lasted for a limited time, it was not a mut’ah marriage. Mut’ah is an 
Arabic term, mut’a, that literally means pleasure or enjoyment. A mut’ah marriage is  a 
marriage where a man agrees to give a woman something for a specified period in return for 
her sexual favour. The institution of temporary marriage was prohibited by the second caliph, 
'Umar ibn Khattāb, who viewed it as fornication. This view is perceived to be fallacious by Shi'i 
Muslims, who have continued to practice temporary marriage. Shahla Haeri, Law of Desire: 
















important	 field	 in	 which	 the	 principles	 laid	 down	 by	 the	 religious	
norms	which	make	family	 law	the	last	stronghold	of	the	Sharia	hold	
sway.2	Fikri	brushed	aside	the	significance	of	legalizing	his	marriage	as	
the	 state	 law	 required	him	 to	 do,	 among	 other	 reasons	 because	 his	




marriage	 remains	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 the	 social	 and	moral	 fabric.3	
Throughout	 the	 Muslim	 world,	 over	 the	 centuries	 the	 practice	 of	
Muslim	marriage	has	been	imbued	with	a	multitude	of	local	norms	and	
influenced	by	the	diversity	of	local	actors.4	Compliance	to	local	norms	
and	 the	 involvement	 of	 local	 actors	 in	 a	 marriage	 ceremony	 are	
essential	 elements	 in	 winning	 social	 acceptance	 of	 a	 marriage.	 In	
Muslim	 communities,	 social	 acceptance	 is	 also	 unquestionably	
determined	by	 the	upholding	of	 religious	principles	 in	 the	marriage	
ceremony.	 Generally	 speaking,	 the	 relationship	 between	 religious	
norms	and	social	acceptance	in	Indonesia	seems	indivisible.	However,	
 
2 Lynn Welchman, Women and Muslim Family Laws in Arab States: A Comparative Overview 
of Textual Development and Advocacy (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), p. 
11. 
3 Maria Platt, Marriage, Gender and Islam in Indonesia: Women Negotiating Informal 
Marriage, Divorce and Desire (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2017). 
4 Dawoud Sudqi el- Alami, The Marriage Contract in Islamic Law in the Shariʾah and Personal 

















signalling	 the	 withdrawal	 of	 its	 support	 from	 hierarchical,	
differentiated	marital	 roles.	Another	 reason	 is	 the	 right	 to	 resort	 to	
legal	 enforcement	when	 family	 relationships	 have	 broken	 down.	 In	




was	 carried	 out	 according	 to	 the	 requirements	 of	 Islam	 but	 was	
unregistered.	 In	 Indonesian	 life,	 marriage	 without	 registration	 is	
popularly	 known	 as	 nikah	 sirri.	 Literally	 nikah	 sirri	 means	 a	 secret	
marriage	which	does	not	entail	either	publicity	(i‘lān)	or	a	festive	meal	
(walīma).	This	notion	arises	from	the	legal	discourse	among	classical	
Muslim	 jurists	 on	 the	 impermissibility	 of	 nikāh	 al-sirr,	 a	 marriage	
contract	 which	 is	 deliberately	 kept	 secret	 and	 concluded	 in	 the	
absence	 of	 male	 witnesses.8	 Diverging	 somewhat	 from	 this	 norm,	
 
5 Nadia Sonneveld, ‘Rethinking the Difference Between Formal and Informal Marriages in 
Egypt’, in Family Law in Islam: Divorce, Marriage and Women in the Muslim World, ed. by 
Maaike Voorhoeve (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), pp. 77–107. 
6 Elizabeth S. Scott, ‘Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage’, Virginia Law Review, 
vol. 86, no. 8 (2000), p. 1903. 
7 Ibid., p. 1901. 
8 According the classical Malikite scholars, marriage without male witnesses is permissible as 





registration.9	 Such	 a	marriage	 is	 performed	 in	 the	presence	of	 local	
religious	 leaders	 (kyai)	 and	 witnesses	 (sometimes	 the	 marriage	








proper	 institution	 of	 marriage	 (ketertiban	 perkawinan).	 This	 act	 of	
registration	makes	 a	 marriage	 legally	 valid.	 If	 a	 marriage	 is	 legally	
valid,	 it	must	be	religiously	valid	because,	according	to	the	Marriage	
Law,	a	marriage	can	be	registered	only	if	it	has	met	with	the	religious	
requirements.	 However,	 instead	 of	 integrating	 registration	 into	 the	




Reconciliation	 does	 not	 affect	 the	 lawfulness	 of	 an	 unregistered	
marriage	 as	 long	 as	 it	 was	 concluded	 according	 to	 the	 religious	
requirements.11	 Bowen	 referred	 the	 complicated	 co-existence	 of	
religious	validity	and	state	recognition	as	“dual	validity”.12		
The	 third	 requirement	 is	 social	 acceptance	 of	 persons	 living	
together	in	a	form	which	is	commonly	referred	to	as	a	marriage.	Mir-
 
Studi terhadap Perundang-Undangan Perkawinan Muslim Kontemporer di Indonesia dan 
Malaysia (Leiden: Indonesian-Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies (INIS), 2002), p. 139. 
9 Eva F. Nisa, ‘The Bureaucratization of Muslim Marriage in Indonesia’, Journal of Law and 
Religion, vol. 33, no. 2 (2018), pp. 291–309. 
10 Silvia Vignato, ‘“Men Come In, Men Go Out”: Single Muslim Women in Malaysia and Aceh’, 
Social Identities, vol. 18, no. 2 (2012), pp. 239–57. 
11 Stijn van Huis, ‘Islamic Courts and Women’s Divorce Rights in Indonesia: The Cases of Cianjur 
and Bulukumba’ (PhD Dissertation. Leiden University, 2015), p. 95. 
12 John R. Bowen, Shari`a, State, and Social Norms in France and Indonesia (ISIM Paper No. 3. 




Hosseini	 refers	 to	 this	as	 “a	socially-valid	marriage”.13	 In	practice	 in	
society,	social	acceptance	often	intertwines	with	religious	validity.	In	
Java	generally,	if	a	marriage	is	valid	according	to	religion,	it	is	assured	
of	 social	 acceptance.	 Social	 acceptance	 is	 inextricably	 tied	 up	 with	
avoiding	 social	 stigma	when	 it	 comes	 to	 activities	 related	 to	 sexual	
intercourse.	 Thus,	marriage	 acts	 as	 a	 social	 norm	when	 it	 comes	 to	
regulating	 sexual	 relations.	 Especially	 in	 the	 case	 of	 teenage	
pregnancy,	 marriage	 is	 the	 only	 acceptable	 solution.14	 In	 addition,	
marriage	 also	 defines	women’s	 sexuality.	 Parker	et	 al.,	 for	 instance,	
have	addressed	the	experience	of	being	a	janda	(widow	or	divorcée)	in	







In	 many	 Muslim	 majority	 countries,	 we	 see	 similar	 tendencies.	 In	
Egypt,	 the	 tension	between	state	 law	and	religious	 law	on	marriage	
results	in	the	practice	of	’urfi	(customary)	marriage.16	Likewise,	non-
registration	leads	to	fātiḥa	marriage	in	Morocco.17	It	is	clear	that	the	
participants	 in	an	unregistered	marriage	attach	more	 importance	 to	
the	Sharia	than	to	the	state	law.	They	value	the	validity	of	a	marriage	
 
13 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial: Islamic Family Law in Iran and Morocco (London and 
New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p. 145. 
14 Mies Grijns and Hoko Horii, ‘Child Marriage in a Village in West Java (Indonesia): 
Compromises between Legal Obligations and Religious Concerns’, Asian Journal of Law and 
Society (2018), p. 7. 
15 Lyn Parker, Irma Riyani, and Brooke Nolan, ‘The Stigmatisation of Widows and Divorcees 
(janda) in Indonesia, and the Possibilities for Agency’, Indonesia and the Malay World, vol. 44, 
no. 128 (2016), pp. 27–46. 
16 Mona Abaza, ‘Perceptions of ’Urfi Marriage in the Egyptian Press’, ISIM Newsletter, vol. 7 
(2001), pp. 20–1. 
17 A marriage contract is signed at a ceremony which intertwines religious symbolism and 
rituals such as the recitation of the Fatiha, the first verse of the Koran, see Mir-Hosseini, 
Marriage on Trial: Islamic Family Law in Iran and Morocco, p. 32. It is often used to hide 
underage marriage, see Paul Scott Prettitore, ‘Family Law Reform, Gender Equality, and 
Underage Marriage: A view from Morocco and Jordan’, Review of Faith and International 















marriage	 demonstrates	 that	 there	 still	 is	 continuity	 in	 the	 tension	
between	Sharia	law	and	state	law.	According	to	Cammack,	Islamic	law	
emphasizes	an	exclusive	divine	sovereignty	and	claims	revelation	as	
its	 basic	 foundation,	 whereas	 the	 concept	 of	 nation-state	 tends	 to	
monopolize	 the	 law-making	 process	 through	 the	 doctrine	 of	





among	 legal	 anthropologists.23	 This	 is	 because	 in	 many	 societies	
people	still	feel	traditional	mechanisms	(religious	law,	customary	law	
 
18 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, ‘Nikah’, Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World (New York: 
Macmillan, 2004), p. 510. 
19 Wael B. Hallaq, Shari’a: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p. 271. 
20 Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial: Islamic Family Law in Iran and Morocco, p. 8. 
21 Ibid., p. 4. 
22 Mark Cammack, ‘Islam, Nationalism and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia’, Wisconsin 
International Law Journal, vol. 17 (1999), pp. 27–63. 
23 There is an abundance of scholarly works which centre their discussion on the position of 
Sharia in the different nation-states. To mention some, Clark B. Lombardi, State Law as Islamic 
Law in modern Egypt: The Incorporation of the Sharīʿa into Egyptian Constitutional Law 
(Leiden: Brill, 2006); Morgan Clarke, Islam and Law in Lebanon: Sharia within and without the 
State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Jan Michiel Otto (ed.), Sharia 
Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in 









dissonance.24	Regardless	of	 this	dissonance,	 on	a	practical	 level,	 the	
different	 legal	bodies	 (Sharia	 law,	 state	 law	and	customary	 law)	co-
exist	and	relate	to	each	other	in	an	Islamic	triangle,	encompassing	the	
changing	relations	between	all	of	them.25		
Indonesia,	 which	 is	 blessed	 with	 a	 myriad	 of	 local	 cultures,	
provides	 a	 pre-existing	 foundation	 on	 which	 Islamic	 law	 can	 be	
understood,	practised	and	taken	as	a	point	of	orientation	by	Muslims	
in	 multiple	 ways.	 Muslim	 society	 in	 Indonesia	 is	 crisscrossed	 by	
competing	norms,	social	orders	and	claims	about	how	people	should	
live	 in	 an	 appropriately	 Islamized	way	 and	 about	what	 they	 should	
become.26	Bowen	sheds	new	light	on	the	fact	that	Muslims	are	being	
challenged	 by	 competing	 legal	 systems	 in	 which	 negotiation	 is	 an	





skilled	 employment,28	 for	 a	 redefinition	 of	 the	 rights	 and	 duties	 of	
 
24 Arskal Salim, Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008), pp. 25–6. 
25 Léon Buskens, ‘An Islamic Triangle: Changing Relationships between Sharia, State Law, and 
Local Customs’, in ISIM Newsletter, vol. 5 (Leiden: Institute for the Study of Islam in the 
Modern World, 2000), p. 8. 
26 Franz Von Benda-Beckmann, Property in Social Continuity: Continuity and Change in the 
Maintenance of Property Relationships through Time in Minangkabau, West Sumatra (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979); Franz Von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet Von Benda-
Beckmann, ‘Islamic law in a plural context: The struggle over inheritance law in colonial West 
Sumatra’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 55, no. 4/5 (2012), pp. 
771–93. 
27 John R. Bowen, Islam, Law, and Equality in Indonesia: An Anthropology of Public Reasoning 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
28 Linda Rae Bennett, Women, Islam and Modernity: Single Women, Sexuality and 





women	 and	men	 and	 to	 promote	 the	 equality	 of	women.	 This	 new	
trend	has	challenged	the	perceived	understanding	of	Islamic	law	and	
traditional	 scriptural	 interpretations.	 In	 this	 context,	 Nancy	 Smith-
Hefner	has	underscored	that	the	changes	taking	place	among	urban,	
educated	Muslim	Javanese	youth	are	also	influenced	by	growing	ideas	




On	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 background,	 my	 thesis	 addresses	 these	





key	 questions,	 the	 thesis	 first	 elucidates	 how	 the	 Indonesian	 state	
governs	Muslim	marriages.	Since	the	early	days	of	Independence,	the	
government	 of	 Indonesia	 has	 included	 marriage,	 divorce	 and	
reconciliation	 among	 Muslims	 in	 its	 steady	 march	 towards	 greater	





how	 state	 officials	 deal	 with	 their	 practices	 and	 in	 what	 ways	





norms	 and	 the	modern	 legal	 norms	 promoted	 by	 the	 state.	 This	 is	
because	 the	 state	 has	 tried	 and	 tested	 various	 ways	 to	 deal	 with	
 
29 Nancy J. Smith-Hefner, ‘The New Muslim Romance: Changing Patterns of Courtship and 
Marriage Among Educated Javanese Youth’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 36, no. 3 






their	 own	 interpretation	 of	 how	 the	 ‘common	 good’	 should	 be	
articulated	 in	marriage.	 The	 bulk	 of	 their	 understanding	 is	 derived	
from	religious	texts	or	other	cultural	norms	and	emerges	from	a	lived	
engagement	with	a	multitude	of	ideas,	expectations	and	local	norms.	
In	 this	 framework,	 this	 thesis	 employs	 ‘everyday	 practice’,	 an	
important	analytical	category,	in	its	attempt	to	take	“a	more	nuanced	
look	at	Muslims’	religious	lives”30	without	incurring	any	unnecessary	




the	 state	 and	 religion	 is	 not	 a	matter	 of	 competition	 but	 of	mutual	
adjustment.	 It	 cannot	 be	 claimed	 that	 there	 is	 any	 clear-cut	
competition	between	religious	law	and	state	law.	Of	course,	there	is	a	
certain	 segment	 of	 religious	 leaders	 who	 do	 oppose	 the	 state	 law,	
mainly	 those	who	 reject	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 nation-state,	 but	 the	
majority	 accept	 both	 the	 state	 and	 the	 state	 law.	 There	 are	 two	
conditions	which	explain	why	the	 former	have	chosen	to	resist.	The	
first	 occurs	 when	 they	 think	 the	 state	 law	 really	 goes	 against	
fundamental	 tenets	 laid	 down	 in	 Sharia	 or	 when	 the	 state	 law	
introduces	 something	 explicitly	 impermissible	 according	 to	 Sharia,	
such	as	allowing	same	sex	marriage	or	 totally	prohibiting	polygyny.	
However,	 this	 would	 seem	 to	 be	 nearly	 impossible	 in	 Indonesia	
because,	to	a	large	extent,	the	legal	reforms	have	scrupulously	taken	
into	 account	 what	 is	 permissible	 and	 impermissible	 according	 to	
Sharia.	In	most	cases,	and	this	is	the	second	form	of	resistance,	when	





30 Samuli Schielke and Liza Debevec, ‘Introduction’, in Ordinary lives and grand schemes: an 
anthropology of everyday religion, ed. by Samuli Schielke and Liza Debevec (New York and 





acceptable	 solution.	 Because	 marriage	 is	 perceived	 in	 society	 as	 a	
religious	ceremony,	religious	law	is	required.	
Another	point	which	this	study	suggests	is	that	the	state’s	attempt	











For	 the	majority	of	 religious	people,	marriage	 is	 “more	 than	a	mere	
contract”.	 It	exceeds	the	compass	of	a	private	contract	between	two	
individuals.	 It	 serves	 as	 an	 important	 familial,	 communal,	 even	




union	 and	 before	 a	 community	 who	 witness	 the	 new	 couple	
commencing	 a	 new	 chapter	 in	 their	 lives	 together.31	 Because	 these	
communal	and	religious	dimensions	of	marriage	are	more	important	
to	 so	 many	 people	 than	 the	 formally	 conferred	 civil	 status,	 the	
relationship	between	the	state	procedures	and	the	religious	law	is	an	
unresolved	 topic	 of	 debate.	 This	 persisting	 tension	 means	 that	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 two	 is	 a	 recurring	 theme	 in	 the	 study	 of	
Islamic	 law	 and	 society.32	 The	 relationship	 between	 them	 is	 key	 to	
 
31 Joel A. Nichols, ‘Religion, Family Law, and Competing Norms’, in Negotiating State and Non-
State Law: The Challenge of Global and Local Legal Pluralism, ed. by Michael A. Helfand 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 198. 
32 Baudouin Dupret, ‘Legal Pluralism, Plurality of Laws, and Legal Practices: Theories, Critiques, 
















the	 interpretations	 made	 by	 human	 beings	 of	 those	 Qur’anic	 legal	
verses	 which	 have	 imprecise,	 multiple	 meanings.	 Therefore,	 fiqh	 is	




aspect	 of	 them.	Of	 course,	 this	position	 assumes	 the	key	 role	of	 the	
state	 in	 the	 legislation.	 Lombardi	 remarks	 that,	 under	 certain	
conditions,	 a	 government	 could	 legitimately	 impose	 its	 preferred	
understanding	 of	 God’s	 law	 and	 hence	 could	 force	 its	 citizens	 to	
observe	 the	 government’s	 interpretation	 in	preference	 to	 their	 own	
interpretations.37	However,	it	is	impossible	to	ignore	that	there	is	still	
room	for	a	Muslim	to	choose	potential	rules	of	behaviour	rooted	in	an	
interpretation	 of	 God’s	 law.	 Arabi	 came	 up	 with	 the	 idea	 of	
 
1–26; Arskal Salim, Contemporary Islamic Law in Indonesia: Shari’ah and Legal Pluralism 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015). 
33 Qur’an 45: 18. 
34 Joseph Schacht, ‘Shari’a’, in First Encyclopedia of Islam, ed. by M. Th. Houstma et al. (Leiden: 
Brill, 1987), pp. 320–4. 
35 Salim, Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia, p. 11. 
36 Bernard G. Weiss, The Search for God’s Law: Islamic Jurisprudence in the Writing of Saif al-
Dīn al-Āmidī (Salt Lake and Herndon: University of Utah Press and International Institute of 
Islamic Thought, 2010), p. 1. 
37 Lombardi, State Law as Islamic Law in modern Egypt: The Incorporation of the Sharīʿa into 





modern	 state	 political	 structure,	 which	 is	 allowed	 from	 a	 religious	
perspective	as	 long	as	not	 it	does	not	 lead	 to	 the	abandoning	of	 the	
ethical	 and	 religious	 spirit	 of	 Islam.38	 The	 boundaries	 of	where	 the	
state	can	impose	its	interpretation	are	if	it	does	not	command	Muslim	














the	 right	 to	 make	 and	 apply	 rules	 and	 regulations	 in	 an	 indirect	
initiative	 to	 provide	 “uniformity	 of	 the	 law”	 among	 different	 legal	
 
38 Oussama Arabi, Studies in Modern islamic Law and Jurisprudence (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2001), p. 194. 
39 Lombardi, State Law as Islamic Law in modern Egypt: The Incorporation of the Sharīʿa into 
Egyptian Constitutional Law, p. 19. 
40 Hallaq, Shari’a: Theory, Practice, Transformations, p. 359. 
41 Rudolph Peters, ‘From Jurists’ Law to Statute Law or What Happens When the Shari’a is 
Codified’, Mediterranean Politics, vol. 7, no. 3 (2002), pp. 82–95; Aharon Layish, ‘The 
Transformation of the Sharīʿa from Jurists’ Law to Statutory Law in the Contemporary Muslim 
World’, Die Welt des Islams, vol. 44, no. 1 (2004), pp. 85–113; Salim, Challenging the Secular 
State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia, pp. 13–4. 
42 Early in the ninth century, Sharia was the greatest subject of Islamic scholarship. Renowned 
as fiqh (literally al-fahm (Arabic) or understanding), it represents the intellectual efforts of 
Muslim jurists to understand the legal substance written in the holy texts. This intellectual 
enterprise, comprising a set of norms, commentaries and stipulations and laid down in the 
works of classical-medieval Muslim jurists, eventually developed into an established system 






such	 a	 leader	 can	 advance	 his	 judicial	 authority.	 In	 practice,	 siyāsa	
shar‘iyya	granted	the	ruler	the	authority	to	legislate	as	a	complement	
to	 Sharia	 law	 when	 the	 religious	 texts	 offered	 no	 opinion	 about	 a	
certain	matter.	 New	 courts	 could	 be	 created	 as	 long	 as	 considered	
necessary	 for	 the	 attainment	 of	 the	 public	 good.44	 This	 judicial	





indicated	 that	 the	 core	 of	 the	 problem	 of	 dominant	 influence	 of	
European	modernity	 in	 the	 shaping	 of	 Islamic	 legal	 institutions	 has	
meant	 a	 struggle	 in	 power	 relations.	 Religious	 authorities	 could	 be	
replaced	by	 the	 state	power	 in	 the	administration	of	private	affairs.	
Hallaq	 argues	 that,	 because	 the	 state	 has	 played	 powerful	 roles	 in	
controlling	the	direction	of	Sharia,	it	has	diminished	the	institutional	
independence	 of	 religious	 scholars	 to	 formulate	 a	 legitimate	
interpretation	 of	 Sharia.46	 In	 other	 words,	 Sharia	 has	 been	 moving	
towards	its	demise	in	the	light	of	the	shifts	in	the	conception	of	legal	
authority	introduced	by	the	modern	nation-state.	Nevertheless,	many	
authors	 have	 shown	 that	 the	 codification	 of	 Islamic	 law	 still	 allows	
different	 legal	 opinions	 within	 Islam	 to	 struggle	 to	 find	 a	 true	
articulation	of	Sharia.		
The	modern	legal	approach,	characterized	by	a	tendency	towards	
a	 hierarchical,	 administrative	 understanding	 of	 the	 law	 has	 heavily	
 
43 Layish, ‘The Transformation of the Sharīʿa from Jurists’ Law to Statutory Law in the 
Contemporary Muslim World’, pp. 87–8. 
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restrictive	 administrative	 state	 code.	 Furthermore,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
idea	of	 legal	 reform	derives	 from	the	rise	of	Western	scholarship	 in	
Islamic	law	has	had	the	consequence	of	leading	to	a	misunderstanding	





consequences	 have	 become	 apparent,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
legislation	has	been	no	more	than	codifying	preferred	fiqh	doctrines.	
Firstly,	 religious	 scholars	 have	 experienced	 a	 struggle	 to	 reach	 an	
authoritative	 legal	 interpretation	 within	 their	 own	 circle.	 Secondly,	
despite	the	involvement	of	the	traditional	Islamic	jurists	in	preparing	





That	 said,	 in	 scholarly	 terms,	 the	 institutionalization	 of	 Sharia	
which	has	taken	place	in	Muslim	majority	states,	including	Indonesia,	
has	 been	 a	 political	 and	 practical	 encounter.49	 This	 situation	 is	 not	
exclusive	to	Indonesia.	Buskens	has	noted	that	the	making	of	Moroccan	
family	 law	 has	 involved	 the	 public	 and	 the	 political	 debates.50	 In	
relation	to	 this,	Hallaq	argues	 that	 the	 transformation	of	Sharia	 into	
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law	 results	 in	 what	 he	 termed	 “great	 synthesis”.51	 This	 expression	
means	that	Islamic	law	has	incorporated	two	aspects:	traditionalism,	
that	 is,	 the	 ideas	and	norms	indicated	 in	the	sacred	texts,	 the	Quran	
and	 prophetic	 traditions,	 and	 rationalism	 in	 the	 forms	 of	 scholarly	
consensus	 and	 analogical	 reasoning.	 A	 negative	 side	 to	 this	 legal-
political	process	is	that	it	has	diminished	the	open	scholarly	discourse	
of	 Sharia52	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 pre-existing	 different	 fiqh	 schools	
(madhhab).		
The	 legal	 reform	 of	 Islamic	 personal	 status	 (al-aḥwāl	 al-
shakhṣiyya)	 in	 Indonesia	 has	 been	 far-reaching,53	 although	 it	 has	
involved	 the	 contesting	 of	 divergent	 religious	 and	 non-religious	
outlooks.	 Various	 scholars	 have	 contributed	 to	 our	 insights	 into	





between	 the	 modernists	 and	 the	 traditionalists	 in	 Islam	 and	 has	
changed	 the	 government’s	 attitude	 towards	 Islam.55	 Furthermore,	
Hefner	has	also	remarked	that	Sharia	has	been	an	arena	of	contestation	
in	 Indonesian	 society.	 These	 remarks	 suggest	 that	 Sharia	 is	 not	 a	
singular	 interpretation,	 but	 is	 composed	 of	 understandings	 which	
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In	 the	early	years	after	 Independence,	 the	 Indonesian	state	devoted	
most	 of	 its	 attention	 to	 the	 administration	 of	 civil	 private	 matters.	
Hence,	 it	 was	 in	 this	 period	 that	 marital	 relations	 came	 under	 the	
control	 of	 the	 state	 and	 this	 shift	 has	 led	 to	 political	 and	 religious	
debates	over	the	last	four	decades.57	A	key	turning-point	has	been	the	
enactment	 of	 the	 Marriage	 Law	 in	 1974.58	 This	 Law	 made	 family	
relations	subject	to	the	state	by	requiring	civil	registration,	although	
the	 substantive	 rules	 of	 the	 Law	 were	 still	 influenced	 by	 religious	
doctrines.		
The	contest	between	religious	law	and	the	state	law	on	marriage	
has	 resulted	 in	 a	 number	 of	 compromises.	 They	 include	 the	 legal	
obligation	 of	 marriage	 registration,	 the	 regulation	 of	 the	 minimum	
ages	at	which	marriages	can	be	performed,	polygyny	and	the	role	of	
the	judiciary	in	family	law	matters.	The	Law	conceptualizes	marriage	
at	 the	 crossroads	 between	 religious	 precepts	 and	 state	
administration.59	The	Law	decrees	that	a	marriage	can	only	be	valid	
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a	 less	 revolutionary	 impact	 on	 Islamic	 family	 law,	 which	 has	
strengthened	the	continuing	improvement	of	the	position	of	women	in	
the	matrimonial	 sphere.63	 Nonetheless,	 public	 debates	 about	 it	 still	
revolve	 around	 the	 contest	 between	 ‘religious	 validation’	 and	 ‘legal	






60 Nani Soewondo, ‘The Indonesian Marriage Law and its Implementing Regulation’, Archipel, 
vol. 13 (1977), pp. 283–94. 
61 Euis Nurlaelawati, ‘Muslim Women in Indonesian Religious Courts: Reform, Strategies, and 
Pronouncement of Divorce’, Islamic Law & Society. 2013, vol. 20, no. 3 (2013), p. 256. 
62 Jayne Curnow, ‘Legal Support Structures and the Realisation of Muslim Women’s Rights in 
Indonesia’, Asian Studies Review, vol. 39, no. 2 (Routledge, 2015), pp. 213–28; Ingrid 
Westendorp, ‘Personal Status Law and Women’s Right to Equality in Law and in Practice: The 
Case of Land Rights of Balinese Hindu Women’, Journal of Human Rights Practice, vol. 7, no. 
3 (2015), pp. 430–50. 
63 Mark Cammack, Adriaan W. Bedner, and Stijn van Huis, ‘Democracy, Human Rights, and 






judges’	 decisions	 and	 court	 reports	 have	 been	 the	 source	 of	 many	




My	 study	 finds	 that,	 in	 terms	 of	 marital	 administration,	 the	
government	has	endeavoured	to	initiate	legal	changes	through	the	civil	
administration.	Acutely	aware	of	 the	 fact	 that	any	proposal	 for	 legal	
reform	 is	 always	 sure	 to	 spark	 controversy,	 the	 government	 has	
thought	 it	 best	 to	 begin	 to	 approach	 Muslim	 marriage	 within	 the	
framework	 of	 citizens’	 rights.	Hence,	 the	 government	 does	 not	 deal	
with	the	legal	status	of	a	marriage	directly,	but	with	the	consequence	
of	 an	 altered	 legal	 status	 to	 the	 rights	 which	 a	 citizen	 can	 claim	
(Chapter	 1).	 This	 shift	 has	 enabled	 the	 government	 to	 improve	 the	
efficacy	of	its	marriage	bureaucracy	and	encouraged	people	to	depend	
more	fully	on	its	authority	in	seeking	to	arrange	their	marital	affairs.	
Nevertheless,	 this	 effort	 has	 not	 succeeded	 in	 entirely	 changing	
people’s	behaviour	in	particular	societal	contexts	(Chapter	5).	
Alongside	 the	 role	 of	 the	 civil	 administration	 in	 this	 direction,	
Islamic	 courts	 have	 also	 remained	 a	 significant	 factor	 in	 helping	
women	obtain	 their	 rights.	 Studies	done	by	 John	Bowen,64	 Stijn	van	
Huis65	 and	 Euis	 Nurlaelawati66	 have	 indicated	 the	 important	 role	
played	 by	 Islamic	 courts	 in	 protecting	 the	 rights	 of	women.	 Bowen	
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courts	 have	 translated	 cultural	 ideas	 of	 fairness	 and	 agreement,	
namely	social	consensus,	into	their	justification	of	gender	equality.		
Furthermore,	 focusing	 on	 the	 functioning	 of	 Islamic	 courts	 in	
West	Java	and	South	Sulawesi,	Stijn	van	Huis	has	argued	that,	despite	
the	 different	 political	 landscapes	 in	 these	 two	 areas,	 Islamic	 courts	
demonstrate	 the	 same	 tendency	 towards	 granting	 a	 divorce	 on	 the	
concept	 of	 a	 ‘no-fault	 divorce’,	 in	 which	 the	 judges	 adopt	 a	 lenient	
approach	towards	divorce.	This	change	means	that	women	now	have	
an	equal	position	 in	divorce	proceedings	 irrespective	of	 their	 social	
position.	 Even	 more	 importantly,	 Islamic	 courts	 now	 have	 enough	
room	 to	 create	 legal	 changes	 through	 reinterpretations	 of	 Islamic	
concepts	 in	 judicial	 processes.68	 Nevertheless,	 this	 positive	
development	 does	 not	 necessarily	 determine	 the	 future	 of	 legal	
reform.	 Any	 legal	 reforms	 still	 need	 to	 maintain	 certain	 normative	
boundaries	in	the	judicial	tradition	of	Islamic	courts	if	they	are	to	be	






countries	 too.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 ‘progressive’	 Tunisian	 family	 law,	
Maaike	Voorhoeve	has	argued	that	 the	state-promoted	 family	 law	is	





and	 this	 is	 advantageous	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 women.	 What	 I	 can	
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agencies	 in	protecting	 the	 legal	 status	 and	 the	 rights	of	women.	My	
study	also	confirms	these	findings	when	it	examines	the	quest	for	the	
state	recognition	of	unregistered	marriages	(Chapter	6).	
By	 contrast,	 O’Shaughnessy,	 who	 studied	 divorce	 cases	 in	
Indonesia	from	1974	to	2005	on	the	basis	of	court	reports	and	printed	
sources,	 arrived	 at	 very	 different	 conclusions.	 She	 argues	 that	 the	
Marriage	 Law	was	 designed	 to	 discourage	 divorces,	 by	making	 not	
only	the	terms	for	acceptance	in	courts	but	also	their	administration	
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religion,74	marriage	 among	 educated	 urban	Muslim	 teenagers75	 and	
informal	 marriage	 and	 gender76	 have	 proposed	 the	 centrality	 of	
religious	 law.	 Summing	up	 their	 study	of	 child	marriage,	Grijns	 and	
Horii	 concluded	 that	 the	 continuing	 practice	 of	 child	 marriage	 is	
sustained	by	religious	 interpretations	made	by	conservative	Muslim	
groups	in	their	efforts	to	deal	with	adolescent	sexuality.	In	line	with	
this	 argument,	 Nisa	 emphasizes	 that	 religious	 piety	 and	 religious	
homogamy	continue	to	be	important	factors	which	shape	marriage	in	
certain	 Muslim	 communities.	 Bianca	 Smith,	 who	 studied	 divorce	
among	 women	 who	 live	 in	 pesantren,	 remarked	 that	 these	 women	
possess	religious	capital	which	allows	them	to	avoid	the	state	law	on	
marriage.77	 In	 this	 pesantren,	 these	 women	 petitioned	 divorce	






marital	 trajectories	 for	 women.78	 Her	 finding	 of	 the	 centrality	 of	
community-based	 law	 is	 very	 relevant	 to	my	 study.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	
everyday	practice	of	marriage	in	the	community	I	am	studying,	I	found	
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should	 be	 looked	 at	 as	 one	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 state	 is	
implementing	its	ideas	of	legal	validity.	Undeniably,	the	government’s	
intervention	in	marriage	through	this	push	towards	bureaucratization	
has	 been	 regarded	 by	 women’s	 groups	 as	 a	 significant	 move	 to	
emancipate	 family	 law.79	 Nisa	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 issue	 of	 legal	








actors	 have	 empowered	 state-funded	 ‘administrative’	 bodies	 in	
diverse	ways	to	guide	and	 influence	Islamic	discourses	and	regulate	
matters	 of	 religion	 and	morality	 in	 the	public	 sphere	 in	 accordance	
with	 their	 political	 interests.”82	 Researching	 religious	 education	 in	
Egypt,	 anthropologist	Gregory	Starrett	argues	 that,	when	 it	 imposes	
bureaucratic	categories,	the	state	not	only	objectifies	religion,	it	also	
functionalizes	 religion.	This	 functionalization	refers	 to	 “processes	of	
translation	 in	which	 intellectual	objects	 from	one	discourse	come	to	
serve	 the	 strategic	 or	 utilitarian	 ends	 of	 another	 discourse”.83	 Of	
course,	this	begs	the	question	of	what	purposes	and	whose	interests	
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the	 bureaucratization	 of	 Islam	 serves.84	 For	 their	 part,	 Sezgin	 and	
Künkler	argue	that	governments	are	interested	in	managing	religion	






We	know	 from	Stijn	van	Huis’s	 study	 that,	 in	West	 Java	 in	 the	mid-
nineteenth	 century,	 a	 symbiotic	 relationship	 between	 the	 colonial	
state,	the	indigenous	priyayi	(social	elite)	rulers	and	the	landowning	
class	of	kyai	(traditional	religious	leaders)	came	to	an	end	when	the	





their	 status	 as	 the	 social	 elite.	 They	 commenced	 a	 social	 process	 of	
making	a	distinct	community	and	of	producing	a	certain	type	of	Islamic	
understanding.	 After	 Indonesia	 declared	 its	 Independence,	 the	
Ministry	of	Religious	Affairs	tried	to	incorporate	kyai	into	its	ranks,	but	




Examining	 this	 relationship	 has	 led	Nurlaelawati	 to	 a	 different	
conclusion,	namely:	that	state	penghulu	and	their	KUA	(Kantor	Urusan	
Agama,	 Office	 of	 Religious	 Affairs),	 an	 office	 on	 a	 sub-district	 level	
which	deals	with	Muslim	marriage	registration,	have	been	an	agency	
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courts.	 The	 KUA	 officials,	 she	 argues,	 consider	 themselves	 the	
guardians	of	Sharia	and	of	the	interpretations	of	ulama	rather	than	as	
state	officials.	The	upshot	has	been	 that	 the	KUA’s	views	on	marital	
problems	are	rooted	 in	 local	 society.87	However,	my	study	seems	 to	
confirm	van	Huis’s	 remarks.	Rather	 than	 taking	 sides	with	 the	kyai,	
penghulu	stands	firmly	on	the	side	of	the	state	and	does	not	act	as	the	
bridge	between	ulama	and	 the	 Islamic	 court.	As	 a	 result,	 some	kyai	
have	 still	 preserved	 their	 own	 perception	 of	 religion	 and	 have	
challenged	the	state	law	when	they	consider	that	it	has	interfered	too	
much	in	people’s	religious	life	(Chapter	4	and	Chapter	5).	












people’s	 religious	 orientation	 towards	 the	 state	 law.	 In	 terms	 of	
marriage	administration,	modin,	who	were	appointed	by	village	head	
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introduced	 by	 the	 KHI	 which	 allows	 people	 to	 legalize	 their	
unregistered	 marriages	 retroactively.	 Upon	 the	 approval	 of	 isbat	
nikah,	unregistered	marriages	turn	into	legal	marriages	(nikah	resmi).	
The	relationship	between	legal	norms	and	agencies	in	a	Muslim	






This	study	deals	 first	and	 foremost	with	 the	practical	dimensions	of	
Muslim	marriage	and	their	bureaucratization.	Before	launching	into	it,	
it	 is	 important	 to	 explain	 how	 I	 have	 approached	 Islamic	 law	 on	
Modernising Muslim Marriage in Indonesia: 













state recognition, legal validity 
The Marriage Law, the Kompilasi Hukum 




















norms	 constructed	 and	 transformed	 over	 historical	 time	 by	 the	
activities	 of	 individuals	 as	 well	 as	 by	 larger	 social	 processes.	 This	
approach	follows	Dupret’s	assertion	that	Islamic	law	is	found	not	only	
in	 the	 diverse	 legacy	 of	Sharia	 and	 fiqh	 treatises,	 but	 also	 in	 what	
people,	 Muslims	 in	 particular,	 think	 about	 Islamic	 law.	 The	 task	 of	
researchers,	in	his	view,	is	not	to	make	a	claim	about	whether	or	not	
people’s	conception	and	practices	are	in	compliance	with	the	pristine	
religious	 teachings,	 but	 describing	 in	what	ways	 they	 conceptualize	
Islamic	law.89	






Here,	 I	 use	 ‘everyday’	 to	 give	 an	 emphasis	 to	 what	 Schielke	 and	
Debevec	have	called	“the	openness	of	practices	and	experiences”,90	so	
as	to	attain	a	better	understanding	of	the	daily	practice	of	Sharia.	The	
term	 ‘everyday’	 guides	 our	 attention	 towards	 the	 ways	 in	 which	
Muslims	produce	their	own	modernity91	 in	everyday	 life.92	Applying	
this	framework,	the	practice	of	Muslim	marriage,	the	core	object	of	this	
study,	 is	 placed	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 social,	 cultural,	 legal	 and	
economic	practices.93	
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the	more	detailed	enquiries	 into	 the	process	of	 law-making	and	 the	
implementation	of	laws	on	marriage	and	charts	the	bureaucratization	
of	marriage.	 Secondly,	 the	 term	 ‘practise’	 refers	 to	 how	marriage	 is	
perceived	and	performed	in	the	everyday	life	of	a	Muslim	community	
in	Pasuruan.	 It	 tries	 to	 capture	 the	 role	 and	 influence	of	 Sharia	 and	
those	of	 local	norms	in	the	shaping	of	marriage	practice.	To	achieve	
this	 research	 goal,	 I	 have	 focused	 on	 the	 roles	 played	 by	 religious	
leaders	 (kyai)	 and	 pengarep	 (a	 voluntary	 broker	who	mediates	 the	
communication	 between	 the	 families	 of	 the	 bride	 and	 the	 groom).	
Thirdly,	the	term	‘negotiate’	refers	to	the	interaction	between	the	state	
and	 society	 within	 the	 parameters	 of	 the	 state	 norms.	 This	 thesis	
investigates	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	penghulu	who	 are	 the	 key	 official	
actor	 in	marriage	 registration,	 the	 position	 of	modin	 and	 how	 local	
people	 deal	with	 them.	 ‘Negotiate’	 also	 refers	 to	 the	ways	 in	which	
villagers	seek	legalization	of	their	unregistered	marriages,	either	in	the	
KUA		or	in	the	Islamic	court.		
This	 thesis	 is	 conceptually	 indebted	 to	Bowen’s	 idea	of	 “public	




the	 national	 scene	 and	 horizontally	 across	 between	 different	
normative	 systems.	 This	 idea	 leads	 me	 to	 ask	 a	 more	 theoretical	
question:	What	can	we	learn	from	the	practices	and	the	negotiations	in	
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One	 specific	 feature	 of	 this	 community	 is	 the	 importance	 of	
maintaining	patron-client	ties.	The	patron	is	a	kyai	and	his	clients	are	
the	people	 in	 general.	Kyai	are	 traditional	 religious	 leaders	who	are	
paid	 the	 greatest	 respect	 by	 the	 community	 for	 their	 religious	
learnedness.	Most	of	them	lead	pesantren	(traditional	Islamic	schools).	
Kyai	 are	not	 only	 invested	with	 religious	 authority	 but,	 referring	 to	
Geertz,	also	play	the	roles	of	cultural	broker.	The	existence	of	both	kyai	
and	 pesantren	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	 continuation	 of	 adherence	 to	
traditional	Islam,	which	is	also	supported	by	the	presence	of	madrasah	
diniyah	 (informal	 Islamic	schools).	Children	attend	 this	madrasah	 in	
the	afternoon	after	they	have	finished	formal	school	in	the	morning.	In	
this	madrasah,	they	are	taught	the	Quran	and	other	Islamic	subjects.	In	
Pasuruan,	 the	Regent	 has	 issued	 a	 decree	which	 obliges	 children	 at	
primary	 and	 secondary	 schools,	 who	 do	 not	 board	 in	pesantren,	 to	











life-history	 to	 describe	 the	 informant’s	 experiences	 in	 concluding	
marriages.		
I	 conducted	 my	 fieldworks	 in	 separate	 periods,	 namely	 seven	
months	 in	 2017	 (January	 to	 July),	 four	 months	 in	 2017	 and	 2018	
(November	 to	 February)	 and	 two	 months	 in	 2019	 (January	 to	
February).	In	order	to	understand	people’s	everyday	practices,	I	lived	
in	 a	 village,	 interacted	 with	 local	 people	 and	 participated	 in	 social	





a. Village	 level	 which	 includes	 women	 (unmarried,	 married,	
widows	 and	 divorcées),	 children,	 parents,	 men,	 religious	
leaders	 (kyai),	 village	 religious	 officials	 (modin),	 village	
officials	 (lurah	 and	 carik),	 heads	 of	 neighbourhoods	 and	
marriage	brokers	(pengarep);		
b. Sub-district	 level,	which	 includes	 the	Kantor	Urusan	Agama	
(KUA,	 the	Office	 of	 Religious	Affairs),	 the	 state	 body	whose	
function	 is	 to	 register	 and	 legalize	 Muslim	 marriage.	 I	
conducted	 a	 host	 of	 interviews	 with	 penghulu	 (marriage	
functionaries)	 and	 the	officials	of	 the	KUA	of	 Sumbersari	 in	
Pasuruan	 district,	 collected	 data	 on	 marriage	 practices	 in	
2015	 and	 2016	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 official	 records,	 made	
categorizations,	 highlighted	 cases	 remarkable	 in	 an	
administrative	sense	and	traced	their	context	in	society.	One	
central	 question	 addressed	 is	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 KUA	
plays	a	role	in	interpreting	and	performing	the	state	rules	on	
marriage	 and	 negotiates	 with	 the	 variety	 of	 religious	 and	
cultural	norms	in	society.	On	order	to	make	a	comparison	with	
Sumbersari,	 I	 also	 studied	 other	 KUAs	 in	 different	 districts	
such	as	in	Jember,	Surabaya	and	Yogyakarta.	
c. District	 and	 upper	 level,	 includes	 state	 institutions	 (the	
Central	and	District	Department	of	Religious	Affairs	and	the	
Office	 of	 Civil	 Registration),	 the	 judiciary	 (the	 local	 Islamic	
court)	and	religious	institutions.	My	questions	dealt	with	their	
decisions,	 fatwas	 and	 guidance	 pertaining	 to	 Muslim	
marriage.	
Pasuruan	regency	was	not	really	new	to	me,	but	Sumbersari	was.	
My	 fieldwork	 began	 through	 my	 acquaintance	 with	 a	 lady,	 Umi,	 a	
graduate	of	an	Islamic	university	in	Surabaya	whose	bachelor’s	thesis	


























It	 is	worth	noting	 that	 I	 used	different	 identities	depending	on	
what	 kind	 of	 institution	 I	 was	 addressing.	 When	 visiting	 kyai	 or	
pesantren,	I	had	to	use	a	religious	identity.	My	status	as	a	member	of	
the	 NU	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 gave	me	 advantages.	 At	 least,	 I	 was	 not	
treated	as	a	 ‘different’	person	because	the	majority	of	 them	are	also	
affiliated	with	 the	NU.	When	doing	 fieldwork	 in	 the	 Islamic	 court,	 I	
used	a	more	formal	approach,	as	was	expected	of	me.	My	position	as	a	
lecturer	 in	the	Sharia	 faculty	of	an	Islamic	university	 in	Central	 Java	
was	an	advantage	to	me.	In	general,	the	relationship	between	Sharia	















ordinary	 people	 as	 it	 was	 possible	 that	 introducing	 this	 note	 of	
formality	might	make	them	feel	uncomfortable	and	interrogated.	Even	
making	notes	 could	destroy	 the	 interview	process.	 In	 this	 situation,	




















religious	 validity	 and	 the	 legal	 validity	 of	 an	 Islamic	marriage.	 This	
chapter	argues	that	the	state-led	modernization	of	Islamic	marriage	in	
Indonesia	 has	 moved	 away	 from	 the	 public	 debate	 about	 the	 dual	
validity	of	a	marriage,	religiously	and	legally,	to	a	public	debate	about	
legal	identity	and	citizens’	rights.	The	state	has	not	necessarily	made	






marriage	 or	 birth	 certificates	 which	 protect	 citizens’	 rights.	 In	 this	
process,	 the	 question	 of	 the	 legal	 validity	 of	 a	 marriage	 becomes	
irrelevant.	 However,	 an	 unprecedented	 consequence	 of	 this	
development	is	conflict	between	state	legal	norms.		
Chapter	 2	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 modernization	 of	 the	
bureaucracy	in	charge	of	organizing	Muslim	marriage,	a	task	carried	
out	 by	 the	 KUA	 under	 the	 supervision	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Religious	
Affairs	(MoRA).	In	this	chapter,	I	 look	at	the	influence	of	the	shifting	
public	 discourse	 on	 the	 regulation	 of	 Islamic	 marriage	 to	 the	
bureaucracy	 supervising	 Muslim	 marriage.	 It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	
there	have	been	series	of	efforts	made	by	the	MoRA	to	reform	the	KUA	
so	 as	 to	 introduce	more	 efficient	management.	 In	 the	 spirit	 of	 good	
governance,	 the	 government	 has	 eradicated	 the	 informal	
administration	fee	and	standardized	the	disparities	in	administration	
fees.	 Marriage	 registration	 has	 been	 integrated	 into	 the	 civil	
administration	 system.	 The	 MoRA	 sanctions	 penghulu,	 a	






tries	 to	understand	how	 it	deals	with	people’s	orientations	 towards	
Islamic	marriage.	In	this	part,	I	seek	to	present	‘plentiful	pictures’	of	




the	 socio-economic	 history,	 the	 religious	 and	 cultural	 life	 and	 the	
development	of	Islam	in	Pasuruan.	It	first	sets	the	scene	by	delineating	
the	 historical	 development	 of	 Pasuruan,	 including	 the	 history	 of	











This	 chapter	 suggests	 that	marriage	 remains	 a	 religious	 concern,	 a	
sacred	 ceremony	 which	 sets	 a	 higher	 value	 on	 the	 involvement	 of	
religious	authorities	than	those	of	the	state.	Despite	the	homogenous	
tradition	of	Islam	in	the	area,	this	chapter	has	discovered	an	internal	
heterogeneity	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 agency	 of	 the	 actors	
involved,	 cultural	 norms	and	 the	 social	 structure	 in	 the	 selection	of	
whom	to	marry.		
However,	 in	all	 classes,	 ideas	about	an	 ideal	 spouse	are	closely	
related	 to	 the	 discourses	 circulating	 within	 traditional	 Islam,	 as	
pesantren	 (traditional	 Islamic	 school)	 are	 the	 centres	 of	 knowledge	
production.	 We	 see	 that,	 while	 pesantren	 have	 been	 an	 important	
institution	in	maintaining	the	fiqh-based	orientation	of	marriage,	being	
a	santri	(student	of	pesantren)	is	a	guarantee	signifying	the	purity	of	a	
girl	 and	 that	 she	 is	 of	 unimpeachable	morals.	Marriage	 practices	 in	
Sumbersari	show	that	 the	accomplishment	of	 the	 ideals	of	marriage	
depends	 heavily	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	 pelantar	 (traditional	 marriage	
broker).	Entrusted	with	a	major	role	in	mediating	the	communications	
between	the	two	families	concerned,	pelantar	are	very	 important	 to	
families	 of	 the	 religiously	 respected	 class	 as	well	 as	 families	whose	
girls	have	been	educated	in	pesantren.	Another	key	actor	in	a	marriage	












as	 a	 body	 capable	 of	 maintaining	 the	 proper	 balance	 between	
marriage,	 religious	 tradition	 and	 modern	 administration.	 In	 the	
meantime,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 tendency	 for	 the	 state	 to	 override	 and	
terminate	 the	 roles	 of	 modin	 as	 informal	 intermediaries	 on	 the	







penghulu	 play	 a	 role.	The	modin	 are	 central	 to	mediating	 these	 two	
processes.	On	the	other	hand,	penghulu	are	still	struggling	to	extend	
their	influence.	A	penghulu	does	not	pretend	to	perceive	himself	as	an	
ulama,	 although	 his	 identity	 as	 a	 religious	 authority	 remains	
important.	 In	 order	 to	 maintain	 his	 legitimacy,	 he	 is	 consistent	 in	
advocating	the	state	recognition	of	a	marriage	which	contributes	to	the	
protection	of	citizens’	rights.		
Chapter	6	deals	with	unregistered	marriage	and	 the	 search	 for	
state	 recognition.	 This	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 cases	 of	 participants	 in	








administrative	 transgressions	 and	 judicial	 discretion.	 This	 chapter	
argues	 that	 people	 are	 not	 really	 concerned	 about	 the	 legality	 of	
marriage.	They	request	legalization	in	order	to	define	the	legal	status	
of	their	marital	relationship	because	there	is	a	need	for	them	to	do	so.	


















































debate	 in	 Indonesia.	 This	 chapter	 addresses	 a	 number	 of	 questions	
arising	from	this	issue	to	do	with	actors,	discourse	and	process.	They	
are	 the	 following:	 Who	 have	 been	 involved	 in	 the	 debates?	 What	
language	 has	 been	 used?	How	 does	 the	 state	 deal	 with	 the	 different	
interpretations	 produced	 by	 Muslim	 leaders?	 In	 essence,	 these	
questions	 replicate	 the	 insistence	 common	 among	 Muslims	 in	
Indonesia	that,	despite	the	codification	of	Islamic	marriage	law	by	the	
state,	marriage	should	still	 include	a	religious	component.	This	is	an	
important	 requirement	 for	 the	 majority	 of	 Muslims	 for	 whom	 the	
Sharia	is	the	frame	of	reference	they	believe	should	be	their	guide	to	
morality	and	human	relations.	Their	concern	is	not	unfounded	since	
the	 legal	 transformation	 from	uncodified	 Sharia	 law	 to	 the	 codified	
form	 of	 Islamic	 law	 has	 occasionally	 unquestionably	 expunged	
religious	norms.1	 The	 elephant	 in	 the	 room	 is	 that	Muslim	majority	
countries	cannot	escape	the	need	to	systematize	uncodified	Sharia	into	
 
















and	 their	 embodiment	 in	a	 legal	 code	 continue	 to	 feature	 largely	 in	
negotiations	 between	 the	 state	 and	 religious	 authorities	 about	
different	 legal	 norms.	 Although	 this	 is	 a	 persistent	 problem	 in	
numerous	 Muslim	 majority	 countries,	 the	 Indonesian	 experience	
offers	some	interesting	unique	features.	I	have	found	that,	while	the	
process	of	legal	reform	has	involved	the	secularization	of	religion	in	
the	 state	 law,	 the	post-New	Order	 era	has	witnessed	 the	 increasing	
application	 of	 religion-inspired	 ideas	 in	 national	 and	 sub-national	
laws.	Unquestionably,	the	government	has	faced	a	steep	learning	curve	
in	 its	 pursuit	 of	 legal	 reform	 through	 legislation	 because	 of	 the	
resistance	from	certain	Islamic	authorities.	In	this	predicament,	in	line	
with	the	outgrowth	of	the	human	rights	movement	and	bureaucratic	
reform,	 the	 judiciary	 and	 government	 bureaucracy	 have	 been	
important	 agents	 in	 facilitating	 reform	 without	 causing	 a	
confrontation	with	religious	norms.		
This	chapter	is	divided	into	five	stages.	The	first	section	provides	
a	 theoretical	 framework	 by	 presenting	 a	 general	 overview	 of	 the	
transformation	of	Sharia	into	state	Islamic	law	throughout	the	Muslim	
world.	 The	 second	 section	 sketches	 how	 the	 Indonesian	 state	 deals	
with	 Muslim	 marriage.	 The	 third	 section	 focuses	 on	 the	 post-New	
Order	development.	In	this	section,	I	problematize	the	use	of	Islam	as	
identity	politics	and	how	 this	 choice	has	 influenced	 legal	 reform	on	
matrimonial	matters	on	national	and	sub-national	 levels.	The	fourth	
section	deals	with	the	contestation	of	maṣlaḥa	 in	 legal	discourses	 in	
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the	 form	 of	 fatwas	 on	 marriage	 registration	 produced	 by	 Islamic	
organizations	 in	 Indonesia.	 The	 fifth	 section	 analyses	 the	 reforms	





the	 establishment	 of	 nation-states	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	
European	 legal	 framework,	 the	political	 rulers	of	numerous	Muslim	
countries,	 for	 instance,	 in	 Egypt	 and	 the	 Ottoman	 heartlands	
intervened	in	the	application	of	Sharia.2	This	political	action	resulted	
in	the	transposition	of	Sharia	norms,	predominantly	those	relevant	to	
personal	 status,	 into	 a	 state-legal	 framework.3	 At	 first	 glance,	 the	
formation	of	a	state	Islamic	personal	status	looks	simple,4	because	it	
elicited	 great	 respect	 from	 Muslim	 groups.	 For	 the	 majority	 of	
Muslims,	 the	 legal	 reform	 of	 Islamic	 personal	 status	 meant	 the	
preservation	of	Sharia	law.5	In	fact,	the	legal	reform	generated	a	high	
degree	of	 complexities.	Throughout	 the	history	of	 Islam,	 Sharia	 law	
had	never	been	codified.	Fiqh	has	never	been	a	 law	code	ratified	by	
legislative	authority.	Therefore,	in	order	to	achieve	unified	rules	and	
legal	 uniformity,	 governments	 have	 to	 transform	 Sharia	 from	
scattered,	 locally	 administered	 sets	 of	 substantive	 laws	 into	 state-
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Indonesian	 taklik	 talak	 (conditional	 divorce)	 formula,	 8	 signed	 by	 a	
husband	at	 the	 time	of	marriage	and	enclosed	on	 the	 last	page	of	 a	
marriage	certificate,	is	one	outcome	in	the	long	historical	development	
of	Islamic	law,	in	progress	since	the	end	of	the	sixteenth	century.9	In	
the	 pre-colonial	 period,	 under	 the	 Islamic	 kingdom	 of	 Mataram	 in	
seventeenth-century	Java,	this	legal	procedure	was	found	in	a	slightly	
different	 context.	 The	 earliest	 form	 of	 this	 conditional	 divorce	
agreement	 was	 called	 janji	 dalem	 or	 janjining	 ratu	 (the	 royal	




aforesaid.	 The	 groom	 only	 needed	 to	 answer	 ‘yes’	 or	 ‘no’	 and	 only	
rarely	did	the	groom	refuse.11		
Since	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century,	Sharia	pronouncements	
related	 to	 marriage	 and	 divorce	 were	 officially	 the	 domain	 of	 the	
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or	 amil.	 The	 substantive	 laws	applied	 in	 court	were	derived	 from	a	
number	of	prominent	Shafi‘i	 fiqh	 treatises.	This	penghulu	 institution	
exemplifies	 the	 close	 relationship	 between	 Islam	 and	 Javanese	
custom.12	In	view	of	the	long-established	political	and	religious	power	
of	 the	 penghulu,	 in	 1835	 the	 penghulu’s	 jurisdiction	 in	 family	 law	
reinforced	by	 a	 legal	mechanism	 to	 enforce	 the	penghulu’s	 decision	
was	formally	recognized.13	Later,	in	the	1880s,	the	office	was	absorbed	
into	 the	 Dutch	 colonial	 administration,	 irrespective	 of	 unexpected	
stereotypes	and	dilemmas.14		
It	was	decided	that	the	principle	of	‘to	each	his	own	law’15	should	
prevail.	 This	 means	 Muslims	 were	 subject	 exclusively	 to	 Islamic	
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The	 demands	 for	 the	 institutionalization	 of	 Islam	 assumed	
increasingly	important	proportions	in	the	late	colonial	administration.	
In	 1937,	 the	 colonial	 state	 acquiesced	 in	 such	 demands	 by	 the	
establishment	 of	 the	 Penghulu	 Court	 with	 the	 jurisdiction	 to	 settle	
marital	disputes,	but	its	competence	still	did	not	extend	to	inheritance	
and	endowment.	Some	years	earlier,	with	the	publication	of	Staatsblad	





of	 Staatsblad	 1895	 No.	 198.	 This	 ordinance	 stipulated	 the	 general	
guidelines	 of	marriage	 registration	 and	 emphasized	 that	 only	 those	












which	 would	 take	 care	 of	 the	 interests	 of	 all	 religious	 groups,	 the	
Ministry	was	largely	staffed	by	Muslims.20	It	offered	wide	employment	
opportunities	 to	members	 of	Muslim	 organizations,	 the	majority	 of	
 
17 Stijn van Huis and Theresia Dyah Wirastri, ‘Muslim Marriage Registration in Indonesia: 
Revised Marriage Registration Laws Cannot Overcome Compliance Flaws’, Australian Journal 
of Asian Law, vol. 13, no. 1 (2012), p. 7. 
18 Deliar Noer, Administrasi Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1983). 
19 Daniel S. Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study in the Political Bases of Legal Institutions 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 47. 
20 Nieuwenhuijze, ‘The Legacy of Islam in Indonesia’, p. 212. 






to	 the	 Islamic	 tradition	 affiliated	 with	 the	 Shafi‘ite	 madhhab,	 the	
Ministry	 has	 initiated	 small	 reforms	 acceptable	 to	 the	 majority	 of	
Muslim	organizations.23	The	best	example	of	this	could	be	seen	when	
the	administration	of	Muslim	private	affairs,	particularly	in	Java	and	
Madura,	 was	 accorded	 government	 priority	 and	 placed	 under	 the	
administrative	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 Ministry.	 The	 government	 even	
applied	 a	 legal	 sanction	 to	 people	 who	 performed	 a	 marriage	
ceremony	without	a	state	official	in	attendance.24	
As	a	consequence,	 in	recognition	of	 the	plurality	of	 legal	orders,	
Law	 22/1946	 on	 the	 registration	 of	 marriage,	 divorce,	 and	
reconciliation	 (nikah,	 talak,	 dan	 rujuk)	 was	 passed	 as	 the	 first	
government	 regulation	 after	 Indonesian	 Independence.	 The	
application	of	the	law	was	restrictedly	to	Muslims	in	Java	and	Madura,	
but	 was	 later	 supplemented	 by	 Law	 32/1954	 extending	 it	 to	 all	
Muslims	throughout	the	nation.	The	law	was	an	important	step	for	the	
Ministry	to	take,	as	under	its	aegis	it	unified	the	registration	of	Muslim	
marriage	 and	 divorce.	 By	 backing	 this	 law	 and	 insisting	 on	 official	





administrations	 (regentschappen)	 were	 no	 longer	 responsible	 for	
 
21 Cammack, Bedner, and van Huis, ‘Democracy, Human Rights, and Islamic Family Law in 
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24 See Article 3 of Law No. 22/1946 on the registration of Muslim marriage, divorce and 
reconciliation. 
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An	 intense	 debate	 about	 the	 unification	 or	 the	 diversity	 of	
substantive	marriage	laws	continued	to	rage	in	the	early	years	of	the	
New	 Order	 administration.	 One	 group	 demanded	 one	 law	 for	 all	
different	 religious	 groups,	while	 its	 opponents	 insisted	 on	 different	
laws	which	would	be	consistent	with	the	requirements	of	the	different	




statute	books.28	 It	was	only	with	 the	 full	 support	 from	the	Soeharto	
government	was	 it	 possible	 to	 introduce	 a	 bill	 before	 the	House	 of	
Representative	on	31	July	1973.	Among	the	fundamental	issues	which	
the	 government	 sought	 to	 control	 through	 unified	 legislation	 on	
marriage	was	population	growth.29	Cammack	argues	that	the	draft	of	
the	marriage	law	gave	the	Islamic	courts	an	advantage.	Firstly,	these	
courts	 were	 now	 given	 firmer	 control	 over	 the	 administration	 of	
marriage	 and	 divorce.	 Secondly,	 the	 draft	 included	 provisions	
regulating	substantive	areas	not	previously	stipulated	as	being	under	
 
26 van Huis and Wirastri, ‘Muslim Marriage Registration in Indonesia: Revised Marriage 
Registration Laws Cannot Overcome Compliance Flaws’, p. 9. 
27 Soewondo, ‘The Indonesian Marriage Law and its Implementing Regulation’. 
28 Katz and Katz, ‘The New Indonesian Marriage Law: A Mirror of Indonesia’s Political, Cultural, 
and Legal Systems’. 
29 Adriaan W. Bedner and Stijn van Huis, ‘Plurality of marriage law and marriage registration 
for Muslims in Indonesia: a plea for pragmatism’, Utrecht Law Review, vol. 6, no. 2 (2010), p. 
178. 
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the	 jurisdiction	 of	 Islamic	 courts.	 These	 areas	 include	 marital	
property,	spousal	support	and	child	custody.30	
June	Katz	and	Ronald	Katz	have	stated	that	it	was	not	clear	who	
had	drafted	 the	bill	before	 the	President	endorsed	 it.31	However,	 as	
O’Shaughnessy	has	argued,	although	President	Soeharto	certainly	did	
instruct	the	Ministry	of	Justice	to	draft	the	bill	on	the	basis	of	the	state	
philosophy	 (Pancasila),32	 from	 the	 outset	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Religious	
Affairs	was	excluded	from	participation	 in	preparing	the	draft	bill.33	
Furthermore,	it	is	fair	to	say	that	unquestionably	Muslim	leaders	felt	
disappointed	 they	 had	 been	 sidelined	 from	 the	 process.	 This	 is	
probably	the	reason	that	some	of	the	Articles	proposed	in	the	Bill	were	
perceived	 to	 be	 in	 contravention	 of	 Islamic	 doctrine,	 a	 clash	which	
elicited	 formidable	 opposition	 from	 Islamic	 parties	 and	 younger	
Muslims.34	 Their	 strongly-worded	 criticism	 made	 the	 government	
aware	that	it	would	have	to	make	some	delicate	compromises.35	The	
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Nobody	 would	 deny	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 government’s	 marriage	
legislation	has	 led	to	a	dramatic	shift	 in	perceptions	and	patterns	of	
marriage.40	 The	 Marriage	 Law	 defines	 a	 marriage	 contract	 as	 a	
religious	 ceremony,	 not	 a	 civil	 marriage.	 Article	 2	 decrees	 that	 a	
marriage	 can	 only	 be	 valid	 if	 it	 has	 been	 performed	 religiously.	
Conformity	 with	 religious	 prescription	 is,	 therefore,	 a	 must	 and	
unavoidable.	 However,	 in	 addition	 to	 religious	 solemnization,	
marriage	 also	 needs	 to	 be	 authorized	 by	 the	 state	 through	
registration.41	 Instead	 registration	 being	 integrated	 into	 the	 legal	
conditions	of	a	marriage,	it	is	a	legal	complement	to	it.	Non-compliance	
with	state	administration	renders	a	marriage	null	and	void	both	civilly	
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In	 other	 words,	 the	 Marriage	 Law	 conceptualizes	 marriage	 at	 the	
intersection	of	religious	precepts	and	state	administration.42	
Although	 an	 unregistered	 marriage	 is	 considered	 not	 legally	




In	 other	words,	 it	 is	 religious	 law	 that	 determines	 the	 validity	 of	 a	
marriage,	not	the	registration.	Bowen	regards	this	as	‘dual	validity’.43	
This	 ambiguity	 means	 that,	 as	 far	 as	 the	 marriage	 contract	 is	











direction	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 Islam	 and	 the	 state.	 It	 is	
noticeable	 that	 the	 earlier	 attempts	 to	 impose	 a	 secular,	 unified	
marriage	 law	 to	 be	 enforced	 in	 a	 general	 court	 failed.	 Therefore,	
instead	of	curtailing	Islamic	law	and	courts,	the	government	decided	
to	support	Muslims	in	their	desire	to	manage	their	own	family	affairs.46	
Nonetheless,	 from	 the	 mid-1980s,	 there	 was	 an	 apparently	 radical	
shift	 in	the	New	Order	government	policy	towards	Islam	on	various	
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the	 law	 is	 also	 perceived	 to	 have	 made	 significant	 progress	 in	 the	
application	of	Islamic	law.	
With	 the	 significant	 backing	 they	 were	 given	 by	 the	 central	
government,	the	confidence	of	Muslim	elites	to	submit	other	proposals	
for	legal	reform	increased.	The	Ministry	of	Religious	Affairs	applied	for	
the	 drafting	 of	 a	 family	 law	 code	which	would	 specifically	 regulate	










process	 of	 conversations	 and	 negotiations	 between	 the	
representatives	 of	 Islam	and	 the	 state.	 It	would	 seem	 that	 the	New	
Order	government	reasoned	taking	a	more	accommodating	approach	
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to	 reforming	marriage	 could	 be	 an	 instrument	 to	 reduce	 resistance	
from	 Islamic	 circles	 in	 the	 future.51	 Nurlaelawati	 remarked	 that	
Soeharto’s	 personal	 desire	 to	 secure	 political	 support	 from	Muslim	
circles	 featured	 among	 the	 most	 important	 arguments.52	 In	 all	 the	
stages	 of	 the	 drafting	 of	 the	 KHI,	 the	 interaction	 between	 the	
perspective	 of	 Indonesian	 ulama	 on	 Islamic	 jurisprudence	 and	 the	
political	will	of	the	state	was	obvious.	The	result	of	this	interaction	can	











the	heir’s	 rights	 to	 inherit	 grandparent’s	 property	 in	 the	 case	 of	 an	




state	and	adat	 law,	 the	KHI	has	 indubitably	defined	marriage	 in	 the	
light	of	classical	 fiqh	doctrine,	 that	 is,	as	a	solemn	agreement	which	
serves	 as	 a	 manifestation	 of	 obedience	 to	 God’s	 commands	 and	
thereby	qualifies	as	an	act	of	worship	(see	Article	2).		
The	 KHI	 makes	 a	 reference	 to	 and	 reinforces	 Article	 2	 of	 the	
Marriage	Law	which	 states	 that	 a	marriage	must	be	 registered	as	 a	
guarantee	of	social	and	legal	order	(Articles	5	and	6).	This	means	that	
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KHI	goes	a	 step	 further	offers	a	new	 form	of	unregistered	marriage	
(nikah	 sirri).	 As	 long	 as	 it	 has	 been	 concluded	 in	 conformity	 with	
Islamic	 doctrines,	 an	 unregistered	 marriage	 can	 be	 legalized	
retrospectively	 by	 the	 marriage	 registrar	 upon	 receipt	 of	 an	
authorization	 from	the	 Islamic	court.	Through	 isbat	nikah	(Article	7	
Point	 2),	 this	 procedure	 is	 a	 state	 compromise	 on	nikah	 sirri.	 Isbat	
nikah	 gives	 the	 couples	 in	 a	 nikah	 sirri,	 and	 their	 children,	 an	
opportunity	to	claim	important	identity	documents	which	will	allow	
them	access	to	state	programmes	and	formal	education.54		
Sumner	 and	 Lindsey	 have	 reported	 that	 more	 than	 13,000	
marriages	were	 filed	 for	 isbat	 nikah	 in	 Islamic	 courts	 in	 2009.55	 In	
2012,	this	number	rose	to	31,927	cases	(7.8%).	Of	course,	we	cannot	
make	a	judgement	about	whether	or	not	this	number	is	high,	because	
we	 need	 to	 compare	 it	 with	 the	 never	 proven	 exact	 figures	 of	
unregistered	marriages.	My	materials	from	a	regional	Islamic	court	in	
East	Java	show	that	the	number	of	isbat	nikah	case	is	extremely	low	(0-
6	 cases	 per	 year),	 whereas	 my	 observations	 in	 some	 villages	 in	
Pasuruan	Regency	found	a	quite	significant	number	of	marital	couples	
(around	20%)	who	are	not	in	possession	of	a	marriage	certificate.	For	
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Furthermore,	 legal	 historians	 have	 taught	 us	 that	 the	 rules	
governing	 familial	matters	 in	 Indonesia	 have	 existed	 since	 the	 pre-
colonial	period,	both	before	and	after	the	introduction	of	Islam.	Since	
the	 advent	 of	 Islam	 to	 the	 present	 day,	 the	penghulu	have	 been	 an	
important	actor	in	the	implementation	of	these	rules.	Obviously	aware	
of	 its	 value,	 the	 colonial	 government	 officially	 incorporated	 this	
penghulu	 system	 into	 its	 colonial	 administration	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	
nineteenth	century.	In	the	early	years	of	Independence,	the	new	state	









For	 Muslims	 in	 particular,	 the	 issue	 of	 marriage	 is	 centred	 on	 the	
nature	 of	 the	 marriage	 contract	 which,	 under	 the	 Marriage	 Law	 is	
recognized	as	a	religious	ceremony	but	not	a	civil	marriage.	Therefore,	
some	 believe	 that	 religious	 validation	 takes	 priority	 over	 state	
legitimation.	 Even	 after	 its	 enactment,	 there	 were	 still	 marriages	
concluded	 purely	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 religious	 laws	 and	 not	 registered	
civilly.	The	issuance	of	the	KHI	in	1991	cleared	up	this	discrepancy	by	
introducing	the	qualification	of	isbat	nikah.	It	is	a	judicial	mechanism	
which	 allows	 people	 to	 legalize	 their	 unregistered	 marriages	
retroactively.	
	
3. Sharia-based	 Regulations	 and	 the	 Steep	 Stairway	 to	
Legislation	
The	political	transition	in	1998,	the	Reformasi,	has	led	to	an	increasing	
challenge	 to	 the	 state	 from	conservative	 Islamic	groups	which	have	
 






the	 agreed	 principle	 of	 a	 “state	 based	 on	 the	 rule-of-law”	 (negara	
hukum,	rechtsstaat),57	the	question	of	whether	Indonesia	is	secular	or	
religious	recurs	at	regular	intervals.	In	the	present	climate,	Islam	has	
increasingly	 become	 the	 most	 important	 frame	 of	 reference	 which	





global	 Islamic	community)	which	has	 led	to	a	dramatic	alteration	 in	




Within	 the	 new	 framework	 of	 democratization	 and	 regional	
autonomy,	 the	 rise	 of	 Islam	 as	 a	 collective	 identity	 has	 become	
concretely	apparent	in	the	introduction	of	Islam-based	regulations	on	
the	sub-national	level.	These	regulations	are	claimed	to	encourage	the	
growth	 of	 a	 better	 Islamic	 society.	 Nonetheless,	 they	 do	 impose	
additional	conditions	on	those	who	wish	to	enter	into	a	marriage.	Since	
2001,	 numerous	 regions	 like	 Solok,	 Payakumbuh	 (West	 Sumatra),	
Bulukumba	(South	Sulawesi),	Kota	Banjarmasin	(South	Kalimantan),	
have	issued	a	local	regulation	on	the	obligation	to	read	the	Qur’an.	The	
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social	 and	 political	 negotiations.62	 Buehler	 argues	 that	 the	




legal	 reform	 has	 also	 fuelled	 debates	 and	 conversations	 between	
Muslim	groups.	A	legal	draft	called	the	Counter	Legal	Draft	Kompilasi	
Hukum	 Islam	 (CLD	 KHI),	 which	was	 proposed	 by	 a	working	 group	
consisting	of	young	Muslims	in	2004,	signalled	a	progressive	shift.	It	
was	meant	to	complement	the	government’s	efforts	to	raise	the	status	
of	KHI	 to	 that	 of	 a	 law.	The	draft	was	 controversial,	 drawing	harsh	
reactions	 from	 conservative	 Muslim	 groups.	 One	 of	 the	 many	
controversies	in	the	CLD	KHI	was	its	conception	of	Islamic	marriage	as	
a	purely	a	civil	contract,	not	a	religious	agreement.64	Subsequently,	it	
was	 proposed	 that	 marriage	 registration	 would	 be	 a	 compulsory	
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Marriage	 in	 Islamic	 Courts	 (Rancangan	 Undang-undang	 Hukum	







but	 put	 forward	 new	 rulings	 (Articles	 143-153)	 pertaining	 to	









the	 presence	 of	 a	 marriage	
registrar	(Article	143)	




or	 fourth	 wife	 without	 the	
official	 permission	 of	 a	
(Islamic)	court	(Article	145)	
	 Conducting	 an	 extramarital	
relationship	with	an	unmarried	




repudiation	 out	 of	 court	
(Article	146)	
	 Performing	 a	 marriage	 and	




A	 marriage	 registrar	 who	
infringes	 on	 his	 obligations	
(Article	148)	









Some	 argued	 the	 criminalization	 approach	was	 taking	 the	 easy	
way	out	(langkah	malas)	by	the	legal	draftsman.	It	was	a	repetition	of	
the	 content	 of	 previous	marriage	 laws.	 The	 1946	 Law	 on	Marriage	
introduced	 the	 concept	 of	 financial	 penalties	 for	women	who	 enter	
into	an	 illegal	marriage	and	 imprisonment	 for	 those	marry	them	off	
illegally.	Furthermore,	Government	Regulation	No.	9/1975	stipulates	
that	 failure	 to	 register	 a	marriage	 is	 punishable	 by	 a	 Rp7,500	 fine.	
Likewise,	 Law	 23/2006	 on	 Civil	 Administration	 introduced	 a	 civil	
penalty,	a	maximum	of	Rp	1,000,000,	for	those	who	fail	to	report	their	








interpreted	as	a	 real	 threat	 to	attempts	 to	 reform	 family	 law	which	
have	 displayed	 a	 tendency	 to	 secularize	 legislation.	 Attempts	 to	
introduce	such	legal	reform	were	made	in	2010.	However,	there	were	
some	 major	 stumbling-blocks	 which	 stood	 in	 the	 way	 of	 the	
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the	 common	 good	 (maṣlaḥa),67	 the	 result	 of	 ijtihād	 is	 not	 always	
supportive	of,	 indeed	can	even	be	 in	opposition	 to,	 the	state	way	of	
thinking.	 By	 exerting	 their	 influence	 on	 Islamic	 legal	 matters,	
particular	 Muslim	 groups	 wish	 to	 make	 their	 position	 in	 the	
relationship	between	Islam	and	state	authority	explicit.		
Analysing	the	proposed	bill,	this	section	investigates	three	fatwas	
(non-binding	 Islamic	 legal	 opinions)	 on	marriage	 registration	 in	 an	
attempt	to	understand	the	diverse	opinions	among	Islamic	authorities.	
These	fatwas	were	issued	by	major	Islamic	organizations,	namely	the	




Each	 of	 them	 has	 a	 special	 body	 of	 iftā’	 (producing	 fatwas),	









the	 Pesantren	 of	 Gontor,	 East	 Java	 in	 May	 2006,	 that	 the	 issue	 of	
unregistered	 marriage	 was	 discussed.	 Two	 years	 later,	 the	 legal	
conclusion	was	 publicly	 announced	with	 the	 issuance	 of	Fatwa	 No.	
10/2008.	In	order	to	avoid	ambiguities,	the	MUI	was	very	careful	 in	
selecting	 its	 term	 by	which	 to	 designate	 an	 unregistered	marriage.	
Despite	the	familiarity	of	the	term	nikah	sirri,	the	fatwa	introduced	the	
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that,	 in	 everyday	 practice,	 nikah	 sirri	 is	 sometimes	 interpreted	 in	
irregular	 terms.	 Instead	 of	 indicating	 a	 marriage	 which	 is	 just	 not	
registered,	 nikah	 sirri	 can	mean	 a	 marriage	 which	 has	 deliberately	
been	concluded	in	secret,	without	the	presence	of	witnesses	(shahīd).	





Although	 the	 fatwa	did	confirm	the	 legal	norm	stipulated	 in	 the	
state	law,	it	embraced	‘dual	validity’	in	a	different	sense.	It	states	that	
an	 unofficial	 marriage	 is	 (religiously)	 valid	 (sah),	 in	 regard	 to	 its	
compliance	with	the	conditions	(syarat,	rukun)	laid	down	in	Islam,	but	
shall	fall	into	the	category	of	haram	(unlawful)	if	it	causes	mudharat	
(harm).	 The	 fatwa	 interpreted	 harm	 as	 matters	 related	 to	 the	
husband’s	obligation	to	fulfil	the	rights	of	wives	and	children.	Despite	
this	 stipulation,	 the	 MUI	 did	 not	 openly	 declare	 any	 unofficial	
marriages	either	harmful	or	immoral.	Discussing	the	status	of	haram,	
Ma’ruf	Amin,	the	General	Chairman	of	the	MUI	at	the	time,	indicated	
that,	 if	 a	 husband	 neglects	 his	 responsibilities,	 he	 will	 (only)	 be	
regarded	as	sinful.	In	its	legal	reasoning,	the	fatwa	adopted	the	method	
of	 sadd	 al-dharī‘a	 (blocking	 the	 means	 to	 unexpected	 evil).	
Consequently	 it	 infers	 that	 marriage	 registration	 is	 strongly	
recommended	 so	 as	 to	 protect	Muslims	 from	 harm.	 The	 fatwa	 also	
refers	 to	 a	 statement	 by	 the	 nineteenth-century	 Javanese	 ulama,	
Nawawi	 al-Bantani,	 saying	 that,	 “if	 a	 ruler	 issues	 an	 obligatory	












The	 second	 fatwa	 was	 handed	 down	 by	 the	 Majelis	 Tarjih	 of	 the	
Muhammadiyah,	well	known	as	a	modernist	movement	which,	under	
the	banner	of	reform	(tajdīd)	and	purification,	approaches	the	basic	
sources	of	 Islam	by	means	of	 independent	 rational	 investigation.	 In	
addition	to	the	principle	of	“the	return	to	the	Qur’an	and	Sunnah	of	the	
Prophet”	 as	 advocated	by	 the	Egyptian	 scholar	Muhammad	 ‘Abduh,	
the	use	of	reasoning	is	encouraged.	In	the	context	of	Sharia	law,	this	
orientation	 is	 epitomized	by	 the	 approach	 called	 tarjīḥ,	which	 is	 an	
examination	 of	 the	 opinions	 of	 various	 Muslim	 jurists	 in	 order	 to	
determine	which	is	most	apposite	to	the	original	Sharia	source.69	Like	
the	MUI,	 in	 2007	 the	Majelis	 Tarjih	of	 the	Muhammadiyah	 issued	 a	
fatwa	on	nikah	sirri	which	reinforced	the	state’s	legal	norm	on	official	
marriage.	 Interestingly,	 this	 fatwa	 did	 not	 contain	 a	 clear-cut	
statement	on	the	legal	status	of	nikah	sirri.	Instead,	it	states	that	the	
function	of	marriage	registration	is	a	preventive	measure	to	eliminate	
possible	 deviations	 from	 the	 required	 conditions	 in	 a	 marriage	
contract	and	to	avoid	the	forgery	of	the	identity	and	documents	of	the	
bride.	Marriage	registration	is	pronounced	compulsory,	on	the	basis	of	







note	 that	 the	 NU	 is	 an	 Islamic	 organization	 which	 promotes	 a	
traditionalist	 view	 of	 Islam.	 Traditional	 religious	 leaders	 (kyai)	 are	
vested	with	the	authority	to	undertake	legal	reasoning.	Its	adherence	
to	 classical	 traditions	 is	 evident	 in	 its	 references	 to	 the	 four	 Sunni	
classical	schools	of	Islamic	jurisprudence,	most	importantly	the	Shafi‘i.	
In	the	field	of	 legal	 issues,	 the	NU’s	Bahtsul	Masail	upholds	the	text-
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based	 reference	 (madzhab	 qauli)	 to	 legitimate	 books	 (kutub	
mu‘tabara)	 and	 draw	 an	 analogy	 (ilḥāq)	 from	 existing	 cases	 in	 the	
books	 (precedents).	 Later	 it	 also	 added	 precedents	 set	 by	 pious	
ancestors	(madzhab	manhaji).70	This	method	affects	the	way	in	which	
contemporary	 issues	 are	 understood.	 Following	 the	 widespread	
introduction	 of	 the	 Bill	 on	 Islamic	 Marriage,	 the	 Pesantren	
Deliberation	 Forums	 from	 throughout	 Java	 and	 Madura	 (Forum	
Musyawarah	Pondok	Pesantren	 se	 Jawa	 dan	Madura)	 held	 a	Bahtsul	
Masail	meeting	 in	Pesantren	Lirboyo,	 East	 Java,	 in	mid-2010.	Nikah	
sirri	 and	 unofficial	 polygyny	 were	 the	 subjects	 of	 the	 most	 heated	
debates.	 The	 question	 raised	 in	 the	 forum	 was:	 “Is	 it	 justifiable	 to	
consider	these	crimes?”	
The	 fatwa	 cites	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	 distinguished	 contemporary	
Syrian	 scholar,	 Wahbah	 az-Zuḥailī	 (1931-2015),	 recorded	 in	 his	
seminal	work,	al-Fiqh	al-Islāmī	wa	Adillatuh.	This	opinion	comes	up	in	
the	 discussion	 of	 polygyny,	 under	 the	 heading	 “requests	 for	 judge’s	
permission	(idhn	al-qāḍī)”.	Az-Zuḥailī	remarks	that	polygyny	is	subject	
to	 the	 permission	 of	 judges.	 The	 judge	 plays	 a	 significant	 role	 in	
authenticating	 whether	 or	 not	 a	 man	 who	 wishes	 to	 enter	 into	 a	
polygynous	 marriage	 has	 fulfilled	 the	 legal	 requirements,	 namely:	
justice	 between	 wives	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 provide	 equality	 of	
maintenance.	This	 is	a	necessary	step	because,	as	Az-Zuḥailī	argues,	
people	 are	 prone	 to	 make	 mistakes	 in	 their	 notions	 of	 concession	
(rukhsah).71	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 Az-Zuḥailī	 urges	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
court’s	permission.		
Significantly	the	fatwa	does	not	seem	to	emphasize	the	core	point	
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this	 reason.	 Knowledge	 of	 the	 facts	 is	 supposed	 to	 expose	 the	
secrets	of	marital	life	and	intervention	in	the	personal	freedom	of	







intervention	 by	 a	 judge.	 Viewed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 criminal	
provisions	in	the	bill,	it	seems	obvious	that	the	fatwa	pronounces	an	
analogy	 (ilḥāq)	 between	 the	 administration	 of	 a	 legal	 sanction	 to	
punish	an	unregistered	marriage	and	exaggerated	control	of	marital	
life.	Here,	the	fatwa	interprets	maṣlaḥa	in	a	different	manner,	namely:	





The	 previous	 section	 contains	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	 diverse	
orientations	in	Muslim	groups	towards	the	legal	reform	of	family	law.	




do	not	 report	 their	marriage	 to	 the	authorized	 institution.	 It	 seems,	
however,	that	the	problem	does	not	lie	in	the	absence	of	a	strict	legal	
norm,	 but	 in	 its	 implementation.72	 Despite	 every	 effort,	 the	
controversies	 about	 what	 makes	 a	 proper	 marriage	 have	 not	 been	
resolved	 by	 different	 laws.	 They	 have	 continued	 to	 surface	 in	 local	
administrative	 practice	 and	 court	 decisions.73	 The	 debate	 about	
 
72 van Huis and Wirastri, ‘Muslim Marriage Registration in Indonesia: Revised Marriage 
Registration Laws Cannot Overcome Compliance Flaws’, p. 15. 
73 Bedner and Huis, ‘Plurality of marriage law and marriage registration for Muslims in 
Indonesia: a plea for pragmatism’, p. 182. 







children’s	 rights	which	derive	 from	 the	 issue	of	 the	 legal	validity	of	
their	 parents’	 marriage.	 Retrospective	 marriage	 legalization	 by	
recourse	 to	 the	 isbat	 nikah	 mechanism	 enshrined	 in	 the	 KHI	 has	
proved	to	be	inadequate	to	accommodate	the	needs	of	any	child	who	
are	 born	 out	 of	 legal	wedlock	 in	 the	 current	 legal	 framework.	 This	
issue	 came	 to	 ahead	 when	 former	 dangdut	 singer,	 Aisyah	 Mochtar	
(Machica)	 claimed	 to	 have	 been	 married	 in	 a	 traditional	 Islamic	
ceremony	 in	 1993	 to	 the	 prominent	 Secretary	 of	 State,	Moerdiono.	
Because	of	the	‘informal’	nature	of	the	marriage,	she	had	problems	in	
having	 the	 marriage	 validated	 and	 the	 son	 born	 of	 that	 marriage,	
















hence	 the	 Article	 was	 believed	 to	 curtail	 children’s	 right	 to	 life	 as	
guaranteed	by	the	Constitution	(Article	28B	Point	2).	The	court	made	
 
74 Simon Butt, The Constitutional Court and democracy in Indonesia (Leiden/Boston: Brill 
















A	 couple	 of	 years	 before	 this	 judicial	 process,	 civil-society	
organizations	had	come	up	with	an	idea	to	improve	the	protection	of	
human	 rights.	 Their	 concern	 centred	 on	 the	 problem	 of	 civil	
registration.	In	conjunction	with	government	agencies,	they	set-up	a	
common	platform	called	Konsorsium	Catatan	Sipil	(the	Consortium	for	
Civil	Registration).	The	goal	 for	which	 this	movement	strove	was	 to	
help	the	government	provide	a	national	legal	framework	which	would	
reinforce	the	right	to	a	legal	identity.	To	this	end,	they	prepared	a	Civil	
Registration	 Bill	 and	 presented	 the	 draft	 to	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Home	
Affairs	(MoHA)	in	2005.	The	bill	was	passed	in	2006.	This	Law	invests	
the	MoHA	with	the	responsibility	to	co-ordinate,	among	other	matters,	
inter-agencies	 in	 population	 administration.	 However,	 from	 the	
government’s	 point	 of	 view,	 legal	 identity	was	 still	 perceived	 to	 be	
primarily	an	administrative	and	registry	affair.	
Since	 then,	 children’s	 rights	 to	 state	 recognition	have	become	a	
central	 issue	 in	 Indonesian	public	debates.	On	the	basis	of	 the	2011	
report	 of	 the	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Women’s	
Empowerment	 and	 Child	 Protection	 has	 claimed	 that	 around	 40	
 
75 Tutik Hamidah, ‘The Rights of Children Born out of Wedlock: Views of Muslim Women’s 
Organizations on Constitutional Court Judgement 46/2010’, in Women and Property Rights in 
Indonesian Islamic Legal Contexts, ed. by John Bowen and Arskal Salim (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 
pp. 47–68. 
76 The Jakarta Post, Paternity Ruling to Apply in Rape Cases (7 Apr 2012). 
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percent	 of	 Indonesian	 children	 are	 not	 formally	 recognized	 by	 the	
state.	Since	2012,	 the	acceleration	of	 the	possession	of	 issuing	birth	
certificates	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 child	 has	 become	 a	 common	
agenda	point	on	the	government’s	programme.	This	issue	was	claimed	
to	 be	 part	 of	 the	 Jokowi’s	 administration	 vision,	 Nawa	 Cita	 (nine	
visions),	 which	 states	 that	 the	 possession	 of	 a	 birth	 certificate	 by	
children	 aged	 0-18	 years	 should	 reach	 78	 percent	 in	 2016	 to	 90	
percent	 in	 2020.	 In	 2015,	 eight	 related	Ministries	were	 involved	 in	
compiling	 a	 Memorandum	 of	 Understanding	 (nota	 kesepahaman).	
whose	aim	has	been	to	frame	a	policy	to	accelerate	the	government’s	
efforts	to	protect	a	child’s	right	to	a	legal	identity.	The	MoHA,	as	the	
body	 responsible	 for	 issuing	 birth	 certificates	 through	 the	Office	 of	
Population	 and	 Civil	 Registration	 (Kantor	 Catatan	 Sipil)	 has	 co-
ordinated	 this	 partnership.	 Furthermore,	 the	 Commission	 on	




right,	 it	 is	 the	 state	 which	 has	 the	 obligation	 to	 register	 people’s	
births.77		
In	 response	 to	 its	 campaign,	 the	 MoHA	 issued	 Regulation	 No.	
9/2016	which	served	as	a	legal	basis	for	the	district-level	office	of	civil	
administration	to	enforce	this	programme.	Article	4	of	the	Regulation	
states	 that	 “if	 the	 parents/guardian/rapporteur	 fail	 to	 procure	 a	
declaration	 of	 the	 birth	 from	 doctor/midwife,	 they	 can	 submit	 an	
SPTJM	 (Surat	 Pernyataan	 Tanggungjawab	Mutlak,	 letter	 of	 absolute	
responsibility)	containing	the	child’s	birth	data	(data	kelahiran).”	This	
letter	allows	the	parents	to	obtain	their	child’s	birth	certificate.	In	the	
letter,	 the	 biological	 father	 declares	 that	 the	 child	 was	 born	 to	 a	




77 KPAI, Akta Kelahiran Adalah Hak Setiap Anak Indonesia, Batalkan UU yang Persulit 
Pembuatan Akta Kelahiran!, http://www.kpai.go.id/tinjauan/akta-kelahiran-adalah-hak-





are	 required	 to	 have	 what	 is	 known	 as	 the	 SPTJM	 of	 the	 married	
couples	(suami	isteri).	This	is	another	form	of	SPTJM	which	should	be	
signed	by	the	guardian	of	the	bride	or	anyone	in	the	presence	of	two	
witnesses.	 It	 is	 clearly	 stated	 that	 this	 SPTJM	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	
substitute	for	a	marriage	certificate.	By	submitting	this	document,	the	
parents	are	able	to	receive	a	birth	certificate	mentioning	the	names	of	
the	 mother	 and	 the	 father.	 Admittedly,	 this	 SPTJM	 is	 a	 highly	
ambiguous	document	as	it	overlaps	and	overrides	both	the	legal	norms	
of	 marriage	 registration	 and	 the	 Islamic	 court’s	 jurisdiction	 on	
marriage	 legalization.	 The	 SPTJM	 can	 even	 be	 used	 to	 recognize	 a	
polygynous	marriage	which	represents	a	fundamental	challenge	to	the	
court’s	 authority,	 at	 least	 as	 far	 as	 the	 recognition	 of	 the	 child	 is	
concerned.	 It	 also	 undermines	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 decision	 of	 the	
Constitutional	Court.	












East	 Javanese	 regencies	 I	 observed	 that	 this	 SPTJM	 policy	 is	 not	 in	
force.	 The	 officials	 who	 reject	 it	 argue	 that	 they	 still	 consider	 a	
marriage	certificate	the	most	legitimate	proof	of	the	legal	status	of	the	
offspring’s	parents.	They	even	oblige	the	parents	to	include	a	marriage	
certificate	 when	 the	 latter	 want	 to	 update	 their	 family	 card	 (kartu	
keluarga).	 If	 they	 fail	 to	 present	 the	 marriage	 certificate,	 the	 legal	


















easy	 to	 define.	 The	 transformation	 of	 a	 scattered	 set	 of	 Sharia	
substantive	laws	into	a	codified	form	of	Islamic	law	has	been	turned	
into	 an	 arena	 encompassing	 scholarly,	 political,	 and	 practical	
dimensions.	In	other	words,	the	struggles	over	the	state	codification	of	
Islamic	 law	 have	 been	 disrupted	 by	 the	 necessity	 for	 negotiations	
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Islam	 itself.	 In	 the	 Indonesian	 context,	 this	 negotiation	 inevitably	
involves	the	debate	about	what	makes	a	Muslim	marriage	valid.		
In	the	late-nineteenth	century,	Dutch	colonial	policy	was	oriented	
towards	 producing	 new	 Islamic	 leaders,	 penghulu,	 who	 could	 be	
incorporated	 into	 its	 colonial	 administration.	 In	 the	 colonial	
framework	of	 legal	plurality,	 Sharia	began	 to	be	 transformed	 into	a	
rigid	 norm	 of	 state	 law.	 Muslim	 marriage	 was	 made	 subject	 to	
legalization	 under	 the	 supervision	 of	 an	 official	 marriage	 registrar	
appointed	 by	 the	 Dutch.	 The	 regulation	 on	 registration	 was	
maintained	 by	 the	 post-colonial	 Indonesian	 government.	 The	 new	
Indonesian	 state	 established	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Religious	 Affairs	 and	
made	the	arrangement	of	Muslim	marriage	a	priority	on	its	agenda	of	
nation-building	and	subsequently	a	significant	reform	was	made.	The	
government	 issued	 a	 Law	 which	 exclusively	 regulated	 Muslim	
marriage	and	divorce.	Muslim	marital	matters	came	under	the	aegis	of	
the	 Ministry	 of	 Religious	 Affairs.	 In	 1974	 the	 state	 unified	 the	
substantive	legal	rules	pertaining	to	marriage	in	an	effort	to	sort	out	




religious	 ceremony,	 but	 added	 the	 legal	 obligation	 of	 registration.	









the	 status	 of	 women,	 Indonesia	 has	 been	 experiencing	 the	 rise	 of	















On	 the	 other	 hand,	 legal	 reform	 in	 the	 post-New	Order	 era	 has	
involved	 dialogues	 and	 conversations	 between	 the	 younger	
generation,	religious	leaders,	academics	and	activists.	The	issuance	of	
the	controversial	CLD	KHI	and	debates	about	inter-religious	issues	are	
irrefutable	 evidence	 of	 this.	 These	 debates	 have	 involved	 prolific	
interactions	between	the	‘progressives’	and	the	 ‘conservatives	 ’.	The	









a	 Presidential	 Instruction	 to	 a	 Law.	 It	 proposed	 a	 Bill	 on	 Islamic	
Marriage	which	included	legal	sanctions	on	certain	infringements,	for	
instance,	 people	 who	 do	 not	 register	 a	 marriage	 or	 a	 polygynous	
marriage.	The	Bill	has	elicited	harsh	reactions	and	been	rejected	by	
many	conservatives.	At	present,	the	future	of	the	bill	is	uncertain.	
The	debate	on	 legal	 reform	has	 also	 involved	ulama.	 By	 issuing	
fatwas,	ulama	have	managed	to	reclaim	their	religious	authority.	Their	
fatwas	 reveal	 a	 new	 trend	 in	 Islamic	 Law	which	 sees	 it	 as	maṣlaḥa	
(common	 good)	 and	 this	 has	 become	 an	 important	 legal	 reasoning	
underlining	the	essential	position	of	the	state	in	administering	marital	
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relations.	 In	 the	 framework	 of	maṣlaḥa,	 marriage	 registration	 is	 a	
viable	 means	 to	 prevent	 social	 harm.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 maṣlaḥa	
orientation	is	challenged	by	a	literal	approach	to	classical	Islamic	texts.	
These	two	religious	orientations	are	locked	in	a	contest	to	shape	the	
content	of	 the	 legal	 reform,	but	 the	different	 interpretations	among	
ulama	only	serve	to	show	that	Sharia	is	not	a	fixed	and	complete	body	
of	legal	prescriptions	which	have	been	derived	from	scriptural	texts	in	
a	 timeless	 manner.79	 This	 public	 debate	 also	 has	 the	 effect	 of	
“producing	a	degree	of	openness…	that	appears	to	have	transformed	
the	 country.”80	 Differentiating	 itself	 other	 fatwa-issuing	 bodies,	
through	its	self-proclaimed	identity	as	a	‘civil	society’	organization,	the	
MUI	 has	 sought	 to	 provide	 the	 country	 with	 an	 agency	 of	 ‘official	
national	mufti.’81	
The	government’s	effort	to	improve	the	position	of	women	in	the	
matrimonial	 sphere	 and	 to	protect	 children’s	 rights	 is	 an	unceasing	
endeavour.	Developments	over	 the	 last	decade	 in	 Indonesia	suggest	
that	 the	 judiciary	 and	 the	 civil	 administration	 have	 been	making	 a	
meaningful	contribution.	The	debate	on	Muslim	marriage	has	shifted	
from	a	debate	about	the	validity	of	Muslim	marriage	to	a	debate	about	
the	 consequences	 of	 marriage	 registration	 for	 citizens’	 rights,	
primarily	the	rights	of	children	to	a	legal	identity.	Firstly,	the	judicial	
authority	provides	a	legally	binding	interpretation	of	the	legal	status	
of	 a	 child	 based	 on	 the	 Constitution.	 This	 decision	 grants	 paternal	
recognition	 to	 children	 born	 out	 of	wedlock.	 Secondly,	 because	 the	
legal	status	of	children	has	become	an	important	issue,	a	government	
body	has	 issued	 a	 programme	 to	 accelerate	 the	 acquisition	 of	 birth	
certificate.	 The	 rub	 is	 that	 this	 policy	 appears	 to	 overlap	 with	 the	
existing	rules	on	marriage	registration,	because	a	marriage	certificate	
is	no	longer	important	administratively	to	prove	the	legal	status	of	a	
marriage.	Despite	 the	conflict	between	 the	rules,	 in	my	opinion,	 the	
existence	 of	 this	 policy	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 step	 forward	 in	 the	
 
79 Hefner, ‘Sharia Law and Muslim Ethical Imaginaries in Modern Indonesia’, p. 91. 
80 Cammack, Bedner, and van Huis, ‘Democracy, Human Rights, and Islamic Family Law in 
Post-Soeharto Indonesia’, p. 13. 
81 Tim Lindsey, Islam, Law and the State in Southeast Asia, Vol. I: In edition (London: Tauris, 





into	 communities	 and	 to	 generate	 individual	 rights	 and	 obligations	
based	 on	 a	 national	 identity	 rather	 than	 membership	 of	 a	 certain	
arrangement.		
In	 the	next	 chapter,	 I	 shall	discuss	 continuity	and	change	 in	 the	
laws	 and	procedures	 governing	marriage	 registration.	 I	 analyse	 the	
bureaucratic	reform	of	the	administration	of	Muslim	marriage	which	





82 Michael G. Peletz, Islamic Modern: Religious Courts and Cultural Politics in Malaysia 
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In	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 I	 have	 indicated	 that	 post-New	 Order	
Indonesia	 has	 been	 experiencing	 a	 rise	 in	 religious	 identity	 which	
continues	 to	 contest	 the	 state’s	 attempt	 to	 reform	Muslim	marriage	
through	legislation.	Nevertheless,	at	the	same	time	there	is	a	tendency	





order.	 On	 the	 secular	 side	 of	 the	 coin,	 the	 non-religious	 state	
bureaucracy	 has	 been	 emerging	 as	 an	 alternative	 force	 introducing	
reformatory	ideas	into	strategic	regulations.	This	bureaucratic	reform	
has	 stimulated	 the	 government’s	 public	 service	 institutions	 to	
strengthen	 the	 protection	 of	 citizens’	 rights.1	 Despite	 the	 conflicts	
arising	 from	 the	 state’s	 insistence	 on	 legal	 norms	 for	 marriage	







(MoRA)	 and	 how	 these	 affect	 the	 administration	 of	 marriage	
registration	in	society.	To	this	end,	the	main	question	of	this	chapter	
is:	 In	what	ways	does	 the	 reform	 shape	 the	bureaucracy	 of	Muslim	
marriage	 which,	 in	 practice,	 is	 implemented	 by	 the	 Kantor	 Urusan	
Agama?	The	KUA	 is	a	state	religious	agency	which	deals	exclusively	
with	 the	 Muslim	 marriage	 ceremony	 (akad	 nikah)	 including	 its	
registration.	Within	the	KUA,	the	penghulu	is	the	key	actor	as	the	state-








1 In 2010, the Indonesian government issued a main guideline for bureaucratic reform 
covering a period of 5 years. Peraturan Presiden (Presidential Regulation) No. 81/2010 
tentang Grand Design Reformasi Birokrasi 2010-2025 (On the Grand Design of Bureaucratic 
Reform of 2010-2015). 
2 Nurdiana Gaus, Sultan Sultan, and Muhammad Basri, ‘State Bureaucracy in Indonesia and its 
Reforms: An Overview’, International Journal of Public Administration, vol. 40, no. 8 
(Routledge, 2017), pp. 658–69. 
3 Sezgin and Künkler, ‘Regulation of Religion and the Religious: The Politics of Judicialization 
and Bureaucratization in India and Indonesia’, p. 450. 




order	 to	 reinforce	 its	 rational	 legal	 authority4	 and	 legitimacy.5	
Although	 it	 seems	 that	 attempts	 at	 reform	 have	 so	 far	 been	 half-
hearted,	 the	state	 is	under	growing	pressure	to	address	the	 issue	of	
citizens’	 rights.	 Political	 actors	 have	 agreed	 that	 Muslim	 marriage	
registration	is	an	integral	part	of	the	civil	registration	system.	Here	we	
encounter	the	problem	of	falling	between	two	stools.	They	formulate	
citizenship	 by	 expressing	 preferences	 in	 a	 way	 which	 has	 been	
strongly	influenced	by	modern,	state-centric	conceptions.6	According	
to	the	Law	on	Civil	Administration,	marriage	is	a	crucial	life	moment	




more	 traditional	 views	 on	 marriage	 which	 are	 still	 very	 much	
embedded	in	village	life.	
In	 this	 chapter,	 my	 purpose	 is	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 KUA	 has	
endeavoured	to	introduce	an	array	of	reforms	to	redefine	its	position,	
interpreting	its	institution	not	just	in	its	narrow	sense	as	a	religious	
bureaucracy	 which	 deals	 with	 Islamic	marriage	 but	 taking	 a	 wider	
perspective	on	it	as	the	administration	of	public	service.	In	this	light,	
the	 KUA	 plays	 a	 role	 as	 a	 prominent	 government	 frontline	 public	
service	agency	helping	the	government	protect	the	rights	of	citizens	
 
4 Weber introduced this concept in response to the transition from medieval to modern 
societies and states in Europe. It refers to authority which is legitimized by a rational-legal and 
interdependent division of labour, characterized by economic and occupational specialization 
and complex rational-legal systems, in which highly specialized bureaucracies are the norm. 
Weber called this rational justification of obedience to authority “domination by virtue of 
legality, by virtue of the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional competence, based 
on rationally created rules.” Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in From Max Weber: essays 
in sociology, ed. by Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1946), p. 79. 
5 Legitimacy is a central concept which defines how individuals accept a power and conceive 
their obedience as a commitment. It is critical because it constitutes any normative claims 
made by a government. R. Stryber, ‘Legitimacy’, International Encyclopedia of the Social & 
Behavioral Sciences (2001), pp. 8700–4. 
6 Pamela J. Stumpo, ‘Challenging the Practice of the State, but Beholden to Its Image: 
Women’s Activists, Academics, and the Public Take on Egypt’s Citizenship Laws’, in The 
Everyday Life of the State: A State-in-Society Approach, ed. by Adam White (Seattle: University 




more	 effectively.	 However,	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 its	 superior,	 the	 MoRA,	
religious	issues	to	do	with	the	marriage	ceremony	still	take	pride	of	
place.	At	the	core	of	the	problem	lies	the	position	of	the	penghulu.	Time	






fees	 for	 marriage	 registration.	 The	 state	 requires	 the	 KUA	 to	 be	 a	
centralized,	powerful	agency,	firmly	in	charge	of	marriage	registration	
and	 it	 has	 attained	 its	 goal	 by	 diminishing	 the	 intermediary	 roles	
played	by	informal	village	religious	leaders.	However,	in	doing	so	it	has	
failed	 to	 appreciate	 the	 social	 importance	 of	 the	 latter.	 Lastly,	 the	
MORA	has	struggled	with	the	integration	of	civil	administrative	data	
into	marriage	registration	system.	To	sum	it	up	in	one	sentence,	the	
implementation	 of	 this	 series	 of	 reform	was	more	 easily	 said	 than	
done.		
This	chapter	begins	with	a	historical	sketch	of	the	formation	of	the	
roles	 of	 the	 penghulu	 and	 the	 KUA	 in	 the	 years	 immediately	 after	
Indonesian	Independence.	Section	2	focuses	on	the	re-organization	of	
the	KUA	bureaucracy	and	the	re-promotion	of	penghulu	as	key	actors	
in	 it.	 Section	 3	 examines	 the	 core	 problem	 in	 the	 administration	 of	
Muslim	 marriage,	 that	 is,	 the	 administration	 fee,	 which	 put	 the	
penghulu	 in	 a	 real	 predicament,	 and	 its	 upshot,	 the	 elimination	 of	
assistant	marriage	 registrars	 from	 the	 bureaucracy.	 Section	 4	 deals	
with	 the	 reform	 of	 the	 administration	 fee	 and	 other	 bureaucratic	
matters	and	how	they	relate	to	the	discourses	about	Muslim	marriage	











groups	 but	 also	 to	 competition	 in	 Muslim	 circles.7	 Gradually,	 the	
political	 process	 of	 administering	 Islam	 has	 proceeded	 to	 what	 is	
called	 “state	 Islam”,8	 a	 form	 of	 Islam	 endorsed	 by	 the	 state.	
Consequently,	 as	 they	 are	 embedded	 in	 religious	 affairs,	 marriage	
norms	have	been	unavoidably	reshaped	by	the	state	actors	to	tackle	
matters	in	the	national	interest	such	as	population	control.9	This	has	
been	 done,	 as	 Muller	 has	 remarked,	 by	 empowering	 “state-funded	
administrative	 bodies	 to	 guide	 and	 influence	 Islamic	 discourses	 in	
diverse	ways.”10		
This	 section	 specifically	 explores	 how	 the	 state	 deals	 with	 the	
administration	 of	 Muslim	 marriage.	 It	 examines	 the	 historical	
trajectory	of	the	bureaucracy	of	Muslim	marriage	under	the	aegis	of	
the	 MoRA.	 This	 bureaucracy	 is	 understudied,	 particularly	 when	
compared	 to	 topics	 related	 to	marital	dispute	 settlement	by	 Islamic	
courts.11	 After	 the	 Indonesian	 state	 began	 to	 reform	 the	 Muslim	
husband’s	unilateral	rights	to	divorce	by	the	 introduction	of	 judicial	
divorce	 in	 1974,	 the	 legal	 practices	 in	 Islamic	 courts	 have	 grown	
enormously	in	importance	as	a	topic	of	debate.	Matters	have	reached	
such	 a	 pitch	 that	 not	 just	 their	 practices	 but	 the	 very	 existence	 of	
Islamic	 courts	 has	 become	 the	 subject	 of	 political	 debate.	 In	 fact,	
political	pressure	demanding	the	abolition	of	Islamic	courts	was	very	
nearly	 successful	 after	 the	 UU	 (Law)	 No.	 19/1948	 on	 the	 Judicial	
Power	was	passed.	Chapter	35	(2)	of	this	Law	decreed	that	disputes	
between	 Muslims	 should	 be	 resolved	 under	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 a	
 
7 Deliar Noer, The Administration of Islam in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia 
Project, 1978). 
8 Moch Nur Ichwan, ‘Official Reform of Islam: State Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
in Contemporary Indonesia, 1966-2004’ (Tilburg University, 2006). 
9 Maznah Mohamad, ‘Malaysian Sharia Reforms in Dlux: The Changeable National Character 
of islamic Marriage’, International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, vol. 25, no. 1 (2011), 
pp. 46–70; Nancy F. Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2002). 
10 Müller, The Bureaucratization of Islam and its Socio-Legal Dimensions in Southeast Asia: 
conceptual contours of a research project, p. 2. 
11 See, for instance, Nur Ahmad Fadhil Lubis, Islamic Justice in Transition: A Socio-Legal Study 








which	 stipulated	 the	 continued	 existence	 of	 Islamic	 courts	 and	 the	
abolition	of	all	 indigenous	adat	courts.14	Under	these	circumstances,	
the	 administration	 of	 Muslim	 marriage	 remained	 relatively	 free	 of	
political	intervention.	
The	modern	bureaucratic	administration	of	Muslim	marriage	was	
set	 up	 simultaneously	 with	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 MoRA	 by	 the	
Indonesian	 government	 on	 3	 January	 1946,	 founded	 on	 Penetapan	
Pemerintah	(the	Government	Declaration)	No.	1/S.D.	1946.	The	MoRA	
itself	was	 in	 fact	an	extension	of	what	had	existed	since	 the	closing	
years	of	the	nineteenth-century	in	the	Dutch	East	Indies,	initially	as	the	
Kantoor	 voor	 Inlandsche	 Zaken	 (Office	 for	 Indigenous	 Affairs).	 This	
became	 the	Bureau	of	Religious	Affairs	 (Kantoor	 voor	 Inlandsche	 en	
Arabische	 Zaken)	 in	 early	 1899.15	 In	 this	 period	 of	 administrative	
changes,	the	colonial	administration	reorganized	the	hierarchy	of	the	




1945,	 this	 Office	 of	 Religious	 Affairs	was	 renamed	 the	 Shumubu	 or	
Kantor	 Oeroesan	 Agama.17	 Prominent	 staff	 members	 of	 the	 former	
 
12 Jaenal Aripin, Jejak Langkah Peradilan Agama di Indonesia (Jakarta: Kharisma Putra Utama, 
2013), p. 70. 
13 According to Lev, Law 19/1948 Chapter 7 made no mention at all of a distinct jurisdiction 
for Islamic courts implying their demise. Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study in the 
Political Bases of Legal Institutions, p. 65. 
14 Emergency Law 1/1951 on the Jurisdiction and Procedures of the Civil Courts.
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Bulukumba’, p. 46. 
15 Rini Rusyeni, ‘Fragmented Voices: The Personal Archives of the Advisors of Inlandsche 
Zaken, 1899-194’ (Leiden University, 2017), p. 13. 
16 Karel A. Steenbrink, Beberapa Aspek tentang Islam di Indonesia Abad ke-19 (Jakarta: Bulan 
Bintang, 1984). Further details about the Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken, read Husnul Aqib 
Suminto, Politik Islam Pemerintah Hindia Belanda: Het Kantoor voor Inlandsche zaken 
(Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), pp. 99–107. 
17 Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study in the Political Bases of Legal Institutions, p. 44. 






to	 expand	 the	 powers	 of	 the	 Shumubu	 in	 various	 karesidenan	
(regencies)	 in	1944.18	 The	Shumuka	was	 supposed	 to	 act	 as	 the	 co-
ordinator	of	 local	ulama	but	with	 the	obvious	aim	of	exerting	more	
control	 over	 them.19	 The	 Shumubu	 served	 as	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	
establishment	of	the	MoRA	in	1946.	
Since	 1946,	 the	mission	 of	 the	MoRA	 has	 been	 to	 be	 the	most	
prominent	 agency	 responsible	 for	 the	 supervision	 of	 all	 matters	
related	to	marriage	and	reconciliation	between	Muslims.20	The	most	
obvious	change	which	has	taken	place	since	the	formation	of	the	MoRA	
was	 the	 reorganization	 of	 the	 existing	 judicial	 and	 executive	
institutions	 on	 both	 national	 and	 regional	 levels.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	





(Regional	 Religious	 Bureau).21	 Ever	 since,	 penghulu,	 who	 had	
previously	been	subordinate	to	a	Bupati,	have	fallen	directly	under	the	
supervision	of	the	MoRA.		




the	 practical	 implementation	 of	Muslim	marriage	 administration	 in	
the	 hands	 of	 the	 Pegawai	 Pentatat	 Nikah	 (the	 Marriage	 Registrar).	
Article	 1	 (1)	 of	 the	 law	 states:	 “A	 marriage	 which	 is	 concluded	 in	
 
18 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Islam dan Politik: Teori Belah Bambu, Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin, 
1959-1965 (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996), p. 20. 
19 Aiko Kurasawa, ‘Mobilization and Control: A Study of Social Change in Rural Java, 1942-
1945’ (Cornell University, 1988), pp. 400–4. 
20 Noer, The Administration of Islam in Indonesia, p. 18. 
21 Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia’s New Order 




accordance	 with	 the	 precepts	 of	 Islam,	 henceforth	 referred	 to	 as	 a	
marriage,	is	to	be	supervised	by	a	marriage	registrar	who	is	appointed	
by	 the	 Minister	 of	 Religion	 or	 other	 designated	 officials.”22	 On	 the	
practical	 level,	 this	 law	 indirectly	 enjoined	 a	 division	 between	
penghulu	kabupaten	(regency	penghulu)	and	penghulu	hakim	(judge	or	
qadi	 penghulu).	 The	 role	 of	 the	 former	 was	 to	 act	 as	 the	 marriage	
registrar,	while	the	latter	adjudicated	on	Muslim	marital	affairs	in	an	
Islamic	court.	A	year	or	so	later,	this	division	was	formally	confirmed	
in	 Keputusan	 Menteri	 Agama	 (KMA,	 the	 Decree	 of	 the	 Minister	 of	
Religious	Affairs)	No.	6/1947	on	8	December	1947	pertaining	to	the	
division	of	tasks	between	the	two	institutions.23	
In	 the	 late	 1940s,	 the	 central	 government	 issued	 Peraturan	
Pemerintah	(Government	Regulation)	No.	33/1949	on	the	susunan	dan	
lapang	pekerjaan	 (the	 structure	and	 the	 tasks)	of	 the	MoRA.	One	of	
these	was	“to	regulate,	undertake	and	observe	all	aspects	related	to	






District	 Religious	 Representatives),	 both	 supervised	 by	 the	 Kantor	
Kepenghuluan	 Kabupaten	 (Office	 of	 the	 Regency	 Penghulu).	 By	 its	
construction	of	this	hierarchy,	the	government	officially	restored	the	
term	 naib,25	 as	 it	 had	 been	 applied	 in	 the	 colonial	 times,26	 as	 the	
designation	of	the	representative	of	the	Regency	Penghulu	on	a	sub-
district	 level.27	 In	 my	 view,	 this	 reorganization	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	
 
22 The Law 22/1946 on the Registration of Marriage, Divorce and Rreconciliation. 
23 Abdul Manan, Pembaruan Hukum Islam di Indonesia (Depok: Kencana, 2017), pp. 2–3. 
24 This division was regulated by Keputusan Menteri Agama (Decree of the Minister of 
Religions) No. 2 1185/KJ November 1946 and was then reaffirmed by Peraturan Pemerintah 
(Government Regulation) No. 33/1949 tentang Susunan dan Lapang Pekerjaan Kementerian 
Agama (on the structure and the task of the Ministry of Religious Affairs). 
25 In the Sunni tradition of Islamic law, naib refers to the authorized representative of a qadi 
(judge) or local magistrate.  
26 Lubis, Islamic Justice in Transition: A Socio-Legal Study of the Agama Court Judges in 
Indonesia, p. 85. 
27 Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), p. 202. 
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government	 strategy	 to	 maintain	 its	 control	 over	 Muslim	marriage	
without	putting	itself	to	too	much	trouble	since	people	were	already	
familiar	with	such	institutions.		
In	 1947,	 the	 bureaucracy	 administering	 Muslim	 marriage	 also	
underwent	a	phase	during	which	informal	religious	officials	on	village	
level	 were	 incorporated	 as	 official	 marriage	 functionaries.	 The	
government	 promoted	 the	 village-level	 religious	 officials,	 namely	
kaum	(modin,	amil,	or	lebei),	to	be	P3NTR	(Pembantu	Pegawai	Pencatat	
Nikah,	 Talak	 dan	 Rujuk	 or	 Assistant	 Marriage,	 Divorce	 and	
Reconciliation	Registrars),	to	assist	the	marriage	registrars	on	higher	
levels.28	 This	 process	 signified	 the	 bureaucratization	 of	 traditional	









Declaration)	No.	3/1947	of	 the	 two	Ministries,	 the	modin	 should	be	
treated	 the	same	as	a	pamong	desa	 (a	village	official).	 In	 the	1980s,	
especially	 following	 the	 issuance	 of	 the	 UU	 No.	 5/1975	 on	
pemerintahan	 desa	 (village	 administration),	 the	 Soeharto	 regime	
incorporated	the	modin	into	the	village	administration	under	the	title	
Kepala	 Urusan	 Kesejahteraan	 Rakyat	 (Kaur	 Kesra,	 head	 of	 People’s	
Welfare).30	However,	this	did	not	apply	to	all	of	them.	In	some	villages	
like	 in	 Pasuruan,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 division	 between	modin	 kawin	
 
28 More details about their tasks and technicalities are regulated in the Instruction of the 
Minister of Religion No. 4/1947 re the obligations of a marriage registrar. 
29 There is a variety of names given to this informal authority, such as modin, kaum 
(community leader) and rois (religious leader). Achmad Zainal Arifin, ‘Defending Traditions, 
Countering Intolerant Ideologies: Re-energizing the Role of Modin in Modern Java’, Al-
Jami‘ah: Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 55, no. 2 (2017), pp. 265–92; Pradjarta Dirdjosanjoto, 
Memelihara Umat: Kiai Pesantren-Kiai Langgar di Jawa (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1999), p. 195. 




(marriage	modin)	 and	modin	 kematian	 (funeral	modin).	 The	 village	
administration	only	 incorporated	modin	kematian	 into	 its	body,	not	
modin	kawin	because	they	were	already	organized	by	the	district	office	
of	 religious	 affairs.	 The	 upshot	 was	 that	 the	 modin	 was	 put	 in	 a	
problematic	position	with	a	foot	in	the	camp	of	each	of	two	Ministries.	
Although	they	were	entitled	to	identify	themselves	as	P3NTR,	with	the	




level	 agencies	 by	 exercising	 a	 strict	mechanism	 of	 control	 to	 bring	




level	 whose	 primary	 task	 was	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 administration	 of	
Muslim	marriage.	In	the	course	of	the	subsequent	transformation	this	
entailed,	 the	 naib	 who	 was	 responsible	 for	 kantor	 kenaiban	
kecamatan,	 given	 equivalent	 status	 to	 the	 head	 of	 the	 KUA.	 The	
equivalence	 of	 a	naib	 with	 the	 head	 of	 the	 KUA	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	
elucidation	to	Peraturan	Menteri	Agama	(PMA,	the	Regulation	of	the	
Minister	 of	 Religion)	 No.	 1/1952	 on	 wali	 hakim	 (magistrate-
guardians).	 This	 regulation	 asserted	 that,	 because	 of	 his	 equivalent	
status	 to	 the	 head	 of	 the	 KUA,	 the	 naib	 had	 the	 authority	 to	 act	 as	
magistrate-guardian	 if	 a	 biological	 guardian	of	 a	 bride	 could	not	be	
present	(mafqud).	Although	the	term	naib	is	no	longer	currently	in	use,	
I	 have	 personally	 seen	 that	 local	 Muslims	 are	 still	 comfortable	
addressing	the	head	of	the	KUA	as	naib.		
The	 year	 1955	 signified	 a	major	 change	 in	 the	 bureaucracy	 of	
Muslim	 marriage	 administration.	 PMA	 No.	 1/1955	 on	 kewajiban-
kewajiban	 pegawai	 pencatat	 nikah	 (the	 obligations	 of	 marriage	
registrars)	restructured	the	organization	of	the	KUA.	It	declared	that	
 
31 Sezgin and Künkler, ‘Regulation of Religion and the Religious: The Politics of Judicialization 
and Bureaucratization in India and Indonesia’, p. 469. 

























the	marriages	 and	divorces	 and	 keeps	 the	 records”.	 In	 her	 opinion,	
describing	the	role	of	the	naib	in	officiating	at	marriages,	divorces	and	







32 PMA No. 15/1955 tentang Contoh-contoh Buku Pendaftaran Nikah, Talak dan Rujuk (On 
Examples of Registration Forms for Marriage, Repudiation and Reconciliation of a Marriage). 
33 Mark Cammack and R. Michael Feener, ‘The Islamic Legal System in Indonesia’, Pacific Rim 
Law & Policy Journal, vol. 21, no. 1 (2012), p. 17. 
34 Hildred Geertz, The Javanese Family: A Study of Kinship and Socialization (New York: The 




both	 to	 see	 if	 the	 marriage	 dissolution	 could	 be	 legally	 approved	
according	 to	 Islamic	 law.	 After	 completing	 this	 examination,	 he	





jurisdiction	 of	 the	 KUA.	 Since	 it	 has	 been	 in	 force,	 the	 KUA	 has	 no	
longer	 had	 to	 deal	 with	 a	 unilateral	 divorce	 pronounced	 by	 the	
husband.	 All	 divorces	 must	 be	 declared	 before	 an	 Islamic	 court.	
Despite	this	fundamental	change,	the	jurisdictions	of	the	KUA	and	the	
Islamic	court	remain	interrelated.	The	Islamic	court	delivers	a	report	
of	 the	 divorce	 to	 the	 KUA	 with	 which	 the	 parties’	 marriage	 was	
registered.	It	is	then	the	duty	of	the	KUA	to	execute	the	court’s	decision	
of	isbat	nikah	(retrospective	marriage	confirmation).	Furthermore,	the	
KUA	 also	 facilitates	 marital	 reconciliation	 (rujuk)	 between	 the	
husband	 and	 the	wife	 during	 the	 prescribed	waiting-period	 (iddah)	




3. Institutional	 Transformation	 and	 the	 Re-centralization	 of	
Penghulu		
A	 series	 of	 organizational	 reforms	 in	 marriage	 administration	 has	
taken	place	on	the	central/national	level	since	Indonesia	declared	its	
Independence.	 Since	 1963,	 all	 matters	 related	 to	 Muslim	 marriage	
have	been	handled	by	the	Directorate	of	Urusan	Agama	Islam	(Islamic	
Affairs).	 As	 of	 1967,	 this	 directorate	 came	 under	 the	 aegis	 of	 the	
Directorate	General	 for	Guidance	of	 Islamic	Community	 (Bimbingan	
Masyarakat	 Islam,	 henceforth	 referred	 to	 as	 Bimas	 Islam).	 Other	
Muslim	affairs	such	as	 Islamic	education,	 Islamic	courts	and	 Islamic	
 
35 Hisako Nakamura, Divorce in Java: A Study of the Dissolution of Marriage among Javanese 
Muslims (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1983), pp. 107–8. 
36 Ibid., p. 106. 
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higher	 education	 were	 also	 run	 by	 the	 Directorate	 General.37	 This	




the	Directorate-General	 for	 the	 Guidance	 of	 the	 Islamic	 Community	
and	Pilgrimage	(Bimbingan	Masyarakat	Islam	dan	Urusan	Haji)	deals	
with	matters	pertaining	directly	 to	 religion,	 including	marriage	 and	
pilgrimage.	 Meanwhile,	 Islamic	 education	 and	 Islamic	 courts	 were	
henceforth	 to	 be	 administered	 by	 the	 second	 body,	 called	 the	





penghulu	 throughout	 the	 nation.	 In	 2010,	 the	 nomenclature	 of	 the	
body	was	changed	to	Direktorat	Urusan	Agama	Islam	dan	Pembinaan	
Syariah	 (Directorate	 of	 Islamic	 affairs	 and	 the	 Advancement	 of	
Shari’a).38	 This	 change	 meant	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 control	 of	 the	
directorate	 was	 broadened	 from	 focusing	 solely	 on	 marital	 affairs	




Regulation	 No.	 42/2016	 on	Organisasi	 dan	 Tata	 Kerja	 Kementerian	
Agama	(Organization	and	Operating	Procedures	of	the	MoRA),	Article	
387,	which	affirmed	the	setting-up	of	a	new	directorate,	namely	Bina	
Kantor	 Urusan	 Agama	 dan	 Keluarga	 Sakinah	 (Office	 for	 the	
Organization	 of	 Religious	 Affairs	 and	 Harmonious	 Families/Family	
 
37 Regulated by Keputusan Menteri Agama (Decree of the Minister of Religion) No. 56/1967 
tentang Struktur Organisasi, Tugas, dan Wewenang Departemen Agama (On the Structure, 
Tasks and Competences of the Department of Religion), dated 30 May 1967. 
38 Kementerian Agama, Profil Direktorat Urusan Agama Islam dan Pembinaan Syariah 









In	 this	 structure,	 the	 KUA	 is	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	
regency/town	 office	 of	 the	 MoRA	 (Kantor	 Kementerian	 Agama	
Kabupaten).	The	relationship	is	hierarchal.	Therefore	the	work	of	the	
head	(kepala)	is	carried	out	under	the	direction	of	Provincial	Office	of	
Religious	 Affairs	 (Kantor	 Wilayah	 Kementerian	 Agama	 Provinsi,	
henceforth	 referred	 to	 as	 Kanwil).	 In	 the	 everyday	 running	 of	 the	
department,	 it	 is	 kepala	 seksi	 (the	 section	 head)	 of	 the	 Bimbingan	
Masyarakat	Islam	(Guidance	of	the	Islamic	Community),	abbreviated	




39 PMA No. 42/2016 on Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Kementerian Agama (Organization and 
Operating Procedures of the MoRA). 





Generally	 speaking,	 the	 KUA	 is	 responsible	 for	 handling	 Islam-
related	affairs	in	one	sub-district.	The	registration	and	reconciliation	
of	Muslim	marriages	lie	at	the	very	heart	of	its	activities,	but	it	also	has	
other	 matters	 to	 deal	 with	 such	 as	 the	 running	 of	 mosques,	 alms,	
property	endowment	and	 family	harmony	 (keluarga	 sakinah).	 In	 its	
handling	 of	marital	 affairs,	 the	 head	 of	 the	 KUA	 acts	 as	 a	marriage	
registrar	(Pegawai	Pencatat	Nikah,	abbreviated	as	PPN).	Article	2	of	
the	PMA	No.	11/2007	on	marriage	registration	states	that	“the	PPN	is	
an	 official	 who	 verifies	 documents,	 supervises	 and	 registers	
marriage/reconciliation,	administers	husband-initiated	divorce	(cerai	
talak),	 wife-petitioned	 divorce	 (cerai	 gugat)	 and	 marriage	
counselling.”		
This	 Article	makes	 it	 quite	 clear	 that	 the	 KUA	 also	 undertakes	
marriage	counselling	and	runs	courses	on	preparation	for	marriage	for	
brides	 and	 grooms	 (kursus	 calon	 pengantin).	 In	 the	 past,	 the	
counselling	was	the	task	of	a	body	called	Badan	Penasehat	Perkawinan	
dan	Penyelesaian	Perceraian	(BP4,	Board	of	Marriage	Counselling	and	
Divorce	 Settlement).	 The	 establishment	 of	 this	 advisory	 board	was	
initiated	 locally	 in	 the	course	of	 the	1950s.40	 In	1962	 it	was	unified	
nationally.	 In	 1977,	 its	 name	 was	 changed	 to	 Badan	 Penasihatan	
Perkawinan,	 Perselisihan	 dan	 Perceraian	 (Board	 of	 Marriage	
Counselling,	Dispute	Settlement	and	Divorce)	based	on	Decree	of	the	
Minister	 of	 Religious	 Affairs	 (Keputusan	 Menteri	 Agama,	 KMA)	 No.	




mission	 is	 to	 lend	 assistance	 and	 to	 solve	marital	 disputes.	 Couples	
who	 wish	 to	 get	 a	 divorce	 are	 expected	 to	 attend	 the	 BP4	 for	
counselling.	Upon	receiving	confirmation	of	a	break-down	in	marriage	
from	 the	 members	 of	 the	 board,	 declared	 in	 the	 form	 of	 Naskah	
 











in	 Ministry	 programmes	 such	 as	 kursus	 pra	 nikah	 (pre-marital	





Functions	 in	 the	KUA	 are	 classified	 into	 three	 categories.	 They	









authority	 to	 sign	 marriage	 certificates,	 although	 there	 has	 been	 a	
debate	about	it.	The	authority	to	sign	marriage	certificates	is	vested	in	
the	 PPN.	 However,	 some	 argued	 that	 penghulu	 were	 allowed	 to	
authorize	marriage	certificates	if	the	PPN	delegated	his	mandate.		
 
41 Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and Identity: The Kompilasi Hukum Islam and Legal 
Practice in the Indonesian Religious Courts, p. 185. 
42 In 2013, the Directorate-General on Islamic Guidance issued Regulation No. DJ. II/542 
concerning the organization of pre-marital courses which declares that BP4 is one of the 
organizers.  
43 See the KMA No. 114/2009 tentang Penetapan Pengurus BP4 Pusat (on the Officials of the 
Central BP4). 
44 KMA No. 517/2001 tentang Penataan Organisasi Kantor Urusan Agama Kecamatan (on the 
organization reorganization of the Sub-district KUA) 





stipulates	 that	 the	 kepala	 KUA	 is	 no	 longer	 a	 structural	 position	
(jabatan	 struktural)	 but	 is	 considered	 an	 additional	 task	 (tugas	
tambahan)	which	can	be	exercised	exclusively	by	a	penghulu.	In	other	
words,	it	is	now	only	penghulu	who	are	eligible	to	act	as	head	of	the	
KUA	 (the	 PPN).	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 kepala	 KUA	 who	 are	 not	
penghulu	have	to	meet	certain	standards	attained	by	passing	a	set	of	
competency	 trainings	 and	 tests	 to	 be	 penghulu.46	 When	 they	 have	
passed	the	exams,	they	are	awarded	a	certificate	which	declares	their	










kecamatan.	 Now	 it	 is	 the	 penghulu	 who	 are	 qualified	 in	 religious	
matters	and	are	fully	responsible	for	the	KUA.	Those	heads	of	the	KUA	
who	 are	 not	 penghulu	 are	 encouraged	 to	 take	 the	 certification	
examination	which	can	qualify	them	as	penghulu.	
	
4. Dilemmas	 Arising	 from	 the	 Administration	 and	 the	
Discontinued	P3N	
Over	the	last	few	years,	the	phrase	Paradigma	Baru	(a	new	paradigm)	
has	 increasingly	 become	 the	 buzz	 word	 circulating	 among	 the	
 
45 PMA No. 34/2016 tentang Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Kantor Urusan Agama Kecamatan (on 
the Organization and the Working Procedures of the Sub-district KUA). 
46 See Peraturan Menteri Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara (The Decree of the Minister for 
the Efficient Running of the Civil Service) No. PER/62 /M.PAN/6/2005 tentang Jabatan 









the	 magazine	 emphasizes	 that	 the	 bureaucracy	 running	 the	 KUA	
needed	 to	 reform	 its	way	 of	 thinking	 and	 its	 attitudes	 if	 it	were	 to	
provide	excellent	public	service.47	This	nub	of	this	problem	had	to	do	
with	 the	 complexities	 surrounding	 the	 informal	 administration	 fee	
traditionally	 received	 by	 KUA	 marriage	 registrars	 which	 was	 later	
defined	as	an	illegal	charge	(pungutan	liar)	or	gratification.	This	illegal	
charge	 was	 the	 reason	 that	 the	 KUA	 found	 itself	 stereotyped	 as	 a	
corrupt	institution.		
The	upshot	has	been	that	a	row	has	broken	out	about	one	of	the	
fundamental	 issues	 to	 do	 with	 marriage	 registration,	 the	
administrative	fee.	In	the	colonial	period,	we	have	seen	that	penghulu	
were	 also	 confronted	 with	 financial	 predicaments.	 The	 1882	
Regulation	 concerning	 the	 Priest	 Councils	 in	 Java	 and	Madura	 was	
issued	for	the	very	purpose	of	controlling	the	informal	fees	received	
by	penghulu	by	 stipulating	 that	 they	be	paid	a	 salary.	The	 fly	 in	 the	




legal	 fees	 (ongkos	 perkara).	 This	 income	 was	 administered	 as	 a	
mosque	fund	(kas	masjid).49	In	practice	the	chief	penghulu	circulated	a	
certain	portion	of	zakat	(alms	fund)	not	only	to	religious	officials	and	




47 Thobib Al-Asyhar, ‘Wajah Baru KUA: Profesional, Berintegritas, dan Akuntabel’, Bimas Islam 
(Jakarta, 2014). 
48 van Huis, ‘Islamic Courts and Women’s Divorce Rights in Indonesia: The Cases of Cianjur 
and Bulukumba’, p. 36; Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study in the Political Bases of Legal 
Institutions, p. 14. 
49 Hisyam, Caught between Three Fires: The Javanese Pangulu under the Dutch Colonial 
Administration, 1882-1942, p. 62. 
50 Ibid., p. 116. 








However,	 this	 intention	was	never	 implemented	as	 the	government	




intended	 to	 restructure	 the	 organization	 of	 penghulu.	 The	 general	
elucidation	on	the	law	clearly	states	that	preceding	Dutch	regulations	
did	not	guarantee	marriage	registrars	(penghulu)	a	salary	since	their	
income	 was	 dependent	 on	 the	 fees	 they	 received	 from	 the	 marital	
couples’	 families.	 This	 gave	 rise	 to	 the	 concern	 that	 they	 were	 not	
executing	 their	 task	 in	 a	 proper	 manner,	 not	 to	 mention	 to	 the	
possibility	that	they	might	be	lining	their	own	pockets	on	the	side.	The	
whole	matter	was	complicated	even	further	because	this	fee	(ipekah)	







ceremony	 in	 the	 office	 and	 a	marriage	 conducted	outside	 the	 office	
(bedolan).	 To	 officiate	 at	 the	 latter,	 the	 penghulu	 had	 to	 attend	 a	
marriage	 ceremony	 held,	 for	 instance,	 at	 the	 bride’s	 house.	 They	
charged	extra	for	this,	but	there	was	no	specific	regulation	which	could	
ensure	a	degree	of	uniformity	in	this	matter.	In	Circular	(surat	edaran)	
No.	 2/B/1954	 issued	 by	 the	 Jakarta	 Office	 of	 Religious	 Affairs	 in	
1954,52	bedolan	featured	as	an	important	issue	with	regard	to	the	legal	
 
51 Ibid., p. 163. 
52 Surat Edaran Jawaban Urusan Agama Jakarta No. 21/B/1954 soal Bedolan (Circular from 




status	 of	 the	 sum	 they	 received	 from	 the	 bride’s	 families.	 Rather	
puzzlingly,	 the	 Circular	 seems	 to	 justify	 this	 extra	 charge.	 It	
emphasizes	 that	 penghulu	 in	 big	 cities	 were	 likely	 to	 receive	 a	
significant	 amount	 of	 money,	 whereas	 their	 counterparts	 in	 small	
towns	and	rural	areas	would	enjoy	smaller	amounts	of	money.	
Ever	 since,	 the	 bedolan	 fee	 has	 been	 subject	 to	 debate	 and	
conflicting	legal	norms.	Each	region	has	its	own	approach	to	dealing	
with	this	matter.	Numerous	regencies	use	local	regulations	issued	by	
the	 Regent	 to	 legalize	 the	 practice	 of	 charging	 an	 additional	 fee	 in	
calculations	 of	 the	 bedolan.	 The	 MoRA	 turned	 a	 blind	 eye	 to	 this	
variation	in	the	fee.	The	government	regulation	only	mentions	that	an	
administration	 fee	of	Rp.	30,000	 is	 charged,	 irrespective	of	where	a	
marriage	ceremony	was	conducted.53	For	some	decades,	the	additional	
fee	 has	 been	 the	 norm	 in	 society.	 Many	 people	 believe	 that	 the	
penghulu	 deserve	 the	 fees	 because	 of	 their	 important	 role	 in	 a	
marriage	ceremony.		
For	example,	 in	Sidoarjo,	East	 Java,	 in	2003	the	Bupati	 issued	a	
decree	 concerning	 the	 adjustment	 (penyesuaian)	 of	 the	 bedolan	 fee	
and	the	honorarium	for	the	P3N	(Pembantu	Pegawai	Pencatat	Nikah	
or	 Assistant	 to	 the	 Marriage	 Registrar).54	 The	 letter	 referred	 to	 a	
higher	regulation,	namely:	the	decision	made	by	the	Governor	of	East	
Java	province	which	approved	the	bedolan	fee	and	the	honorarium	for	
the	 P3N.55	 The	 Regent	 of	 Sidoarjo’s	 decree	 stipulated	 that	 the	
administration	 fee	 for	marriage	outside	 the	office	 in	working	hours	
was	Rp.	180,000,	differing	considerably	from	that	in	the	government	
regulation.	 This	 Regent’s	 regulation	 demonstrates	 that	 the	
 
53 Peraturan Pemerintah (the Government Regulation) No. 51/2000 tentang Tarif atas Jenis 
Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak yang berlaku pada Departemen Agama (on the Non-tax 
Revenue of the MoRA). 
54 Keputusan Bupati Sidoarjo (Decree of the Regentof Sidoarjo) No. 29/2003 tentang 
Penyesuaian Biaya Nikah Bedolan dan Honorarium Pembantu Pegawai Pencatat Nikah (P3N) 
Kabupaten Sidoarjo (on the Synchronization of the Bedolan Fee and the Honorarium of P3N 
in Sidoarjo). 
55 Surat Gubemur Jawa Timur (Letter of the Governor of East Java) No. 45113267/02112002 
tentang Permohonan Persetujuan Penyesuaian Besarnya Biaya Nikah Bedolan dan 
Honorarium Pembantu Pegawai Pencatat Nikah (P3N) (In Response to the Request for an 
Adjustment to the Bedolan Fee and the Honorarium of P3N). 
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administration	 fee	 for	 an	 Islamic	marriage	 has	 become	 a	matter	 of	
concern	 not	 only	 to	 the	 MoRA	 District	 Office	 (Kantor	 Kementerian	




In	 response	 to	 the	 confusion	 caused	 by	 these	 different	 local	





regulations.56	 Moreover,	 the	 central	 government	 also	 issued	
Regulation	 No.	 47/2004.	 Although	 this	 replaced	 the	 previous	












(penghulu,	 modin,	 marriage	 preparation	 course	 and	 other	 things),	




A Instruksi Menteri Agama (Instruction of the Minister of Religious Affairs) No. 2/2004 tentang 
eningkatan Pelayanan Pernikahan Pada Kantor Urusan Agama Kecamatan (on the 
Improvement of Service in Sub-district KUA). 
57 Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Subang (Local Regulation Subang) No. 22/2006 tentang Biaya 

















the	 bedolan	 fee,	 penghulu	 cannot	 reject	 any	 proposal	 for	 paying	
bedolan	as	 it	 is	allowed	by	the	regulation.	Accordingly,	 the	statistics	







municipality	 for	 receiving	money	 as	 bedolan	 and	 sentenced	 to	 one	
year’s	 imprisonment	 and	 a	 fine	 of	 Rp.	 50,000,000.	 It	 appeared	 that	









58 Departemen Agama RI, Bimas Islam dalam Angka 2007 (Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal 
Bimbingan Masyarakat Islam, 2007), p. 24. 
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Some	portion	 of	 the	 fee	was	 used	 to	 pay	 the	 salary	 of	 non-tenured	
administrators	in	the	KUA	and	was	also	deposited	with	the	marriage	
section	at	the	District	Office	of	Religious	Affairs.	I	was	informed	that	
this	 regular	 deposit	 enabled	 the	 district	 office	 to	 pay	 allowances	 to	
P3N.	Romli	was	prosecuted	under	Article	11	of	the	Law	on	Bribery	and	
Corruption	 of	 2001.	 The	 informal	 fee	 was	 officially	 defined	 as	 an	
unlawful	gratification.59	The	Article	states	that	a	state	official	is	subject	
to	 5-year	 term	 of	 imprisonment	 or	 a	 fine	 ranging	 from	 50	 to	 250	
million	rupiahs,	if	he/she	receives	a	gratification	as	a	consequence	of	
his/her	 position.60	 The	 judges	 decided	 that	 Romli	 was	 had	 been	




KUA	 in	Surabaya	who	was	 the	 co-ordinator	of	 the	Forum	of	Kepala	
KUA	of	East	Java.	The	forum	was	established	after	the	Romli	case	had	
been	 filed	 with	 the	 court	 of	 Surabaya.	 Samsu	 Thohari	 argued	 that	
Romli	had	been	acting	carefully	and	 in	good	 faith	and	should	never	
have	been	prosecuted.	Thohari	and	his	colleagues	perceived	Romli’s	
case	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 criminalization	 of	 penghulu	 and	 condemned	 the	
central	Ministry	for	ignoring	the	situations	on	the	ground	with	which	
penghulu	were	confronted.61	They	protested	against	the	legal	process	






60 The decision of Surabaya General Court No. 104/Pid.Sus/2013/PN.Sby. 






Thohari	 argued	 that	 Romli’s	 gratification	 case	 should	 be	
understood	in	the	framework	of	the	central	government’s	attempts	to	
achieve	good	governance	 in	 the	MoRA.	 In	mid-2012,	 the	MoRA	was	
shaken	by	a	corruption	case	arising	from	a	project	to	print	the	Qur’an	
(pengadaan	Al-Qur’an).	In	the	same	year,	M.	Yasin,	the	ex-deputy-head	
of	 the	 Commission	 for	 the	 Eradication	 of	 Corruption	 (Komisi	
Pemberantasan	Korupsi,	KPK)	was	appointed	Inspector-General	of	the	
MoRA.	 He	 later	 became	 an	 icon	 of	 the	 corruption	 eradication	
movement	in	all	the	working	units	under	the	MoRA.	The	KUA,	as	the	
MoRA	frontline	public	service	institution,	emerged	as	a	major	concern	
in	 the	 hoary	 practice	 of	 charging	 informal	 fees.	 In	 2014,	 the	 KPK	
designated	the	MoRA	one	of	the	‘red-report’	(rapor	merah)	Ministries	
on	account	of	the	lack	of	integrity	of	its	functionaries.63		
A	 few	 years	 prior	 to	 the	 allegations	 against	 Romli,	 the	 MoRA	
attempted	 to	 reduce	 the	 practice	 of	 informal	 fees,	 whose	 roots	 the	
MoRA	assumed	had	to	do	with	the	intermediary	roles	played	by	P3N.64	
 
62 This picture was taken from 
https://m.kbr.id/media/?size=810x450&filename=/archive/2013/12/16/pengulubesar.jpg 
63 https://tirto.id/biaya-nikah-dan-rapor-merah-kua-bGz3 
64 As the effort, the Director General of Bimas Islam issued the Circular letter No 
DJ.II.I/3/HK.007/2757/2013 on the prohibition of collecting informal fees in marriage 
registration. 





is	 that,	 despite	 the	 official	 position	 of	 P3N,	 they	 are	 not	 officially	
salaried.	Although	it	was	said	that	they	receive	allowances	once	every	
three	 months,	 when	 push	 came	 to	 shove,	 the	 local	 government	
allocated	their	allowances	from	the	informal	fees	collected	by	the	KUA.	
In	 its	attempt	 to	get	on	 top	of	 the	problem,	 the	MoRA	reformed	the	
position	 of	 P3N.	 This	 reform	was	 initiated	 in	 2009,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
Instruction	of	the	Director	General	of	Bimas	Islam	DJ.II/113/2009.65	
The	Instruction	orders	the	District	Office	of	Religion	not	to	extend	the	






rejections	 in	 numerous	 areas.	 In	 Palembang,	 South	 Sumatra,	 for	
instance,	P3N	requested	a	hearing	 in	 the	 local	Parliament	 to	 secure	
their	position.		
Returning	to	the	Romli	case,	the	heart	of	the	problem	is	that	the	
role	 of	 a	penghulu	 is	 critical	 in	 the	 administration	 of	 a	marriage.	 A	






which	 seem	 perfectly	 legitimate	 given	 the	 extra	 work	 he	 has	 been	
required	to	do.	We	learn	from	Lipsky	that	as,	a	civil	servant,	a	penghulu	
might	have	to	work	in	situations	which	often	require	responses	to	the	
human	dimensions	of	a	 situation.68	 If	dedicated	 to	his	 job,	he	might	
 
65 Instruction of the Director General of Bimas Islam DJ.II/113/2009 (10 February 2009) on the 
use of non-tax revenue funds and the reorganization of P3N. 
66 Instruction of the Director General of Bimas Islam DJ. II/1/2015 on the promotion of P3N. 
67 Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services, p. 3. 





on-the-spot,	 he	 feels	 that	 he	 is	 best	 equipped	 to	 deal	 with	 local	
situations	and,	when	the	central	government	attempts	to	change	the	
status	quo,	he	often	tries	to	resist	this	intervention.	
Likewise,	 in	 Sumbersari	 society	 in	 which	 I	 was	 doing	 my	
fieldwork,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	abolition	of	 the	position	of	P3N	had	no	
effect	whatsoever	on	the	practices	of	modin.	Fighting	to	uphold	their	
position,	 the	modin	 have	 set	 up	 an	 association	 (paguyuban)	 called	
Samawa.	Every	month	they	meet	in	each	other’s	houses.	Sometime	in	
January	 2017,	 I	 attended	 one	 of	 their	meetings.	 Although	 it	was	 an	
informal	 gathering,	 it	 was	 spilling	 over	 with	 religious	 agenda.	 A	
recitation	 of	 tahlil	 (prayers	 to	 remember	 the	 dead)	 opened	 the	
meeting.	 A	 number	 of	 issues	 came	 up	 in	 a	 discussion	 session	
afterwards.	One	was	wali	(guardianship).	Haji	Hamim,	co-ordinator	of	
this	 paguyuban,	 argued	 that	 guardianship	 continued	 to	 cause	
problems	in	society	because,	in	fact,	official	documents	cannot	always	
be	guaranteed	to	contain	valid	data	about	a	citizen,	especially	in	the	
matter	 of	 the	 biological	 relationship	 between	 a	 father	 and	 his	
daughter.		
Moreover,	Haji	Mustofa’s	opening	statement	implied	that	people	
actually	 involve	 them	on	 the	basis	of	 their	position	as	modin	 rather	
than	as	P3N.	He	also	emphasized	that	it	would	be	almost	impossible	
for	the	government	to	monopolize	the	administration	of	marriage	as	
long	 as	 the	 civil	 administration	 on	 the	 level	 of	 local	 society	 is	 not	
properly	 organized.	 Besides	 performing	 his	 religious	 duties,	 at	 the	
very	least	a	modin	plays	an	important	role	in	verifying	the	biological	
relationship	 between	 the	 bride	 and	 the	 marriage	 guardian.	 In	






For	 example,	 on	 one	 occasion	 a	 bride	 registered	 a	 man,	 Pak	
Ahmad,	as	her	marriage	guardian.	A	neighbouring	villager	dropped	a	
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hint	 that	 the	 modin	 should	 double	 check	 who	 could	 serve	 as	 the	
guardian	 in	 her	marriage	 because	 Pak	 Ahmad	was,	 in	 fact,	 not	 the	
biological	 father	 of	 the	 bride,	 even	 though	 on	 the	 family	 card	 Pak	
Ahmad	is	listed	as	her	father.	This	raised	the	problem	that,	according	







good	deal	of	discretion,	 assuming	 that,	 if	 the	biological	 father	knew	
about	the	situation,	he	would	confront	Pak	Ahmad.		
In	 Sumbersari,	 rarely	 does	 a	 father	 give	 the	 bride	 in	marriage	










This	 experience	 goes	 a	 long	 way	 to	 underline	 that	 Muslim	
marriage	 registration	 is	 much	 more	 than	 simply	 an	 administrative	
affair.	 It	has	wider	dimensions,	both	religious	and	social.	Because	of	
these	 ramifications,	 a	modin,	 the	 man-on-the-spot,	 remains	 a	 vital	
actor.	The	story	I	have	just	told	shows	very	clearly	that,	in	contrast	to	
the	limited	capacity	of	the	state,	the	modin	played	an	important	role	in	











have	 become	 an	 important	 step	 on	 the	 road	 to	 further	 reform.	 An	
important	 figure	 in	 the	 section	 of	 the	MoRA	dealing	with	penghulu,	
Anwar	 Saadi,	 told	 me	 that,	 through	 its	 failure	 to	 live	 up	 to	 its	
responsibility,	the	government	was	ignoring	the	interests	of	penghulu	
and	neglecting	Muslim	affairs	 in	general.69	Adding	his	weight	 to	 the	
discussion,	 Suryadharma	 Ali,	 the	 incumbent	 Minister,	 argued	 that	
people	 perceive	 the	marriage	 ceremony	 to	 be	 a	 sacred	 event.	 They	
prefer	 to	 conduct	 it	 at	 home	 and	 it	 is	 common	 for	 people	 to	 give	
voluntary	gifts	to	their	kyai	or	penghulu	for	performing	their	religious	
roles	in	a	marriage	ceremony.		





marriage	 registration	 can	 never	 be	 free	 of	 charge.70	 Under	 the	
supervision	 of	 the	 Co-ordinating	 Ministry	 for	 Human	 Development	
and	 Cultural	 Affairs,	 the	 government	 prepared	 a	 new	 regulation	 to	
accommodate	 its	 preference.	 According	 to	 Anwar	 Saadi,	 the	 MoRA	




Thirdly,	 if	 the	 marriage	 ceremony	 was	 held	 on	 hired	 premises	
(gedung),	the	couple’s	family	would	have	to	pay	even	more.	This	initial	
proposal	 was	 rejected	 as	 too	 complicated	 and	 the	 proposal	 was	
simplified	into	two	categories	of	fees.	The	first	category	remained	the	
 
69 Interview with Anwar Saadi, 13 December 2017. 
70 http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2014/02/07/menkokesra-biaya-nikah-harus-tetap-
ada 
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same,	while	 the	 second	and	 the	 third	were	 fused	 into	one	with	one	
charge,	Rp.	600,000.	
The	KPK,	 the	Parliament	and	the	Ministry	of	Home	Affairs	 then	
exerted	 pressure	 on	 the	 MoRA	 to	 change	 the	 first	 category	 by	
eliminating	 the	 fee	altogether.	Their	argument	was	premised	on	UU	
No.	 23/2006	 on	 Civil	 Administration	 (administrasi	 kependudukan).	
The	 law	merely	 stipulates	 that	 all	 Muslim	 citizens	 who	 conclude	 a	
marriage	ceremony	must	report	it	to	the	sub-district	KUA	within	60	
days.	 According	 to	 the	 law,	 a	 marriage	 ceremony	 is	 considered	 to	
constitute	 one	 of	 the	 ‘crucial	 life	 moments’	 (peristiwa	 penting)	 to	
which	 the	 legal	 obligation	 of	 registration	 is	 applied.71	 Furthermore,	
Article	79A	of	the	UU	No.	24/2013,	a	revision	of	the	previous	UU	No.	
23/2006	 on	 Civil	 Administration,	 states	 that	 “all	 matters	 as	 the	
consequence	 of	 the	 publication	 of	 civil	 documents	 (dokumen	
kependudukan)	are	 free	of	charge”.	With	regard	 to	 these	provisions,	
marriage	certificate	issued	by	the	KUA	is	taken	to	be	one	of	these	civil	







No.	 23/2006	 refers	 specifically	 to	 documents	 of	 civil	 registration	
(pencatatan	 sipil),	 which	 does	 not	 necessarily	 include	 marriage	
registration.	Secondly,	there	is	still	a	dichotomy	between	registration	





71 The Law 23/2006 on Civil Administration (administrasi kependudukan). 
72 This idea was, for instance, expressed by a penghulu in West Java, arguing that the 
management of administration fee should be decentralized because of the variety of 





rules.	 Anwar	 Saadi	 confessed	 that	 the	MoRA	 failed	 to	 negotiate	 the	
KUA	 officials’	 interests	 effectively	 in	 the	 meeting	 with	 different	
elements	in	the	government.		
To	ensure	the	proper	administer	of	the	civil	administration	and	
public	 service,	 the	 central	 government	 issued	 Governmental	
Regulation	No.	48/	2014	which	accommodates	the	last	option.	Article	
6	states	that	every	citizen	who	performs	a	marriage	or	brings	about	a	
reconciliation	 inside	 or	 outside	 the	 KUA	 office	 should	 not	 charge	 a	
registration	fee.	If	a	marriage	ceremony	is	held	outside	the	KUA	office,	









was	 launched	 in	 tandem	 with	 the	 application	 of	 the	 single	
identification	number	(Nomor	Induk	Kependudukan,	NIK),	introduced	
by	 the	 government	 in	 2009.74	 This	 is	 also	 known	 as	 the	 electronic	
identity	 card	 (e-KTP).	 The	 SIMKAH	 uses	 the	 NIK	 as	 the	 main	
parameter	 by	 which	 to	 examine	 the	 validity	 of	 a	 person’s	 private	
details.	During	the	first	years	of	its	operation,	however,	the	SIMKAH	
did	 not	 link	 up	 with	 the	 NIK	 database	 stored	 by	 the	 MoHA.	
Nevertheless,	it	was	already	able	to	prevent	any	inaccurate	scrutiny	of	
the	 age	 of	 the	 bride.	 It	was	 only	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2015	 that	 numerous	
regencies	 initiated	 integration	 of	 the	 local	 civil	 administration	
database	with	the	SIMKAH	database	managed	by	the	KUA.	This	was	an	
outcome	 of	 the	 regulation	 issued	 by	 the	 Minister	 of	 MoHA	 which	
 
73 See Article 6 PP No. 48/2014 on the non-tax income of the MoRA. 
74 Peraturan Presiden (the Presidential Regulation) 26/2009 Tentang Penerapan Kartu Tanda 
Penduduk Berbasis Nomor Induk Kependudukan Secara Nasional (on the implementation of 
the identity card on the basis of a national identity number). 
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co-operation	accord	which	ushered	 in	 the	use	of	 e-KTP	 in	marriage	
registration	 nationwide.	 E-KTP	 has	 now	 become	 a	 compulsory	




data	 on	 marriage	 registration	 managed	 by	 the	 MoRA.	 Of	 course,	
according	to	Anwar	Saadi,	the	implementation	of	the	use	of	e-KTP	is	
subject	to	the	readiness	of	each	KUA	to	undertake	this	task.75		
That	 said,	 the	 integration	of	marriage	registration	 into	 the	civil	
administration	 has	 had	 important	 consequences.	 Firstly,	 because	
nowadays	the	KUA	obliges	them	to	submit	an	electronic	identity	card	
(e-KTP),	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 possible	 for	 both	 the	 brides	 and	 grooms	 to	




submit	 a	 letter	 from	 the	 local	 civil	 administration	 bureau	 declaring	
that	the	NIK	has	been	verified	and	the	identity	card	is	being	processed.	
This	 procedure	means	 there	 is	 no	 longer	 any	 room	 for	 backdating	
birthdates	(menuakan	usia)	when	applying	to	register	a	marriage.		
 
75 Pencatatan Nikah Hanya Menggunakan KTP Elektronik, 
https://bimasislam.kemenag.go.id/post/berita/pencatatan-nikah-hanya-menggunakan-ktp-







Secondly,	when	 the	 bride	 is	 not	 legally	 allowed	 to	 register	 her	
marriage,	 primarily	 because	 her	 age	 is	 under	 16	 on	 the	 day	 of	 the	
marriage	ceremony,	the	modin	usually	marry	a	couple	informally	for	
social	 reasons	 and	 postpones	 the	 registration.	 This	means	 that	 one	
consequence	of	the	modernization	of	the	marriage	registration	system	

















through	 the	 SIMKAH,	 the	MoRA	 introduced	 a	marriage	 card	 (kartu	
nikah)	in	November	2018	and	stipulated	in	the	newest	regulation	on	












the	 state	 co-opts	 religion	and	centralizes	 Islamic	 religious	authority	
within	its	own	institutions.76	We	see	how	state	actors	are	empowering	
state-funded	 administrative	 bodies	 to	 shape	 Islamic	 discourses	 and	
 
76 Ann Marie Wainscott, Bureaucratizing Islam: Morocco and the War on Terror (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 14; Müller, The Bureaucratization of Islam and its Socio-





















In	 order	 to	 sift	 out	 some	 of	 these	 complexities,	 the	MoRA	 has	
attempted	a	series	of	reforms	of	the	KUA	over	the	last	few	years.	These	
reforms	 have	 been	 introduced	 into	 numerous	 fields	 and	 include	
administrative	 fees,	 the	 positions	 of	 penghulu	 and	modin	 and	 their	
competences	 and	 the	 administrative	 system	 itself.	 Despite	 the	
solutions	 the	 reforms	 have	 offered,	 they	 have	 brought	 a	 number	 of	
problems	in	their	wake.	It	seems	as	one	problem	is	solved,	another	one	
arises.		
The	 first	 problem	 is	 related	 to	 the	 administrative	 fees	 and	 the	
position	of	the	penghulu.	The	position	of	penghulu	has	always	been	a	
thorn	in	the	side	of	the	Ministry	ever	since	early	years	after	Indonesian	
Independence.	 One	 of	 the	 most	 persistent	 problems	 with	 which	
penghulu	have	been	confronted	is	the	issue	of	the	administrative	fee	




East	 Java,	 in	 2013.	 Therefore,	 the	 MoRA	 has	 introduced	 various	




has	 taken,	 the	MoRA	has	made	marriage	registration	 free	of	charge.	
This	 policy	was	 influenced	by	 the	 law	of	 civil	 administration	which	
positioned	 marriage	 registration	 as	 a	 civil	 registration.	 The	 law	
stipulates	 that	 each	 citizen	 has	 the	 right	 to	 obtain	 a	 dokumen	
kependudukan	 (civil	 document)	 free	 of	 charge.	 Because	 marriage	
certificates	are	deemed	to	be	the	equivalent	to	other	civil	documents,	
Muslim	marriage	 registration	 accordingly	 should	 cost	 nothing.	Only	
people	who	wish	 to	 conclude	bedolan	 are	 expected	 to	 pay	 extra	 to	
cover	the	costs	incurred	by	the	penghulu.	This	reform	has	meant	that	
the	 KUA	 officials	 apparently	 tended	 to	 identify	 themselves	 as	 civil	
registration	 rather	 than	 religious	 officials.	 In	 fact,	 the	 KUA	 has	 a	
religion-based	jurisdiction,	namely:	to	supervise	whether	a	marriage	
ceremony	complies	with	Islamic	doctrines	and	it	seems	that	the	MoRA	









with	 the	 uncertain	 legal	 status	 of	 the	 P3N	 which	 means	 the	
government	is	disobliged	to	pay	them	a	salary.	In	practice,	it	is	hard	to	
implement	 this	 reform	 in	 society.	 In	 certain	 rural	 Muslim	
communities,	 Islamic	 marriage	 is	 a	 religious	 ceremony	 which	
necessitates	the	authority	of	informal	religious	leaders	such	as	kyai	or	




delegate	 any	marriage	 administration	 to	 a	modin	 and,	 by	 so	 doing,	
villagers	 manage	 to	 achieve	 two	 goals	 simultaneously:	 the	





legal	 status	as	P3N	does	not	affect	 their	 roles	as	modin.	As	a	 result,	
these	informal	leaders	cannot	be	replaced	just	like	that.	
The	 third	kind	of	 reform,	 integrating	marriage	registration	 into	
the	 civil	 administration,	 seems	 to	 have	 run	 into	 the	 same	 sorts	 of	
problems.	The	use	of	 the	NIK	 is	unquestionably	 to	avoid	 fraudulent	
changes	in	the	ages	of	the	couples,	yet	there	is	no	guarantee	that	this	
will	 stop	 people’s	 willingness	 to	 marry	 their	 children	 under	 the	
statutory	marriageable	age.	In	cases	like	this,	the	intervention	of	the	
modin	 remains	 important.	 Neither	 the	 modern	 system	 nor	 the	
government	 officials	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 able	 to	 handle	 this	 situation	
adroitly.	Confronted	with	a	problem	 like	 this,	 a	modin	will	 come	up	
with	a	solution.	Their	most	common	solution	is	to	perform	a	religious	
marriage	 with	 a	 delayed/retroactive	 registration.	 Although	 the	
religious	 marriage	 literally	 does	 breach	 the	 law,	 the	 delay	 in	
registration	does	guarantee	the	legal	status	of	the	couples.	
In	 the	 next	 chapters,	 I	 leave	 the	 discussion	 on	 the	 legal	 and	
bureaucratic	reform	of	marriage	administration	in	the	KUA	and	turn	
my	 focus	 instead	 to	 look	 at	 law	 in	 action.	 I	 try	 to	 build	 up	 an	
understanding	of	 how	people	deal	with	 the	 state	 law	and	negotiate	
their	 interest	 to	 comply	with	 it.	However,	 before	 plunging	 into	 this	
discussion,	 the	 following	 chapter	 presents	 the	 social	 context	 of	 the	
society	in	which	I	have	done	my	research.	This	is	to	give	a	preliminary	














































socio-economic	 history,	 the	 religious	 and	 cultural	 life	 and	 the	
development	of	Islam	in	Pasuruan.	It	consists	of	three	sections.	It	first	
sets	the	scene	by	delineating	the	historical	development	of	Pasuruan,	












betel.1	 However,	 this	 name	 has	 gone	 out	 of	 use	 and	 the	 fact	 that	
Pasuruan	 was	 once	 a	 place	 where	 the	 betel	 (areca)	 palm	 grew	 in	
abundance	 has	 long	 since	 faded	 from	 people’s	 memories.	 The	
alternative	name	of	Pasuruan,	Gembong	(the	name	of	a	river	dividing	
the	 town),	which	was	used	by	many	 Javanese	 in	 the	past	 is	 also	no	
longer	used.	
The	district	of	Pasuruan	is	 located	around	65	kilometres	south-
east	of	Surabaya,	 the	capital	 city	of	 the	province.	Today	Pasuruan	 is	
home	 to	 1,501,798	 Muslim	 people	 or	 98	 percent	 of	 the	 whole	
population.	A	group	of	Hindus,	around	15,612	(1%),	most	of	whom	live	
in	the	southern	highlands	around	the	volcano	Mount	Bromo,	constitute	
the	 second	 largest	 population.2	 Historically,	 it	 was	 not	 until	 the	




was	 a	 frontier	 area	 of	 Mataram,	 especially	 in	 view	 of	 its	 close	




1 P.A. van der Lith and Joh. F. Snelleman, Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië, vol. 3 edition 
(Amsterdam: KIT Royal Tropical Institute, 2010), p. 233. 
2 BPS Kab. Pasuruan, Kabupaten Pasuruan dalam Angka 2016 (Pasuruan: BPS Kab. Pasuruan, 
2017). 
3 R.E. Elson, ‘Sugar and Peasants: The Social Impact of the Western Sugar Industry on the 
Peasantry of the Pasuruan Area, East Java, from the Cultivation System to the Great 
Depression’ (Monash University, 1979). 





This	 section	 elucidates	 the	 history	 of	 Pasuruan,	 including	 the	





Pasuruan,	 and	 this	 is	 generally	 true	 of	 other	 areas	 located	 in	 the	
Eastern	Salient	of	 Java	 (tapal	kuda),	 is	home	 to	people	of	Madurese	
descent.	The	historical	ties	between	Madura	and	Pasuruan	go	back	a	
long	way	to	the	thirteenth	century,	when	Raden	Wijaya,	the	founder	of	
the	 Majapahit	 kingdom,	 agreed	 to	 grant	 Wiraraja,	 the	 Regent	 of	
Madura,	the	Eastern	Salient	of	Java	in	gratitude	for	his	support	of	the	
kingdom.	Nevertheless,	earlier	literature	suggests	that	both	Javanese	
and	 Madurese	 were	 already	 conscious	 of	 belonging	 to	 the	 same	
cultural	 community.	 Husson	 categorizes	Madurese	 out-migration	 to	
East	Java	into	six	chronological	orders.	He	claims	that	Madurese	serfs	
first	went	 to	East	 Java	 in	 the	 thirteenth	and	 fourteenth	centuries,	 to	







and	 the	 nineteenth	 century.	 At	 the	 time,	 Madura	 was	 a	 source	 of	
soldiers	 for	 the	 powers	 fighting	 for	 supremacy	 in	 East	 Java.	 The	
military	 missions	 stimulated	 population	 movements.	 To	 take	 one	
example,	a	thousand	Madurese	were	recruited	by	the	VOC	for	the	war	
against	 Blambangan	 in	 1741.	 Madurese	 soldiers	 who	 had	 been	
involved	in	different	battles	in	East	Java	remained	there	afterwards.	If	
they	 did	 return	 to	Madura,	 they	 brought	 back	 such	 glowing	 stories	




Regent	 of	West	 Madura	 and	 the	 VOC	which	 stated	 that	 the	 Regent	




pay	 crippling	 taxes	 and	 retributions	 and	 therefore	 many	 left	 their	






has	been	an	enduring	problem	and	always	 formed	 to	 the	barrier	 to	
agricultural	 development.	 Agricultural	 harvests	 in	 the	 nineteenth	
century	 were	 far	 from	 enough	 to	 satisfy	 local	 needs.	 There	 are	
 
4 Laurence Husson, ‘Eight Centuries of Madurese Migration to East Java’, Asia and Pacific 
Migration Journal, vol. 6, no. 1 (1997), p. 79. 
5 Ibid., pp. 81–3. 
6 Ibid., pp. 84–5. 
7 Ibid., p. 85. 
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references	which	indicate	the	widespread	use	of	coolies	and	seasonal	
and	 permanent	 workers	 from	 Madura	 in	 East	 Java,	 particularly	 in	





the	 1830s	 and	 the	 1870s.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 very	 large-scale	
government	 project,	 enterprising	 individuals	 also	 set	 up	 their	 own	
private	 plantations.	 The	 establishment	 of	 these	 private	 plantations	
produced	 a	 rapid	 spurt	 in	 Madurese	 migration.	 Madura	 quickly	
became	 a	 reservoir	 of	 the	 manpower	 which	 was	 so	 vital	 to	 this	
development.	 For	 instance,	 Probolinggo	 experienced	 a	 5.19	 percent	
population	increase	in	1854,	attributable	to	the	arrival	of	Madurese.	
The	 expansion	 of	the	 government	 plantation	 project	 and	 private	
enterprises	meant	that	the	cane-sugar	industry	of	Java	was	the	second	
largest	in	the	world	after	Cuba.8	This	seasonal	migration	marked	the	
fourth	wave	 of	migration	which	 took	 place	 in	 the	 latter	 part	 of	 the	
nineteenth	century.	According	to	Husson,9	with	reference	to	Weddik,	
kinship	ties	meant	that	migrants	from	Sampang	and	Bangkalan	chose	
to	 reside	 in	 Pasuruan.	 Quoting	 Van	 Nes,	 Elson	 reveals	 that,	 in	 the	
1830s,	demographically,	Madurese	constituted	around	35	percent	of	
Pasuruan	 residents,	 approximately	 170,049	 Javanese	 and	 92,463	
Madurese.10		
The	 fifth	 round	 of	 migration	 occurred	 during	 the	 Japanese	
occupation	 (1942-1945).	 During	 this	 period,	 Madurese	 peasants	
suffered	famine	and	poverty	because	of	the	continual	worsening	of	the	
island’s	economy,	the	result	of	failed	harvests	and	crippling	taxation.	A	
very	 large	 group	 of	Madurese	made	 their	way	 to	 East	 Java	 on	 foot,	
travelling	at	night	to	avoid	the	sun,	in	their	battle	to	survive	seeking	to	
find	 food	 and	 work	 in	 Java.11	 The	 last	 wave	 of	 migration	 occurred	
 
8 Ulbe Bosma, ‘The Cultivation System (1830-1870) and Its Private Entrepreneurs on Colonial 
Java’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 38, no. 2 (2007), pp. 275–91. 
9 Husson, ‘Eight centuries of Madurese migration to East Java’, p. 86. 
10 Ibid., p. 85. 








also	 worked	 as	 shopkeepers,	 run	 food-stalls	 (warung),	 become	
rickshaw-drivers	(tukang	becak)	and	 fruit-sellers.	 Internal	solidarity	
among	 Madurese	 seems	 to	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 group’s	
economic	situation.12	 Interestingly,	 the	migratory	 influx	has	 led	 to	a	








an	 important	 area	 on	 the	 stage	 of	 Java’s	 history	 when,	 in	 1830,	
Governor-General	 Van	 den	 Bosch	 decreed	 that	 it	 was	 part	 of	 the	
Cultivation	 System.	 This	 was	 a	 policy	 introduced	 by	 the	 Dutch	
government	which	imposed	on	the	Javanese	population	the	obligation	
to	 grow	 and	make	 compulsory	 deliveries	 of	 coffee,	 sugar-cane	 and	
other	export	products	in	exchange	for	crop	payments.14	The	expansion	
of	 agricultural	 commodities	 required	 thousands	 of	 labourers	 and	




12 Ibid., pp. 90–2. 
13 Robert W. Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 195. 
14 Fasseur Cornelis, ‘The Cultivation System and its Impact on the Dutch Colonial Economy and 
the Indigenous Society in Nineteenth-Century Java’, in Two Colonial Empires. Comparative 
Studies in Overseas History, ed. by Bayly C.A. and Kolff D.H.A. (Dordrecht: Springer, 1986), pp. 
137–54; Melissa Christina van Bijsterveld, ‘Continuation and Change on Dutch Plantations in 
Indonesia’ (Leiden University, 2018). 
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At	the	height	of	the	Cultivation	System,	the	labour	force	mobilized	
for	 government	 enterprises	 was	 coerced	 and	 their	 sheer	 numbers	
massive.15	 Meanwhile,	 the	 number	 of	 coffee	 trees	 planted	 grew	
significantly	until	eventually	70	percent	of	all	Javanese	families	were	
involved	in	compulsory	cultivation	and	more	than	half	of	them	worked	
with	 coffee.	 However,	 the	 payment	 for	 these	 products	 was	 not	
commensurate	with	the	market	value	or	with	the	efforts	required	by	
the	planters.	The	value	of	the	export	product	amounted	to	11.3	million	
guilders	 in	 1830	 and	 rose	 to	 66.1	million	 in	 1840.16	 Although,	 as	 a	
consequence	 of	 its	 astonishing	 profitability,	 coffee	 remained	 a	
government	 monopoly	 longer	 than	 any	 other	 crop,17	 the	 northern	
littoral	 stretching	 from	Pasuruan	 to	 Surabaya	became	 Java's	 largest	












capital	 of	 the	 present-day	 regencies	 of	 Probolinggo,	 Malang	 and	
Lumajang.	 As	 time	 passed,	 the	 economic	 position	 of	 the	 Pasuruan	
regency	 declined	 as	 the	 result	 of	 various	 factors.	 One	 of	 the	 most	
important	 was	 that	 the	 Gembong	 River,	 which	 divided	 the	 town,	
gradually	silted	up.20	At	the	precisely	same	time,	the	early	twentieth	
 
15 Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History, p. 45. 
16 Cornelis, ‘The Cultivation System and its Impact on the Dutch Colonial Economy and the 
Indigenous Society in Nineteenth-Century Java’. 
17 Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History, p. 43. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Dédé Oetomo, ‘The Chinese of Pasuruan: Their Language and Identity’ (Australian National 
University, 1987). 












grew	 out	 of	 an	 association	 of	 Muslim	 merchants	 who	 wanted	 to	
improve	their	economic	interests	to	put	them	more	on	a	par	with	those	
of	Chinese	merchants	in	Java.	It	became	a	political	party	in	the	1920s.	





configuration,	 SI	 attracted	 peasants	 and	 quickly	 became	 an	
organization	embraced	by	the	peasants	in	their	struggles	against	the	
infidel	rulers	and	the	priyayi,	a	social	class	comprising	the	elites	and	
government	 officials.	 This	 idea	 of	 struggling	 against	 the	 rulers	 and	





economic	 crisis,	 popularly	 known	 as	 the	 Great	 Depression,	 in	
Indonesia	 during	 the	 1930s.	 Although	 this	 Great	 Depression	 had	 a	
detrimental	 effect	 on	 the	 Pasuruan	 economy,	 it	 did	 not	 change	 the	
 
21 Ibid. 
22 Harry J. Benda, ‘The Pattern of Administrative Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in 
Indonesia’, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 25, no. 4 (1966), p. 592. 
23 Elson, ‘Sugar and Peasants: The Social Impact of the Western Sugar Industry on the 
Peasantry of the Pasuruan Area, East Java, from the Cultivation System to the Great 
Depression’. 





the	 rulers	 and,	 on	 the	 ground	 in	 the	 villages,	 it	 encouraged	 rural	
religious	 teachers	 to	 promote	 its	 own	 style	 of	 religious	 platform.	
Students	in	pesantren	(santri)	were	sent	into	areas	of	the	countryside	
to	 organize	 pengajian	 (classes	 in	 Qur’an),	 thereby	 laying	 the	
groundwork	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 new	 chapter	 of	 the	
organization.	 In	 short,	 its	 strategies	 were	 apolitical.25	 Its	 priorities	
could	 be	 said	 to	 have	 been:	 do	 not	 provoke	 immediate	 anticolonial	
resistance	 but	 concentrate	 on	 disseminating	 traditional	 Islam.	 By	
deploying	this	cautious	approach,	the	NU	won	the	hearts	and	minds	of	
that	 section	 of	 the	 population	 which	 was	 a	 still	 less	 ‘Islamic’,	
succeeding	in	spreading	its	base	to	the	southern	highlands,	despite	the	
fact	 that	 the	 contest	 between	 Islam	 and	 Javanism	 (kejawen)	 in	 the	
highlands	was	still	ongoing.26	
The	Dutch	colonial	rule	was	powerful	enough	to	curb	attempts	to	









period.27	 The	 policy	 the	 Japanese	 employed	 towards	 Islam	 was	
virtually	 the	 reverse	 of	 that	 of	 the	 Dutch	 and	 exploited	 the	 old	
antipathy	towards	Christian	rulers.	The	Japanese	authorities	courted	
religious	 teachers	 in	 the	 villages	 and	 rewarded	 them	 by	 increasing	
their	local	power.	In	a	nutshell,	the	effect	of	the	Japanese	policy	was	to	
 
24 Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History, p. 197. 
25 Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese 
Occupation,1942-1945 (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1983). 
26 Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History, p. 197. 








important	 roles.	 The	 NU	 then	 became	 part	 of	 the	 government	
bureaucracy	 through	 its	 involvement	 in	 the	Shumubu,	 the	 Japanese-
created	Office	of	Religious	Affairs.29	In	the	final	months	of	the	Japanese	
occupation,	 Hizbullah,	 a	 military	 arm	 of	 the	Masyumi,	 launched	 an	
intensive	 campaign	 to	 win	 mass	 membership	 in	 Pasuruan.	 The	









of	 the	Republic	 of	 Indonesia	 came	 into	 being	 in	 the	 territory	 of	 the	
former	 Dutch	 East	 Indies.	 However,	 the	 dream	 of	 an	 independent	
Indonesian	state	was	opposed	by	the	former	colonial	power.	At	the	end	








28 Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese 
Occupation,1942-1945. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History, p. 198. 
31 Kevin W. Fogg, ‘Islam in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, 1945-1949’, Al-Jami’ah, vol. 53, no. 2 
(2015), p. 308. 
32 Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History, p. 198. 
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north.	 This	 movement	 caught	 the	 Islam-based	 organizations	 in	
Pasuruan	at	a	disadvantage	and	led	to	the	establishment	of	Nationalist	
dominance	in	the	region	following	the	war.	However,	greatly	assisted	





not	 possible.	 In	 1953,	 the	 government	 was	 able	 to	 pass	 a	 bill	 on	






(Partai	 Nasional	 Indonesia,	 the	 Indonesian	 National	 Party)	 or	 PKI	
(Partai	Komunis	Indonesia,	the	Communist	Party	of	Indonesia).33	This	





as	 the	 runner-up,	 with	 20.9	 percent	 of	 the	 votes.	 Religion	 featured	
prominently	in	the	political	campaign.		




the	Masyumi,	 disagreeing	with	 its	modernist	 ideology.	Nevertheless,	
the	NU	and	Masyumi	 leaders	met	on	 common	ground	 in	 their	 ideas	
about	 Communism.	 They	 identified	 communists	 with	 atheists.	
 
33 Justus M. van der Kroef, ‘Indonesia’s First National Election: A Sociological Analysis’, The 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol. 16, no. 3 (1957), p. 238. 
34 Robert W. Hefner, ‘Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java’, The Journal of 
Asian Studies, vol. 46, no. 3 (1987), p. 550. 
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Although	 certain	 figures	 in	 the	 NU	 condemned	 the	 PKI	 as	 an	 anti-
Islamic	organization,	some	NU	leaders	were	less	concerned	about	the	
communists	than	about	their	modernist	Muslim	rivals.	




the	 1955	 election	when	 tensions	 escalated	 after	 a	 group	 of	Muslim	
activists	 (linked	 to	 radical	 factions	 in	 the	 NU)	 occupied	 a	 famous	
upland	 dhanyang	 (a	 sacred	 place).	 Although	 overall	 the	 Islamic	
political	parties	were	disappointed	with	the	result	of	the	first	election	




put	 the	 Pasuruan's	 Javanist	 highlanders	 in	 a	 tricky	 situation.	 The	





PKI	 took	 the	 opportunity	 presented	 by	 the	 deteriorating	 economic	
situation	to	expand	its	rural	constituency.	At	the	end	of	1963,	the	PKI	
introduced	 a	 campaign	 to	 make	 the	 land	 reform	 enacted	 in	 1960	
Agrarian	 Law	 a	 reality.	 The	 PKI	 mobilized	 farmers	 into	 ‘unilateral	
actions’	(aksi	sepihak)	to	seize	the	land	of	large	landowners	and	hold	






35 Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History, p. 200. 
36 Ibid., p. 201. 






country.	The	killings	 generally	 targeted	members	of	 the	PKI	 and	 its	
comrade	 organizations.	 The	 trouble	 began	 on	 the	 evening	 of	 30	
September	 1965	 when	 a	 group	 of	 militants	 who	 proclaimed	
themselves	 Soekarno's	 protectors	 executed	 six	 of	 Indonesia's	 top	
military	 generals	 allegedly	 to	 pre-empt	 a	 possible	 coup.	 However,	
Soekarno	refused	to	associate	himself	with	this	movement.	Now	the	
cracks	 in	 the	 façade	 of	 his	 poor	 leadership	 begin	 to	 show.	 Major-
General	Soeharto,	who	at	the	time	was	the	leader	of	Kostrad	(Komando	
Strategis	Angkatan	Darat,	 Army	Strategic	 Command),	 capitalized	on	
the	 situation	 to	 claim	 control	 over	 the	 country.	He	deployed	 troops	
while	 propagating	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 movement’s	 actions	 posed	 a	
danger	 to	 the	 nation.	 Masterminded	 by	 Soeharto	 and	 his	 military	
forces,	propaganda	associating	the	coup	attempt	with	the	PKI	began	to	
be	 disseminated.38	 The	 campaign	 was	 successful,	 convincing	 both	
Indonesian	and	international	audiences	that	the	murders	were	a	PKI	





commit	 the	 mass	 murder	 of	 large	 segments	 of	 the	 population	
associated	 with	 the	 PKI.	 The	 army	 removed	 those	 top	 civilian	 and	
military	 leaders	 it	 thought	 sympathetic	 to	 the	 PKI.	 By	 the	 end	 of	
October,	the	propagation	of	this	conspiracy	theory	had	easily	won	the	
support	 of	 the	 Muslim	 leaders.	 These	 leaders,	 many	 of	 whom	
controlled	large	swathes	of	agrarian	land,	felt	threatened	of	the	PKI’s	
efforts	 to	 speed	 up	 land	 reform.	 Furthermore,	 groups	 of	 devout	
Muslims	joined	in	the	purges	against	communists,	arguing	that	it	was	
 
37 Ibid., p. 202. 
38 Jerome R. Bass, ‘The PKI and the Attempted Coup’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 









Order	 attempted	 to	 control	 Islamic	 forces.	 Islamic	 political	 parties	
were	weakened	and	merged	into	a	single	one	in	1973	and,	later,	this	







also	meant	 to	 encourage	 citizens	 to	make	 strong	 a	 commitment	 to	
practising	their	religious	doctrine,	particularly	Islam.	Consequently,	it	
is	not	 too	 farfetched	 to	 say	 that	 this	 idea	was	meant	 to	be	 the	New	
Order’s	strategy	orchestrated	to	gain	Muslim	support.	The	Pasuruan	
government	was	also	encouraged	 to	establish	 these	villages.40	 In	 its	
campaign	 the	 central	 government	 stressed	 that	 commitment	 to	 the	
religious	principle	in	Pancasila	was	the	determinant	in	the	application	
of	 the	 other	 principles.	 Therefore,	 the	 development	 of	 traditional	
Islamic	 schools	 (pesantren),	 which	 produced	 Islamic	 leaders,	 was	
considered	consistent	with	the	spirit	of	Pancasila.	
Despite	the	success	of	this	tactic,	the	New	Order	felt	it	necessary	





39 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Islamic state or state Islam? Fifty years of state-Islam relations in 
Indonesia Hamburg: Abera-Verlag’, in Indonesien am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. by Ingrid 
Wessel (Hamburg: Abera-Verlag, 1996), pp. 19–34. 
40 Pemda Kab Pasuruan, The Present Day of Kab Pasuruan (Pasaruan: Pemda Kab Pasuruan, 
1974). 




reflected	 the	growing	 influence	of	 Islam	 in	 the	bureaucracy	and	 the	
rise	of	 a	Muslim	urban	 'middle	 class'.41	However,	 some	others	have	
claimed	 that	 it	was	 an	 expression	 of	 the	 continuing	 Islamization	 of	
daily	life	which	had	occurred	in	the	1970s	and	1980s.42	In	Pasuruan	
the	trend	towards	the	growing	influence	of	Islam	among	the	Muslim	
middle	 class	did	not	 seem	 to	happen.	Pesantren	were	not	dislodged	








centre	 of	 so-called	 traditionalist	 Islam.44	 The	 most	 fundamental	
feature	of	this	type	of	Muslim	community	is	its	deep	commitment	to	




The	 influence	 of	 Islam	 was	 reinforced	 by	 the	 expansion	 of	





41 Robert W. Hefner, ‘Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian 
Middle Class’, Indonesia, vol. 56, no. October (1993), p. 32. 
42 Bruinessen, ‘Islamic state or state Islam? Fifty years of state-Islam relations in Indonesia 
Hamburg: Abera-Verlag’. 
43 M.C. Ricklefs, A history of modern Indonesia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 
p. 34. 
44 M.C. Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese society: Islamic and other visions, c. 1830-1930 (Leiden: 
KITLV Press, 2007); Koentjaraningrat, Javanese Culture (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 




were	 also	 expected	 to	 make	 gifts	 of	 money	 and	 land	 to	 religious	
teachers	to	support	the	running	of	the	pesantren.45	
Nevertheless,	Hefner	 remarks	 that	Pasuruan	 is	one	of	 the	most	
heterogeneous	 regencies	 in	 Java46	 As	 I	 have	 already	 mentioned,	
kejawen	 holds	 sway	 in	 the	 south	 while	 Islamic	 traditionalism	
predominated	in	the	north.	This	Islamic	orientation	is	not	the	preserve	
of	certain	social	classes,	but	spans	them	all.	In	this	section,	I	wish	to	











Javanese	 or	 Indonesian,	 they	 do	 so	 with	 a	 Madurese	 accent.	 As	
discussed	earlier,	the	strong	influence	of	Madurese	culture	in	this	area,	




pedalungan	 or	 orang	 campuran	 (mixed	 people).48	 This	 new	 culture	
displays	special	characteristics,	namely:	the	use	of	local	language,	the	
pattern	 of	 economic	 activities	 and	 political	 participation.49	 Another	
 
45 Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History, p. 195. 
46 Hefner, ‘Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java’, pp. 533–554. 
47 Husson, ‘Eight Centuries of Madurese Migration to East Java’. 
48 Konstantinos Retsikas, ‘The Power Of The Senses: Ethnicity, History and Embodiment in East 
Java, Indonesia’, Indonesia and the Malay World, vol. 35, no. 102 (2007), p. 970. 
49 Retsikas, ‘The Power Of The Senses: Ethnicity, History and Embodiment in East Java, 
Indonesia’; Konstantinos Retsikas, Becoming – An Anthropological Approach to 
Understandings of the Person in Java (London: Anthem Press, 2012). 
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reference	 calls	 them	pendhalungan.	 The	 term	 comes	 from	 the	word	
“dhalung”	in	Javanese	which	means	a	big	pot	in	which	rice	is	cooked.	





language	 and	 culture	 are	 characterized	 as	 arek’an.	 Geographically,	
arek’an	 culture	 is	 located	 in	 the	central	part	of	East	 Java,	 stretching	
from	 Surabaya	 to	 south	 coast	 of	Malang	 regency.	 The	 term	arek’an	
itself	 comes	 from	 the	 Javanese	word	arek	which	means	 children	 or	
young	people.	Arek’an	 is	associated	with	being	 ‘modern’	 in	 terms	of	
open-minded,	rational,	well-educated	and	able	to	adapt	easily	to	new	
situations.	From	the	religious	point	of	view,	if	pendhalungan	are	said	
to	 be	 very	 fervently	 attached	 to	 a	 traditional	 type	 of	 Islam	 and	 are	




They	 still	 preserve	 a	 culture	 which	 has	 been	 inspired	 by	 in	 the	





Besides	 the	 language	 marker,	 another	 indication	 of	 the	





50 Christanto P. Raharjo, Pendhalungan: Sebuah ‘Periuk Besar’ Masyarakat Multikultural 
(presented in Jelajah Budaya 13 August, 2006), p. 3. 
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colours.	 The	 idea	 behind	 the	 selection	 of	 such	 colours	 is	 that	 they	
reflect	courage,	openness	and	a	certain	straightforwardness.	The	men	
wear	a	loose	black	blouse	with	red	and	white	stripes.	The	sharp	stripes	
are	 meant	 to	 encourage	 the	 building	 of	 a	 firm	 character	 and	
fearlessness	in	facing	challenges.	The	loose	clothes	indicate	freedom	
and	openness.	This	outfit	is	called	pesa’an,	and	is	worn	on	both	formal	
occasions	and	 in	daily	 life.	The	women	 like	 to	wear	accessories	and	
really	conspicuous	jewellery.	It	can	be	fashioned	from	either	gold	or	
silver	 and	 sometimes	 includes	unique	motives.	 Jewellery	 is	worn	 to	
display	social	and	economic	status.52		
3.2. Religious	Groups	
The	 regency	 of	 Pasuruan	 has	 long	 been	 one	 of	 the	most	 important	
centres	of	Islamic	traditionalism	in	Java.	As	a	channel	of	traditionalist	
Muslim	clerics,	after	its	foundation,	the	NU	quickly	attained	dominance	
in	 lowland	 political	 life.	 In	 the	 Indonesian	 religious	 landscape,	 a	
‘traditionalist’	is	someone	who	embraces	one	of	the	four	Sunni	schools	
of	 jurisprudence.53	 Islamic	 traditionalism	 is	 the	main	 feature	which	
distinguishes	 the	 NU	 from	 Muslim	 ‘modernist’	 or	 ‘reformist’	
organizations.54	 In	addition	to	its	adherence	to	traditional	Islam,	the	
NU	 has	 been	 forthright	 and	 quite	 active	 in	 promoting	 the	 role	 of	 a	
religious	civil	society	by	criticizing	the	state	power	and	by	becoming	a	
vehicle	for	social	cohesion	among	citizens	in	the	1980s	and	1990s.	The	




Khittah	 (Guidelines)	 of	 1926.	 This	 would	 have	 meant	 that	 the	 NU	
abandon	 politics	 and	 revert	 to	 being	 purely	 religious	 and	 social	
 
52 Etty Herawati, Kain dan Pakaian Tradisional Madura (Jakarta: Dinas Museum dan Sejarah, 
Pemerintah DKI Jakarta, 1979). 
53 Rumadi, Islamic Post-Traditionalism in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 
2015), p. 23. 
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Within	NU	 itself	 a	diversity	of	 religious	 tendencies	 is	 apparent.	
Some	NU	leaders	in	Pasuruan	adhere	strictly	to	classical	fiqh	doctrines	








to	 cultivate	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 middle	 path	 of	 Islam.	 They	
promote	 an	 idea	 called	 Islam	 Nusantara	 (Archipelago	 Islam)	which	











have	 a	 presence,	 they	 are	 less	 popular.	 Both	 organizations	 were	
inspired	 by	 the	 reformist	 movement	 inaugurated	 by	 Muhammad	
Abduh	in	the	magazine	Tafsir	Al-Manar.	The	Muhammadiyah	chose	to	
follow	a	path	which	emphasizes	both	religious	and	secular	education	
and	 a	 tolerance	 of	 other	 faiths.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 NU,	 the	
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Muhammadiyah	 encourages	 its	 followers	 to	 use	 their	 own	 legal	
reasoning	 (ijtihad)	 rather	 than	 adhering	 to	 tradition.	 Adherence	 to	
legal	 decisions	made	by	previous	 jurists	 (taklid)	 should	be	 avoided.	
This	 religious	 idea	 is	 designated	 pemurnian	 akidah	 (purifying	 the	
faith).57	As	did	the	Muhammadiyah,	Persis	has	evolved	in	the	direction	
of	 reforming	 traditional	 Islamic	practices.	 It	 opposes	 the	practice	of	
kissing	the	hand	of	another	person	as	a	sign	of	respect,	a	practice	which	
remains	part	of	NU	tradition.58	
Furthermore,	 Bangil,	 the	 capital	 of	 Pasuruan,	 is	 home	 to	 the	
headquarters	 of	 Shi’a	 Islam	 in	 Indonesia.	 The	 rapid	development	 of	
this	 Islamic	stream	led	to	an	anti-Shi’a	protest	 in	2007.	The	protest,	
mainly	championed	by	older	NU	members,	took	place	in	front	of	the	
YAPI	 (Yayasan	 Pesantren	 Islam)	 in	 Bangil.	 The	 YAPI	 is	 a	 pesantren	
which	belongs	to	Shi’a	Muslims.	It	was	founded	by	Husein	al-Habsy,	an	
Indonesian	 of	 Arab	 descent,	 in	 1976	 and	 has	 expanded	 into	 an	









the	 protection	 of	 diversity	 is	 enshrined	 in	 the	 national	 motto	 of	
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Another	 recent	 development	 is	 that	 the	 right-wing	 Islamic	
organization	established	in	August	1998,	the	Islamic	Defender	Front	
(FPI,	Front	Pembela	Islam),	which	is	most	strongly	represented	in	the	
urban	 areas,	 has	 begun	 to	 gain	 influence	 in	 rural	 areas.	 From	 a	
theological	point	of	view,	it	is	not	different	to	the	NU	and	a	number	of	
local	kyai	have	even	shown	an	interest	in	it.	The	FPI	promotes	the	idea	
of	 amar	 makruf	 nahi	 munkar	 (commanding	 what	 is	 good	 and	
forbidding	 what	 is	 evil)	 and	 even	 allows	 the	 use	 of	 violence	 in	 its	
implementation.	 Its	 principal	 attraction	 to	 this	 idea	 is	 that	 the	
organization	 perceives	 it	 to	 be	 part	 of	 real	 dakwah	
(propagation/proselytization).	The	FPI	has	become	rather	notorious	








was	 triggered	 by	 a	misunderstanding	 about	 a	 Facebook	 post	which	
was	believed	to	have	humiliated	the	top	FPI	leader.61	In	mid-2017,	the	
local	FPI	invited	its	top	leader,	Rizieq	Syihab,	to	deliver	a	speech	in	the	





influenced	 local	people’s	social	 life	 in	northern	Pasuruan.	 Important	
phases	 of	 life,	 such	 as	 birth,	 marriage,	 birthdays	 and	 death,	 are	
celebrated	 and	 commemorated	 in	 a	 localized	 form	of	 Islamic	 ritual.	
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Beatty	 remarks	 that	 all	 rituals	 reflect	 the	 interests	 of	 orthodoxy	 in	














the	 basis	 of	 the	 patron-client	 ties	which	 characterize	 society	 in	 the	
easternmost	part	of	East	Javanese.63	The	bulk	of	these	are	manifested	
in	 informal	 institutions,	 for	 instance,	 kyai	 and	 santri	 (people	 of	
pesantren).	 These	 Islamic	 institutions	 and	 religious	 leaders	 are	 two	
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fundamental	 entities	 which	 maintain	 such	 power	 relations.64	
Pesantren	serve	as	centres	in	which	knowledge	of	Islam	is	transferred	
to	pupils	 (santri)	 and	kyai	 are	 reproduced.65	Pesantren	 are	not	only	
considered	to	be	the	guardians	of	traditionalist	Islam	as	a	whole,	but	
become	part	of	both	religious	and	socio-cultural	institutions	in	which	
kyai	 are	 the	main	 actors.66	 They	preserve	 the	 chain	of	 traditionalist	
Islam	within	the	structure	of	intellectual	and	social	networks,	to	which	
marriage	 and	 kinship	 make	 a	 considerable	 contribution.	 Both	
pesantren	and	kyai	 co-maintain	 the	entity	known	as	santri	 culture,67	
which	entails	a	mixture	of	 Javanese	and	 Islamic	cultures.68	To	put	 it	
simply,	the	religious	orientation	of	traditionalist	Islam	is	imbued	with	
the	people’s	devotion	to	a	strict	observance	of	Islamic	principles	and	
their	 intensive	performance	of	 religious	 rituals69	 and	 is	 inextricably	




The	 relationship	 between	 them	 and	 local	 people	 is	 embodied	 in	 a	
patron-client	tie.	
After	more	 than	half	 a	 century,	 the	 time	has	 come	 to	 re-assess	
Clifford	 Geertz’s	 important	 1960	 work	 on	 Javanese	 kyai	which	 has	
 
64 Dhofier, The Pesantren Tradition: The Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of Traditional 
Islam in Java; Robert W. Hefner, ‘Reimagined Community: A Social History of Muslim 
Education in Pasuruan, East Java’, in Asian visions of authority: religion and the modern states 
of East and Southeast Asi, ed. by Charles F. Keyes, Laurel Kendall, and Helen Hardacre 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), pp. 75–95. 
65 Azyumardi Azra, Dina Afrianty, and Robert W. Hefner, ‘Pesantren and Madrasa: Muslim 
Schools and National Ideals in Indonesia’, in Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of 
Modern Muslim Education, ed. by Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 174. 
66 Ronald Alan Lukens-Bull, ‘A Peaceful Jihad: Javanese Islamic Education and Religious Identity 
Construction’ (Arizona State University, 1997), p. 5; Hiroko Horikoshi, Kiai dan Perubahan 
Sosial (Jakarta: P3M, 1987), p. 114. 
67 Yanwar Pribadi, ‘Religious Networks in Madura: Pesantren, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Kiai as the 
Core of Santri Culture’, Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 51, no. 1 (2013), pp. 1–32. 
68 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, ‘Kinship and Marriage among the Javanese Kyai’, Indonesia, vol. 29 
(1980), pp. 47–58. 
69 Ibid., p. 50. 
70 Lukens-Bull, ‘A Peaceful Jihad: Javanese Islamic Education and Religious Identity 
Construction’, p. 5; Horikoshi, Kiai dan Perubahan Sosial, p. 114. 
Chapter 3 
	134	
been	a	basis	 for	 further	studies	about	 their	changing	position	 in	 the	
complexity	of	social	transformations	in	Indonesia.	He	argues,	instead	
of	 being	 alienated	 from	 the	 pressures	 of	 Nationalism	 and	 Islamic	
modernism,	 the	kyai	 transformed	 themselves	 into	a	kind	of	 cultural	
broker	 for	 a	 different	 sort	 of	 interest.	Kyai	 have	 not	 only	 played	 a	





their	 function	 as	 a	 mediator	 of	 the	 political	 issues	 concerning	
Nationalism	for	the	villagers	surrounding	them.	Mansurnoor	remarks	
kyai	 are,	 and	 always	 will	 be,	 embedded	 in	 the	 socio-political	 and	
religious	 lives	 of	 Muslims.	 He	 emphasizes	 the	 roles	 they	 play	 in	
maintaining	the	balance	between	their	attachment	to	religious	tenets	
and	the	local	setting	in	which	they	operate.72	The	critical	role	played	
by	kyai	 can	 take	 a	 variety	 of	 forms	 as	 either	kyai	 pesantren	 or	kyai	
tarekat	(in	Sufi	orders).	As	suggested	by	Turmudi,	as	a	group,	kyai	have	
striven	 either	 to	 make	 the	 existing	 social	 order	 compatible	 with	
religious	 ideals	 or	 to	mould	 these	 religious	 ideals	 to	 be	 compatible	
with	the	existing	order.73	
Patronage	 is	 also	 a	 part	 of	 formal	 institutions,	 especially	when	
religious	 leaders	 enter	 politics	 and	 the	 state	 bureaucracy.	 This	
tendency	is	incontrovertible	when	we	look	at	the	reality	in	Pasuruan	
in	 the	 last	 decade.	 Furthermore,	 kyai	 are	 commonly	 wealthy	
landowners,	and	therefore	part	of	the	social	elite.74	The	upshot	is	that	
the	 local	people	 in	Pasuruan	are	heavily	dependent	on	kyai	 socially	
and,	 even	 more	 importantly,	 in	 all	 matters	 related	 to	 religious	
normativity.	 For	 instance,	 they	 come	 to	kyai	 to	 ask	 for	blessing	and	
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prayers	or	seek	advice	on	an	appropriate	name	for	their	offspring	or	




their	 daily	 lives,	 with	 a	 helping	 hand	 from	 the	 influence	 of	 local	
traditions.		
How	the	state	deals	with	religious	 issues	remains	an	 important	
topic	of	public	debate	 in	present-day	 Indonesia.	The	 following	short	
sketch	illuminates	how	traditionalist	Islam	interacts	with,	or	at	least	
contests,	 the	 state	 in	 the	Pasuruan	 context.	 It	was	 at	 the	 end	of	 the	
Islamic	 holy	 month	 of	 Ramadhan	 in	 mid	 September	 2008	 when	 a	
terrible	tragedy	hit	the	town	of	Pasuruan.	Thousands	of	people,	many	
of	whom	were	mothers	between	the	ages	of	forty	and	sixty,	went	to	the	






cash	 delivery	 turned	 into	 a	 deadly	 stampede.	 The	 women	 in	 front	
fought	to	scream	as	they	were	pushed	from	behind	in	the	crowd.	More	
than	 twenty	 people	 were	 crushed	 to	 death.	 Called	 to	 account,	 a	
Saychon	son,	Faruq,	was	named	by	the	police	as	a	suspect	as	he	was	
the	co-ordinator	of	this	distribution.	The	local	criminal	court	decided	
to	 sentence	Faruq	 to	 three	 years’	 imprisonment,	 indicting	him	with	
negligence	causing	death.75	
Unhappily	 that	 year,	 the	 Saychon	 family	 had	 not	 chosen	 a	
charitable	 institution	 to	 distribute	 the	 alms	 as	 had	 been	 its	 custom	
since	the	1980s.	Among	the	many	reasons	for	this	change	of	heart	was	
that	the	family	did	not	want	to	delegate	its	long-established	identity	as	
a	 philanthropist	 to	 other	 agencies.	 The	 Saychon	 family	 thought	 it	
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with	 the	 poor.	 Another	 version	 has	 it	 that,	 by	 holding	 such	 a	 self-
managed-distribution,	family	members	were	more	confident	that	the	
funds	would	reach	the	intended	recipients,	as	it	was	dubious	about	the	




of	 the	 National	 Almsgiving	 Body	 (Badan	 Amil	 Zakat	 Nasional,	
BAZNAS),	Didin	Hafiduddin,	was	harsh	in	his	criticism.	He	stated	that	
direct	 distribution	 is	 not	 an	 Islamic	 tradition,	 but	 owes	 far	more	 to	
feudal	 tradition.	 Nevertheless,	 he	 did	 not	 deny	 that	 there	 was	 a	
problem	 about	 social	 trust	 in	 government	 almsgiving	 agencies.	 76	
Taking	a	different	 tack,	Hasyim	Muzadi,	 the	general	head	of	 the	NU,	






to	 provide	 protection	 and	 benefits	 to	 persons	 of	 lower	 status	 who	






76 Tempo.co, ‘Tebar Zakat ala Haji Syaikhon Tak Sesuai Quran’, TEMPO Interaktif (2008), 
https://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2008/09/16/058135727/tebar-zakat-ala-haji-
syaikhon-tak-sesuai-quran, accessed 15 Jun 2017. 
77 Tempo.co, ‘Pembagian Zakat Haji Syaikhon Fikri Tidak Haram’, TEMPO Interaktif (2008), 
https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2008/09/16/058135791/pembagian-zakat-haji-syaikhon-
fikri-tidak-haram, accessed 15 Jun 2017. 
78 James C. Scott, ‘Patron-Clients Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia’, The American 
Political Science Review, vol. 66, no. 1 (1972), p. 92. 







Scholarly	discussion	has	 linked	politics	 in	East	 Java	 to	politik	 aliran	
(stream	politics).	First	proposed	by	Clifford	Geertz,	this	 is	a	political	
force	 which	 was	 built	 on	 deeply	 rooted	 streams	 present	 in	 socio-
religious	communities.	Scholars	have	argued	that	the	first	democratic	
election	in	1999	reflected	the	old	pattern	of	aliran	politics.	Certainly	
this	 rings	 true	 when	 applied	 to	 East	 Javanese	 society.	 Despite	 the	
complex	 multi-party	 system	 available	 in	 Indonesia,	 electoral	
competition	in	East	Java	has	unquestionably	been	dominated	by	two	
major	aliran-oriented	 parties:	 the	 Partai	 Kebangkitan	 Bangsa	 (PKB,	
The	National	 Awakening	 Party),	 the	NU-based	 political	 party	which	
broadly	 represents	 the	 traditionalist	 santri	 community,	 and	 the	PDI	
Perjuangan	which	 tends	 to	 attract	 the	 ballot-papers	 of	 the	abangan	
voters.	As	times	have	changed,	some	scholars	argue	that	the	intense	
competition	between	individual	candidates,	publicly	known	as	perang	
figure	 (war	 of	 personalities)	 has	 challenged	 the	 old	 aliran	 politics.	
These	political	candidates	have	not	only	managed	to	win	votes	from	






‘new	 clientelism’	 in	 which	 patron-client	 relations	 within	 aliran	 are	




fifteen	 out	 of	 the	 fifty	 seats	 or	 30	 percent	 of	 the	 local	members	 of	
Parliament	were	from	the	PKB.	In	the	2014	election,	the	PKB	suffered	
a	 dramatic	 decline,	 gaining	 only	 twelve	 parliamentary	 seats	 or	 24	
percent.	Second	in	the	race	were	the	nationalist	parties,	namely:	PDI	
Perjuangan	and	Partai	Gerindra,	 each	with	 seven	 seats.	Despite	 this	
decline,	 the	 PKB	 has	 succeeded	 in	 having	 one	 of	 its	 representative	









This	section	explores	some	particular	aspects	of	 the	area	 in	which	 I	
have	been	conducting	my	fieldwork.	Sumbersari	is	a	pseudonym	of	a	
sub-district.	It	is	composed	of	seventeen	villages	in	which	the	majority	
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According	to	Retsikas,	the	area	is	characterized	by	an	interesting	
idea	 of	 the	 endless	 transformation	 from	 one	 culture,	 Madurese,	 to	






daily	 behaviour	 mirrors	 the	 ideal	 of	 sejatining	 becik,	 which	 means	
aspiring	 to	 a	 character	 based	 on	 pituduh	 (acting	 advisedly)	 in	 the	
Javanese	tradition.	Conversely,	somebody	is	said	to	be	“not	Javanese”	
if	his	or	her	daily	way	of	life	fails	to	reflect	the	good	values	embodied	
in	 Javanese	 culture.82	 Under	 these	 circumstances,	 Madurese	 try	 to	
become	‘Javanese’.	Despite	their	best	intentions,	this	does	not	alter	the	
negative	 stereotype	of	Madurese	 in	 circulation	 among	 the	 Javanese.	





Sumbersari,	 as	 is	 common	 in	 Maduro-Javanese	 areas,	 has	 to	
contend	with	an	array	of	social	problems,	chief	among	them	poverty85	
and	a	tendency	not	to	participate	in	formal	education.	This	avoidance	
of	 the	 established	 formal	 educational	 system	 has	made	pesantren	 a	
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in	society	but	also	 instils	religion	and	character-building	 in	them.	 In	
the	following,	I	seek	to	explore	two	major	elements	in	Sumbersari.		
4.1. Economy	and	Education		
Based	 on	 the	 2015	 official	 record,	 Sumbersari	 has	 around	 63,635	
residents,	with	birth	rate	of	1.49	percent	per	year.	The	majority	of	the	
people	 of	 Sumbersari	 work	 as	 farmers	 and	 labourers	 (kerja	
serabutan).	Seventy	percent	of	the	economic	resources	of	the	villagers	
is	generated	by	the	agricultural	sector.	The	rate	of	unemployment	is	
fairly	 high.	 Although	 the	 land,	 50	 percent	 of	 which	 is	 rice-fields,	 is	
generally	 fertile,	 the	 crops	 cultivated	 do	 not	 make	 any	 significant	
amount	of	money.	The	smaller	area	of	 the	 land	 is	given	over	 to	dry	
cultivation	(tegal)	on	which	the	people	do	plant	rice	here	during	the	
rainy	 season.	However,	 as	 this	 is	 impossible	 in	 the	dry	 season,	 they	
change	 to	 planting	maize,	mango	 trees	 and	 tuberose	 flowers.	When	
adverse	 weather	 conditions	 mean	 that	 the	 going	 gets	 tough,	 the	
farmers	raise	cattle	and	goats.	The	majority	of	the	women	do	not	earn	
money	 outside	 the	 household.	 They	 sometimes	 do	 work	 at	 home	
embroidering	 the	 costume	worn	 by	 women	 during	 Islamic	 prayers	
(mukena)	but	this	generates	only	a	very	low	income.	
Participation	in	formal	education	of	people	ten	years	and	older	is	




level	 secondary	 school	 certificate,	while	 a	mere	 4,146	 (6.5	 percent)	
have	 finished	 senior	 secondary	 school.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 should	 be	
noted	that	these	figures	relate	to	secular	education.	This	is	a	society	
which	pays	great	 attention	 to	 their	 children’s	 religious	education	 in	
various	 Islamic	 education	 institutions,	 ranging	 from	 small-scale	
pesantren	 to	 very	 large	 ones.	 Hence,	 their	 participation	 in	 informal	
pesantren	 education	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 best	 explanation	 of	why	 the	
number	going	on	to	the	last	two	levels	of	formal	education	is	so	low.	It	
must	also	be	said	that,	though	youngsters	are	increasingly	going	on	to	
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Even	 on	 the	 level	 of	 middle	 school,	 Islamic	 schools	 are	 dominant.	
leaving	 that	 aside,	what	 is	 obvious	 on	 both	 district	 and	 sub-district	
levels	is	that	informal	schools,	pesantren	and	madrasah	diniyah,	are	the	
most	common	educational	institutions	in	the	area.	A	madrasah	diniyah	
is	 an	out-of-school	 institution	 teaching	 subjects	 related	 to	 Islam.	 Its	
curriculum	 spans	 primary	 to	 high	 school	 level.	 As	 just	 mentioned	
above,	the	high	number	of	madrasah	diniyah	on	primary	(ūlā)	level	is	
an	 indication	of	 the	concern	among	the	 locals	about	equipping	their	
children	with	adequate	knowledge	of	and	skills	related	to	their	religion	
from	an	early	age.		
Quite	aware	of	 the	 situation,	 the	 local	government	has	 recently	
drawn	up	a	policy	designed	 to	support	 the	 importance	of	madrasah	
diniyah.	 In	 2016	 the	 local	 regent	 (Bupati)	 issued	 Regulation	 No.	
21/2016	which	obliges	Muslim	pupils	in	the	primary	and	junior	high	
schools	 to	 attend	 madrasah	 diniyah	 for	 at	 least	 two	 hours	 in	 the	
afternoon.87	 Article	 4	 of	 the	 Regulation	 states	 that,	 as	 an	 informal	
school,	 the	purpose	of	 the	madrasah	diniyah	 is	 to	 expand	children’s	
capacity	so	as	to	form	them	into	pious	and	well-behaved	persons.	The	
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run	madrasah	 diniyah,	 while	 some	 also	 run	 formal	 Islamic	 schools.	
However,	not	all	madrasah	diniyah	belong	to	pesantren.	Consequently	
the	 number	 of	 madrasah	 diniyah	 far	 exceeds	 the	 number	 of	
pesantren.88	Pesantren	represent	a	discourse	of	what	it	is	to	be	a	devout	
Javanese	 Muslim.89	 For	 people	 living	 in	 the	 lowlands,	 a	 pesantren	
education	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 an	 important	 factor	 in	 shaping	 their	
children’s	lives.	Commensurate	with	this	mindset,	the	ideal	pattern	is	
that,	 after	 completing	 primary	 school,	 female	 teen-agers	 study	 in	
pesantren.	 Middle-class	 religious	 families	 want	 their	 daughters	 to	





and	 protection	 of	 female	 morality.	 To	 ensure	 the	 system	 works	
properly,	 a	 pesantren	 education	 generally	 adopts	 the	 concept	 of	
educational	segregation,	keeping	male	and	female	pupils	separated.90	
Although	they	are	happy	for	their	daughters	to	participate	in	this,	for	
women	 in	 particular	 general	 education	 is	 still	 perceived	 as	 less	
important	 than	 religious	 education.	 This	 is	 because	 women	 are	
supposed	to	work	in	the	home	and	raise	children.	The	general	line	of	
thinking	is	that	women	do	not	need	a	good	educational	foundation	to	
carry	 out	 these	 tasks.	 Local	 people	 seem	 to	 ignore	 the	 fact	 that	 a	
mother	has	more	influence	on	educating	children	than	a	father.	They	







88 BPS Kab. Pasuruan, Kecamatan Rembang dalam Angka 2015, p. 54. 
89 Muhammad Latif Fauzi, ‘Traditional Islam in Javanese Society: The Roles of Kyai and 
Pesantren in Preserving Islamic Tradition and Negotiating Modernity’, Journal of Indonesian 
Islam, vol. 6, no. 1 (2012), pp. 125–44. 
90 Eka Srimulyani, Women from Traditional Islamic Educational Institutions in Indonesia: 
Negotiating Public Spaces (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), p. 118. 





visit	 her	 house	 and	was	 introduced	 to	 Gus	 Raibin,	 her	 forty-seven-	




and	 others	 in	 their	 surroundings	 who	 has	 managed	 to	 reach	 a	
university	 education.	Nearly	 all	 the	women	of	Alfi’s	 age	 are	 already	
married	and	busy	with	their	children.	I	was	curious	about	how	local	
people	 generally	 view	 the	 relationship	 between	 religion	 and	
education.	They	explained	me:		
“Sumbersari	 is	 different.	 Religion	 is	 the	 prime	 instrument	 in	
preserving	morality.	 Girls	 are	 encouraged	 not	 to	 obtain	 a	 fully	
rounded	education	(sekolah	tinggi).	This	is	nothing	to	do	with	the	
lack	 of	 financial	 resources.	 People	 do	 not	 comprehend	 the	
contribution	made	 to	 life	 by	 (secular)	 education.	When	women	
are	assumed	to	become	housewives,	why	spend	much	money	for	
schooling?	Furthermore,	they	believe	that	vocational	high	school	





only	 a	 good	 understanding	 of	 Islam,	 but	 also	 acquire	 general	
knowledge	 and	 practical	 skills.	 Consequently,	 pesantren	 have	 been	
expanding	their	curricula	to	respond	to	these	new	aspirations.	In	my	
fieldwork	 I	 have	 found	 that,	 over	 the	 last	 few	 years	 a	 number	 of	
pesantren	 in	 Sumbersari	 have	 been	 attempting	 to	 reduce	 the	 gap	
between	religious	and	secular	education.	This	 is	coincident	with	the	
development	 on	 the	 national	 level	 which	 has	 shown	 a	 growing	
tendency	 for	 Islamic	 schools	 to	 be	 more	 open	 to	 change.	 In	 2009,	
Pesantren	 Al-Ikhlas	 set	 up	 a	 vocational	 school	 (sekolah	 menengah	
kejuruan).	 Likewise,	 some	 year	 ago,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 informal	
madrasah	 diniyah,	 Pesantren	Roudlotunnajah	 expanded	 its	 range	 of	
formal	 schools.	 It	 opened	 an	 Islamic	 junior	 high	 school	 (madrasah	
Chapter 3 
	144	
tsanawiyah)	 which	 educates	 students	 in	 both	 Islamic	 and	 secular	
subjects.	 Since	 the	 opening	 of	 this	 school,	 this	 pesantren	 has	 been	
enjoying	a	considerable	increase	in	the	number	of	students,	although	
not	all	of	 them	are	boarders.	This	all	 suggests	 that	parents	are	now	
aware	that	having	a	diploma	in	formal	education	is	the	touchstone	to	a	
much	better	life	future	for	their	children.91		
Sumbersari	 itself	 does	 not	 have	 many	 major	 pesantren.	 The	








this	 reason,	 numerous	madrasah	 diniyah	 in	 Sumbersari	 are	 official	
branches	 (ranting)	 of	 the	 Pesantren	 Sidogiri’s	 Madrasah	 Miftahul	
Ulum	(MMU)	which	has	been	going	since	 the	1930s.	The	MMU	runs	
madrasah	diniyah	on	four	levels:	isti‘dadiyah	(preparatory),	ibtida’iyah	
(basic),	 tsanawiyah	 (middle)	 and	 aliyah	 (high).	 These	 ranting	
madrasah	 teach	the	same	curriculum,	subjects	and	references	which	
are	taught	in	the	MMU	headquarters.		
Among	East	 Javanese	Muslim	 traditionalists,	 Pesantren	Sidogiri	
enjoys	the	reputation	of	being	the	most	distinguished	and	important	
centre	 for	 studying	 the	 classical	 books	 (kitab)	 on	 fiqh	 used	 by	 the	
Shāfi‘ı̄	school.	Among	the	references	taught	are	the	kitab	written	by	the	





91 This is based on my interviews with the leader of this pesantren. 
92 Hefner, ‘Reimagined Community: A Social History of Muslim Education in Pasuruan, East 
Java’. 
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Qurrat	 al-‘ayn	 by	 Zayn	 al-Dīn	 al-Malībarī	 (d.	 1579).93	 Pupils	 on	 the	
aliyah	 level	 are	 taught	 using	 fiqh	 sources	 from	 a	 comparative	
perspective.	Its	alumni	network	is	well	maintained,	joined	together	in	
an	 association	 called	 Ikatan	 Alumni	 Santri	 Sidogiri	 (IASS,	 the	
Association	 of	 the	 Sidogiri	 Alumni).	 This	 network,	 encompassing	
district	representatives	throughout	East	Java,	regularly	holds	a	bahsul	










residents	 have	 historical	 roots	 in	 the	 island	 of	 Madura.	 For	 many	
centuries,	Pasuruan	has	been	 the	destination	of	Madurese	migrants.	




This	 community	 has	 been	 established	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 patron-client	






93 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic Script Used in the Pesantren Milieu, 
Comments on a New Collection in the KITLV Library’, Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- en 
Volkenkunde, vol. 146, no. 2 (1990), pp. 244–6; Scott C. Lucas, ‘Justifying Gender Inequality in 
the Shāfiʿī Law School: Two Case Studies of Muslim Legal Reasoning’, Journal of the American 
Oriental Society, vol. 129, no. 2 (2009), p. 242. 
94 Dhofier, The Pesantren Tradition: The Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of Traditional 





predominant,	 Pasuruan	 is	 home	 to	 different	 Muslim	 groups.	 These	





The	development	of	 traditionalist	 Islam	 in	Pasuruan	 constantly	
affects	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 state,	 religious	 leaders	 and	 the	
Muslim	community.	The	commitment	to	practising	Islamic	traditions	
and	the	strongly	inculcated	obedience	to	religious	leaders	(kyai)	have	
led	 to	 a	 complicated	 relationship	 between	 religion	 and	 the	 state.	
Community-level	politics	operate	on	the	basis	of	the	patron-client	ties	
which	characterize	the	eastern	part	of	East	Javanese	society	in	general.	




member	 of	 the	 PKB	 faction	 in	 Parliament	 can	 be	 considered	 an	
overarching	icon	of	the	triumph	of	the	NU.	
The	political	and	social	situation	in	Pasuruan	is	not	significantly	
different	 from	that	 in	other	areas	 in	eastern	part	of	East	 Java.	Areas	
such	as	Probolinggo,	Lumajang	and	Jember	also	have	a	big	number	of	
Madurese	 migrants	 who	 have	 evolved	 into	 a	 pendhalungan	
community.	Nevertheless,	Pasuruan	does	have	its	own	idiosyncrasies	
which	 set	 it	 apart.	 Firstly,	 Pasuruan	 is	 geographically	 close	 to	 the	
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anecdote	which	says	 that	pendhalungan	people	are	deemed	modern	















Pesantren	 have	been	expanding	 their	 curricula	 to	 respond	 to	 a	new	
aspiration,	i.e.	providing	general	knowledge	and	practical	skills.	This	is	
coincident	 with	 the	 development	 on	 the	 national	 level	 which	 has	
shown	 a	 growing	 tendency	 for	 Islamic	 schools	 to	 be	more	 open	 to	
change.	
The	 next	 chapter	 focuses	 on	marriage	 practices	 in	 a	 village	 in	
Pasuruan.	It	tries	to	understand	the	entanglement	of	local	norms	and	
the	roles	of	local	actors,	namely	kyai	(religious	clerics)	and	pengarep	
(voluntary	 traditional	 matchmakers)	 in	 the	 everyday	 practice	 of	
marriage.	 It	 specifically	 questions	 in	 what	 ways	 does	 the	 social	
structure	of	traditionalist	Islam	influence	the	practice	of	marriage	in	
the	 community	 of	 Sumbersari	 in	 Pasuruan.	 Significantly,	 it	 also	


















regulated	 by	 a	 code	 of	 law	 rooted	 in	 religious	 precepts.	 In	 social	
practice,	it	is	imbued	with	the	variety	of	local	norms	and	influenced	by	
the	 diversity	 of	 local	 actors	 throughout	 the	 Muslim	 world.1	 This	
chapter	examines	how	these	norms	and	actors	interact	with	each	other	
to	 shape	 these	 marriage	 practices.	 Its	 aim	 is	 to	 broaden	 our	
understanding	 of	 the	 entanglement	 of	 different	 norms	 governing	
marriage	 and	 the	 roles	 of	 the	 actors	 involved	 in	 everyday	marriage	
practice	 in	 a	 village.	 This	 chapter	 seeks	 to	 answer	 the	 following	
questions:	 What	 do	 locals	 consider	 the	 fundamental	 norms	 which	
constitute	 a	 marriage?	 In	 what	 ways	 do	 individuals	 negotiate	 with	
these	norms?	To	what	 extent	do	 local	 actors	 such	as	kyai	 (religious	
leaders)	 and	pengarep	 (marriage	 intermediaries)	 become	 involved?	
What	are	their	orientations?	What	changes	have	taken	place?		
The	 material	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 the	 fruit	 of	 my	 fieldwork	 in	
Sumbersari,	 a	 religious	 sub-district	 in	 rural	 eastern	 East	 Java.	 As	
mentioned	in	the	previous	chapter,	at	first	glance	Sumbersari	society	
 
1 Ali, ‘Marriage in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence: A Survey of Doctrines’; Alami, The Marriage 





to	 as	 ‘traditionalist	 Islam’,2	 characterized	 by	 what	 is	 known	 in	
Indonesia	as	‘santri	culture’.3	Nevertheless,	despite	its	homogeneity	in	
terms	of	Islamic	orientation	and	practices,	contemporary	Sumbersari	
presents	 an	 interesting	 spectacle	 of	 heterogeneity	 in	 marriage	
practices.	For	this	reason,	 this	chapter	offers	some	narratives	which	
reveal	the	complicated	relationship	between	the	norms,	the	agency	of	
the	 actors	 involved	 and	 the	 social	 structure	 so	 as	 to	 expose	 some	
recent	changes.		
Below	 I	 commence	 with	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 intermixture	 of	
Islamic	and	cultural	norms	in	Sumbersari.	To	illustrate	this,	I	present	
a	brief	sketch	of	how	a	young	man	dealt	with	localized	norms	and	the	
social	 actors	 which	 impacted	 on	 the	 social	 process	 prior	 to	 his	
marriage,	 namely:	 the	 finding	 of	 a	 potential	 spouse.	 His	 experience	
leads	 me	 to	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 broader	 spectrum	 of	 social	 life	 in	
Sumbersari.	Here	I	identify	issues	that	are	key	to	marriage	practices:	
the	 centrality	 of	 informal	 Islamic	 education	 compared	 to	 other	
institutions	and	economic	life.	The	next	section	seeks	to	demonstrate	
the	ways	in	which	the	virtues	of	an	ideal	spouse	are	determined	by	the	








2 Dhofier, The Pesantren Tradition: The Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of Traditional Islam 
in Java; M. Bambang Pranowo, ‘Pesantren, Traditional Islam in Contemporary rural Java: The 
case of the Tegal Rejo Pesantren’, in Islam in the Indonesian social context, ed. by M.C. Ricklefs 
(Clayton: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), pp. 39–56; Mun’im 
Sirry, ‘The Public Expression of Traditional Islam: the Pesantren and Civil Society in Post-
Suharto Indonesia’, The Muslim World, vol. 100, no. 1 (2010), pp. 60–77. 
3 Dhofier, ‘Kinship and Marriage among the Javanese Kyai’; Pribadi, ‘Religious Networks in 
Madura: Pesantren, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Kiai as the Core of Santri Culture’. 
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his	own,	but	belongs	to	his	parents-in-law,	which	is	in	line	with	the	still	
fairly	 common	 uxorilocal	 tradition,	 requiring	 that,	 after	marriage,	 a	
husband	lives	in	the	bride’s	house.	I	was	introduced	to	his	family	by	





begun	 to	 decrease,	 although	 he	 did	 mention	 some	 of	 his	 female	
neighbours	 whose	 (re)marriages	 had	 been	 concluded	 without	 the	
benefit	of	official	registration.	We	then	suddenly	moved	on	to	a	very	
personal	 talk	 about	 his	 life	 trajectories	 up	 to	 the	 moment	 of	 his	
marriage.		
Munir	 graduated	 from	 a	 local	 junior	 Islamic	 high	 school	




various	 subjects	 associated	 with	 Islam,	 ranging	 from	 akidah	
(theology),	 fiqh,	 akhlak	 (ethics)	 to	 Arabic	 grammar	 (nahwu).	 He	 is	
fairly	familiar	with	the	classical	fiqh	doctrines	like	those	documented	
in	 ‘yellow’	 Islamic	 treatises	 (kitab	 kuning).4	 After	 graduating	 from	












4 Bruinessen, ‘Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic Script Used in the Pesantren Milieu, Comments 










After	 the	holy	month	of	Ramadhan	2006,	Munir	 chose	 to	 follow	his	
uncle	 and	head	 to	 Jakarta,	 the	 capital	 city.	After	 a	while	working	 in	
Jakarta	 as	 a	 builder’s	 labourer,	 he	 moved	 to	 Subang	 (West	 Java),	
working	in	a	small	restaurant	(warung)	owned	by	a	man	from	Malang,	
East	 Java.	From	 there	he	moved	on	 to	other	 cities	 in	East	 Java,	 first	
Jember	and	later	Surabaya.	While	he	was	in	Surabaya,	he	was	happy	as	
he	was	able	 to	manage	 to	visit	his	parents	 in	his	home	village	once	
every	two	weeks.	However,	 in	 the	mid-2010	he	decided	to	 leave	his	

















5 Geertz, The Javanese Family: A Study of Kinship and Socialization, p. 56. 





to	 receive	 the	proposal.	Neither	Ulfa	nor	Munir	were	known	 to	one	
another	 before.	 Ulfa’s	 parent	 eagerly	 anticipated	Munir’s	 visit.	 This	
visiting	stage,	called	namu	in	Javanese,	signifies	a	kind	of	preliminary	
negotiation.7	Culturally	speaking,	the	parent’s	agreement	to	the	man’s	
visit	 implies	 their	 approval	 of	 him	 taking	 their	 daughter	 as	 a	 wife.	
Following	 the	 approval	 of	 Ulfa’s	 parents,	 Munir	 visited	 her	 house	
accompanied	 by	 the	 pengarep.	 In	 traditional	 Javanese	 society,	 this	
stage	 is	called	nontoni	 (viewing).8	The	purpose	of	 the	visit	 is	 to	give	
both	the	prospective	husband	and	the	girl	a	chance	to	see	each	other.	
In	this	nontoni	 stage,	Ulfa	did	not	 join	the	meeting.	 Instead,	she	was	
asked	to	serve	guests	a	cup	of	coffee,	bringing	it	from	the	kitchen	to	the	
front	room.	It	was	in	this	very	short	encounter	which	enabled	them	to	
see	 each	 other.	 Munir	 made	 up	 his	 mind	 to	 marry	 Ulfa.	 Religious	
considerations,	particularly	the	idea	of	the	purity	(kesucian)	of	a	girl,9	




The	 choice	 of	 Ulfa’s	 prospective	 husband	 was	 made	 by	 her	
parents.	Ulfa	depended	on	her	parents	whom	she	believed	were	in	a	
position	to	decide	the	worth	of	her	potential	spouse	so	as	she	and	he	
might	 enjoy	 a	 blessed	 life	 together.	 The	 marriage	 proposal	 was	
accepted,	 but	 the	 marriage	 contract	 was	 suspended	 until	 she	 had	
completed	 her	 studies.	 In	 some	 cases,	 when	 there	 is	 a	 big	 age	 gap	
 
6 Anke Niehof, Women and Fertility in Madura (Indonesia) (Leiden: Instituut voor Culturele 
Antropologie en Sociologie der Niet-Westerse Volken, 1985), p. 115. 
7 Geertz, The Javanese Family: A Study of Kinship and Socialization, p. 62. 
8 Smith-Hefner, ‘The New Muslim Romance: Changing Patterns of Courtship and Marriage 
Among Educated Javanese Youth’, p. 446. 
9 Middle-class rural women in numerous parts of the world also have the tendency to accept 
patriarchal norms of honour and purity. See Santi Rozario, ‘Islamic Piety against the Family: 
From “Traditional” to “Pure” Islam’, Contemporary Islam, vol. 5, no. 3 (2011), pp. 285–308; 
Smith-Hefner, ‘The New Muslim Romance: Changing Patterns of Courtship and Marriage 
Among Educated Javanese Youth’, p. 453. 
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between	 the	bride	and	 the	groom,	parents	marry	 their	daughter	off	
directly	although,	after	the	initial	introduction,	the	prospective	groom	




the	 waiting	 period	 prior	 to	 the	 wedding,	 Munir	 was	 occasionally	
invited	by	her	parents	 to	 join	them	in	a	visit	 to	give	money	(ngirim,	
Javanese)	 to	 Ulfa	 in	 the	 pesantren.	 The	 locals	 jocularly	 refer	 to	 the	
man’s	participation	as	ngredit	(paying	off	a	loan).	It	is	essential	for	a	
young	 man	 to	 become	 involved	 in	 this	 process	 so	 as	 to	 build	 his	
reputation	as	a	good	person	with	his	potential	parents-in-law	and	to	
socialize	with	their	extended	families.		
Munir’s	 ideas	 of	 what	 he	 expected	 of	 his	 future	 spouse	 give	 a	
strong	 hint	 of	 the	 significance	 of	 norms	 constraining	 women’s	




the	 division	 between	 the	 two	 has	 somehow	 blurred.	 Like	 so	 many	




Clifford	 Geertz,	 referring	 to	 Mohamed	 Koesnoe,	 stressed	 the	
significance	of	the	notion	of	propriety	in	any	discussion	about	adat.	He	
states:	Adat	is	constructed	as	“the	form	of	life	of	the	Indonesian	people	
as	 founded	 in	 their	 sense	 of	 propriety.”10	 Therefore,	 Bowen	 has	
underlined	 that	 the	 term	 ‘law’	 cannot	 be	 used	 to	 exemplify	 the	
complicated	 norms	 surrounding	 marriage	 and	 other	 matrimonial	
matters.	 In	 rural	 settings,	 legal	 matters	 are	 usually	 bound	 up	 with	
older	people,	religious	commitment	and	a	sense	of	propriety.11	In	the	
 
10 Clifford Geertz, ‘Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective’, in Local 
Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 210. 
11 Bowen, Islam, Law, and Equality in Indonesia: An Anthropology of Public Reasoning, p. 18. 
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next	 section,	 we	 shall	 see	 how	 the	 sense	 of	 propriety	 operates	 in	












This	 is	 the	 story	 of	 the	marital	 experiences	 of	 Kulsum.	When	 I	met	
Kulsum	 in	 early	 2007,	 she	 was	 thirty-one	 and	 was	 married	 to	 her	
second	 husband.	 Her	 first	marriage	 had	 been	 concluded	 in	 2001,	 a	
couple	 of	 months	 after	 she	 graduated	 from	 an	 Islamic	 junior	 high	
school	(madrasah	tsanawiyah).	Kulsum	was	raised	in	a	religious	family	
and	 claimed	 to	 be	 the	 only	 girl	 in	 the	 village	 at	 the	 time	 who	 had	
enjoyed	 any	 formal	 schooling.	 However,	 she	 did	 not	 pursue	 her	
education	to	a	higher	level	and	was	eventually	married	off.	She	told	me	
the	following:	
“My	 father	 insisted	 that	 I	 keep	 studying.	 He	 accompanied	 me	
when	I	handed	in	a	registration	form	at	a	madrasah	aliyah	in	the	
centre	of	Sumbersari.	This	despite	the	fact	my	older	sister	had	said	
binek	 noapah	 asekola,	 monduk	 beih	 rapah	 (for	 a	 woman’s	



















therefore,	 competent	 to	manage	 her	marital	 life.	 The	marriage	was	
assumed	to	set	the	seal	on	her	maturity.	Hildred	Geertz	has	remarked	
that	 marriage	 is	 an	 important	 rite	 of	 passage	 which	 marks	 the	






of	 rushd	 of	 a	 woman	 but	 it	 does	 crucially	 involve	 reliance	 on	 the	





exchange	 which	 involves	 a	 set	 of	 rights	 and	 obligations	 incumbent	
upon	 each	 party.	 Kulsum	 had	 the	 obligation	 to	 submit	 to	 husband	
 
12 Geertz, The Javanese Family: A Study of Kinship and Socialization. 
13 Van Gennep designated the ritual ceremonial patterns which mark an individual’s 
transitions in his/her life as rites of passage. The concept of “liminality” was introduced to 
indicate the time in which people are teetering on the threshold of entering a new phase in 
their lives. Rites of passage include rites of separation, transition and incorporation. Marriage 
is part of the rite of incorporation, while rites of separation are most apparent in funeral 
ceremonies. Meanwhile, transition rites are found in the rituals surrounding betrothal and 
pregnancy. Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), 
p. 11. 
14 Nayel Badareen, ‘Identity and Authority: Changes in the Process of Debates over the Islamic 
Marriage Contract among Contemporary Muslim-Arab Intellectuals’ (PhD Dissertation. The 
University of Arizona, 2014), p. 58. 
Everyday Practice: Roles of Kyai and Pengarep 
	 157	
because,	 reciprocally,	 she	 was	 assumed	 to	 have	 the	 right	 to	
maintenance.	Under	the	umbrella	of	a	marriage	contract,	she	moved	
from	 her	 birth	 family	 to	 come	 under	 her	 husband	 protection.	 After	
marriage,	Kulsum	requested	her	husband	and	his	family	to	be	allowed	
to	 remain	 close	 to	 her	 mother.	 This	 was	 granted	 as	 she	 and	 her	
husband	 went	 to	 live	 in	 a	 house	 next	 door	 to	 her	 natal	 family’s	
dwelling.	 The	marriage	 unfortunately	 survived	 less	 than	 two	 years.	
She	admitted	that	the	husband	was	rude	and	disrespectful.	When	she	




It	 was	 suggested	 to	 Kulsum	 that	 she	 ask	 for	 a	 divorce	 from	 her	
husband.	 He	 granted	 her	 an	 out-of-court	 talak	 (pronouncement	 of	
divorce),	witnessed	by	a	religious	leader	and	her	family.	Despite	the	
social	stigma	of	being	a	divorcée,	Kulsum	decided	not	to	remarry.	She	
preferred	 to	 continue	her	 studies	 in	 the	 equivalent	 to	 a	 senior	high	
school	 (kejar	 paket	 C)	 and	 participated	 in	 social	 activities.	 Only	 ten	
years	later,	in	2012,	did	she	seek	and	obtain	a	legal	validation	of	the	
divorce	after	lodging	a	divorce	petition	(gugat	cerai,	Indonesian)	with	




respected	 role	 in	 the	 development	 of	 Islam	 in	 her	 village.	 Her	 first	
marriage	 ended	 in	 divorce.	 She	 then	 remarried	 to	 a	 man	 from	 a	
pesantren	family	and	gave	birth	to	two	daughters.	The	first	daughter,	
Fahim	 (now	 22	 years),	 studied	 in	 a	 pesantren	 in	 Pasuruan.	 After	
finishing	the	first	two	years,	at	the	age	of	fifteen,	she	was	unexpectedly	
brought	home	to	be	married-off	to	a	man	whom	she	had	never	even	




















that	 she	 had	 to	 return	 home	 in	 order	 to	 receive	 intensive	 medical	
treatment.	Mahmud	visited	her	and	Ibu	Fatimah	rejoiced	in	the	happy	
accident	which	gave	Mahmud	the	chance	to	become	better	acquainted	
with	 her	 daughter.	 Unaware	 of	 any	 ulterior	 motive,	 Anis	 had	 no	
suspicion	that	this	was	an	initial	step	would	lead	to	her	being	married	
off.	Not	long	afterwards,	Mahmud	came	with	his	family	to	propose	to	
her	 (lamaran).	 Her	 father	 agreed	 to	 the	 proposal	 as	 long	 as	 the	
marriage	could	be	postponed	for	two	years	after	Anis	had	finished	her	






to	 be	 the	 prerogative	 of	 families.	 Obedience	 to	 one’s	 parents,	
particularly	the	father,	is	the	most	important	norm.	This	cultural	norm	
is	enshrined	in	a	well-known	Madurese	dictum	bhuppa’	bhabhu’	ghuru	
rato	 (father,	 mother,	 teacher	 and	 formal	 leader	 respectively).	
However,	 although	 the	 power	 over	 the	 household	 and	 landed	 to	
delegated	 to	 male	 authority,	 the	 marriage	 pattern	 tends	 to	 be	
uxorilocal.	 A	 husband	 moves	 to	 live	 with	 his	 wife’s	 family	 after	
marriage,	especially	when	he	does	not	own	his	own	house.	This	custom	




Both	 the	 cases	 just	 cited	 exemplify	 the	 practice	 of	 arranged	
marriage.	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 it	 is	 a	 form	 of	 marital	 union	 in	 which	 the	
parents,	 usually	 the	 fathers,	 choose	 appropriate	 spouses	 for	 their	
daughters	or	sons.	This	pattern	tends	to	be	even	stronger	and	more	
frequent	when	the	female	spouse	is	young	and	the	male	is	much	older.	
Sumbersari	 people	 refer	 to	 this	 type	 of	 marriage	 arrangement	 as	
ajuddhuagi	(married-off).	This	local	term	implies	not	only	the	decision	
about	the	choice	of	a	spouse,	but	also	the	decision	about	the	timing	of	
the	marriage	 is	 firmly	 in	 the	hands	of	 the	parents.	Furthermore,	 the	
arrangement	 is	 found	whatever	 the	 type	 of	marriage,	 registered	 or	
unregistered.	However,	it	should	be	borne	in	mind	that	any	decision	to	
register	is	dependent	upon	multiple	factors,	such	as	whether	or	not	the	
girl	 is	 of	 an	 age	 to	 enter	 into	 a	 legally	 registered	marriage	 and	 the	
presence	of	a	legal	document	in	the	case	of	remarriage.	
Nilan	 argues	 that	 marriage	 among	 middle-class	 families	 is	
influenced	by	 the	 two-pronged	values	of	 faith	 and	 family.	However,	
faith	 is	 generally	 considered	 less	 important	 than	 family.15	
Furthermore,	 in	 different	 Asian	 contexts,	 the	 practice	 of	 arranged	
marriage	is	also	justified	by	the	juxtaposition	of	the	ideologies	of	family	
honour	 and	 shame.16	 Local	 people	 usually	 opt	 for	 an	 arranged	
marriage,	 seeing	 it	 as	 a	 manifestation	 of	 control	 and	 an	 ability	 to	
ensure	the	preservation	of	social	honour.	As	was	Ibu	Fatimah,	parents	
of	 a	 certain	 class	 in	 Sumbersari	 are	 concerned	 about	 ensuring	 that	
their	daughters	marry	a	suitable	man.	For	this	reason,	girls’	mobility	is	
subject	to	stringent	control.	The	concept	of	who	constitutes	a	possible	
husband	 is	 primarily	 based	 on	 the	 man’s	 religious	 orientation	 and	
estimates	 of	 his	moral	 capital.	When	 a	man	well	 versed	 in	 religion	
comes	to	ask	their	daughter’s	hand,	there	is	a	feeling	of	afraid	that	the	
man	 will	 be	 married	 to	 another	 woman	 (takok	 ekalak	 oreng,	
 
15 Pam Nilan, ‘Youth Transitions to Urban, Middle-Class Marriage in Indonesia: Faith, Family 
and Finances’, Journal of Youth Studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (2008), pp. 65–82. 
16 Santi Rozario, ‘Islamic Marriage: A Haven in an Uncertain World’, Culture and Religion, vol. 




and	 social	 standing	 do	 not	 count	 as	 highly	 as	 the	 notion	 of	 good	
manners.		


















groom	 frequently	 trail	 in	 as	 the	 least	 consideration.	 However,	 we	







17 Andrew Beatty, ‘Feeling Your Way in Java: An Essay on Society and Emotion’, Ethnos: Journal 
of Anthropology, vol. 70, no. 1 (2005), pp. 53–78. 
18 One Prophetic tradition relevant to this issue is recorded in Islamic books, such as Bulūgh 
al- marām: “Tunkaḥ al-mar’atu li’arba‘in, lidīnihā, linasabihā, lijamālihā, wa limālihā.” This 
means that “marry a woman for the intensity of her religious devotion, kin reputation, beauty 
and wealth. Aḥmad b. ʿAlī Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Bulūgh al-Marām min Adillat al-Aḥkām 
(Riyadh: Maktaba al-Rushd, 2005), p. 350. 




The	 concept	 of	 apik	 in	 marriage	 also	 infiltrated	 ideas	 about	
sexuality.	It	has	to	do	with	the	notion	of	a	woman’s	chastity.	Chastity	is	
culturally	 deemed	 an	 essential	 symbol	 of	 the	 family	 honour.	 Local	
people	 express	 this	 in	 the	word	praban	 (maiden	or	 virgin),20	which	
specifies	the	ideal	condition	of	a	possible	wife.	It	is	imposed	by	a	social	








Hallaq	 has	 described	 the	 position	 of	 Islamic	 marriage	 as	 the	
cornerstone	 of	 communal	 harmony.22	 Looking	 at	 the	 issue	 more	
pragmatically,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 numerous	 marriages	 in	 my	
research	site	have	involved	marriage	partners	from	the	same	family.	
This	sort	of	marriage	is	considered	to	be	a	good	strategy	by	which	to	
consolidate	 familial	 relationships	 and	 landownership.	 Described	 as	
mapolong	tolang	(collecting	the	scattered	bones),23	on	a	down-to-earth	




late	 for	 women	 to	 embark	 on	 matrimony.	 Without	 a	 doubt,	 the	
 
19 Not confined to, this principle also applies to other cultures. See Nurul Ilmi Idrus, Gender 
Relations in an Indonesian Society: Bugis Practices of Sexuality and Marriage (Leiden: Brill, 
2016), p. 82. 
20 Niehof, Women and Fertility in Madura (Indonesia), p. 107. 
21 Ali, ‘Marriage in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence: A Survey of Doctrines’, p. 12. 
22 Hallaq, Shari’a: Theory, Practice, Transformations, p. 271. 
23 Mansurnoor, Islam in an Indonesian world: Ulama of Madura, p. 84. 
24 A. Latief Wiyata, Carok: Konflik Kekerasan dan Harga Diri Orang Madura (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 




marriageability	 and	 “saleability”.	 Society	 perceives	 an	 adult	woman	
who	is	unmarried	to	be	an	unsaleable	maiden	or	old	spinster	(perawan	
tua).	Meanwhile,	men	are	not	 tarred	with	 this	saleability	stereotype	
when	 they	 remain	 unwed.	 Instead,	 the	 people	 in	 a	 circle	 around	 a	




juddhu	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	 principle	 of	 mompong	 (good	 fortune).	
Parents,	not	necessarily	the	father,	are	more	committed	to	the	concept	






hadith	 narrated	 by	 al-Tirmidhī	 (d.	 892)	 stating	 that,	 if	 there	 should	









offices	 of	 a	 pengarep	 (marital	 intermediary),	 who	 sometimes	 also	
referred	 to	 as	 pelantar.	 A	 pengarep	 is	 a	 person,	 usually	 a	 family	
member	 or	 a	 close	 neighbour,	 who	 performs	 the	 role	 of	 brokering	
marriage	 between	 the	 two	 families	 concerned.	 Although	 this	
brokerage	 is	 undertaken	 voluntarily,	 once	 the	 role	 is	 assumed	 a	
 
25 Idrus, Gender Relations in an Indonesian Society: Bugis Practices of Sexuality and Marriage, 
p. 82. 
26 Abī ‘Īsā al- Tirmidhī, Jāmi‘ al-Tirmidhī (Riyadh: Bayt al-Afkār al-Dawliyya, 1999), p. 192. 
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pengarep	 carries	 the	 responsibility	 of	 finding	 a	 suitable	 wife	 for	 a	
young	man.	The	pengarep	will	do	his/her	best	to	answer	her	parents’	







a	 girl’s	 marriage	 prospects	 which	 contributes	 significantly	 to	 the	
perpetuation	of	the	custom	of	early	marriage.27	
The	 role	 of	 a	 pengarep	 is	 essential	 in	 many	 ways,	 particularly	
when	women’s	mobility	and	 social	 interaction	between	 the	genders	
are	strictly	controlled.	Gus	Raibin,	my	key	 informant,	 indicated	that,	
upon	receiving	an	affirmative	answer	from	the	girls’	parents	through	
the	 pengarep,	 the	 man’s	 family	 has	 the	 confidence	 to	 organize	 a	
betrothal	(peneket).	In	other	words,	the	presence	of	a	pengarep	might	
curtail	 the	 risk	 of	 embarrassment	 to	 the	 man’s	 parents	 should	 the	







A	pengarep	also	plays	a	role	 in	remarriage.	Despite	 the	 fact	her	
divorce	had	not	been	legally	recognized	by	the	state,	the	community	
regarded	 Kulsum	 as	 a	 divorcée.	 Hence,	 she	was	 often	 requested	 to	
welcome	 male	 guests	 (tamu)	 in	 search	 of	 a	 prospective	 wife.	 A	
pengarep	was	the	intermediary	who	introduced	them	to	Kulsum.	On	
some	 occasions,	 her	 own	 brother-in-law	 assumed	 this	 role.	 Kulsum	
had	great	difficulty	in	coming	to	terms	with	this	reality,	although	she	
 
27 Anke Niehof, Women and fertility in Madura (Indonesia) (Leiden: Instituut voor Culturele 
















he	was	 faced	with	 the	problem	of	having	 to	deal	with	a	polygynous	
marriage.	 This	 case	 throws	 interesting	 light	 on	 his	 socio-political	






his	 grasp	 of	 how	 different	 legal	 systems	 operate	 is	 undisputable.	
Importantly,	 the	 locals	 recognize	 him	 as	 a	 religious	 leader	 whose	
understanding	of	Islam	is	not	influenced	by	old-fashioned	ideas	(tidak	









28 Greg Fealy and Robin Bush, ‘The Political Decline of Traditional Ulama in Indonesia’, Asian 
Journal of Social Science, vol. 42, no. 5 (2014), pp. 536–60. 





A	 few	 years	 ago,	 a	man,	 Rudi,	 and	 a	woman,	 Nana,	 arrived	 at	 Kyai	













marriage	 without	 the	 permission	 of	 his	 superior	 (pejabat).29	 Kyai	
Karim	was	in	a	dilemma.	As	a	religious	leader,	he	was	bound	by	the	
doctrine	in	classical	Islamic	law	inspired	by	the	fear	that	extramarital	
sex	makes	 it	obligatory	 for	a	man	 to	marry.	Meanwhile,	under	state	
law,	the	permission	of	the	first	wife	is	required.		
To	cut	a	long	story	short,	he	married	them	as	he	believed	this	was	
the	 only	way	 to	 rescue	 the	 couple	 from	 living	 in	 sin	 (kumpul	 kebo)	
according	to	Islam.	For	Rudi,	it	was	a	polygynous	marriage.	After	the	
conclusion	of	the	marriage	ceremony,	Kyai	Karim	asked	the	couple	to	
sign	 a	 letter	 declaring	 that	 they	 had	 been	 religiously	married.	 This	
letter	was	 in	 lieu	 of	 a	marriage	 certificate.	 The	 letter	mentions	 the	
names	 of	 the	 couples,	 the	 witness	 and	 the	 religious	 leader	 who	
solemnized	 the	 marriage.	 Kyai	 Karim	 urged	 Nana	 to	 tolerate	 her	
position	 as	 a	 second	 wife	 in	 an	 unofficially	 polygynous	 situation.	
 
29This prohibition is enshrined in Government Regulation no. 45/1990 jo. Government 
Regulation no. 10/1983 on the permission for marriage and divorce of civil servants. See 
O’Shaughnessy, Gender, State and Social Power in Contemporary Indonesia: Divorce and 
Marriage Law, p. 34. 
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the	case,	her	husband	could	be	subject	 to	 legal	 sanctions	 for	having	
entered	 into	a	marriage	which	counted	as	non-procedural	polygyny.	
The	 official	 alleged	 that	 Kyai	 Karim	 had	 married	 them	 illegally,	












	I	 actually	 cannot	 accept	 polygyny	 because	 it	 is	
difficult	to	do	justice	to	all	the	wives	involved.	But,	
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This	conversation	shows	that	Kyai	Karim	resorted	to	Sharia	in	his	






turpitude	 and	 the	 state	 law	 can	 no	 longer	 provide	 a	 solution,	 the	
religious	authorities	cannot	 just	abandon	them	to	a	moral	 limbo.	He	
stated:		
“Polygyny	 is	 very	 casuistic.	 From	an	ordinary	point	of	 view,	no	
wife	 can	 accept	 her	 husband	 taking	 another	 wife.	 I	 have	 a	
daughter.	 I	 shall	never	agree	 that	her	husband	enter	 into	other	
marriages.	But,	in	the	case	in	which	a	man	finds	himself	morally	






into	 the	 complicated	 relationship	 between	 social	 norms	 and	 legal	
practice,30	 in	 which	 Sharia	 continues	 to	 act	 as	 an	 independent	
normative	 system.	 Cammack	 et	 al.	 have	 argued	 that	 control	 over	
marriage	practice	is	played	out	in	a	contested	arena	in	which	different	
social	 actors	 seek	 to	 exercise	 their	 power.31	 Importantly,	





the	 compulsory	 enforcement	 of	 Sharia	 on	 the	 adherents	 of	 Islam,	
 
30 Bowen, Islam, Law, and Equality in Indonesia: An Anthropology of Public Reasoning, p. 8; 
Sally Engle Merry, ‘Law, Culture, and Cultural Appropriation’, Yale Journal of Law & the 
Humanities, vol. 10, no. 2 (1998), pp. 575–603. 













courts	 in	 respect	 of	 judicial	 divorce.33	 Also	 in	 the	 West	 Javanese	
context,	 Grijns	 and	 Horii	 have	 pinpointed	 the	 dilemmas	 and	
compromises	which	epitomize	the	contending	norms	on	marriage	and	
sexuality	on	the	societal	level.	They	emphasize	that	the	influence	of	the	
conservative	 interpretation	of	 Islam	 in	 controlling	morality	 leads	 to	
the	 continuing	 practice	 of	 child	 marriage.34	 Platt,	 in	 the	 localized	
context	 of	 religious	 Lombok,	 puts	 forward	 a	 convincing	 case	 for	
arguing	 that	 the	 state	 law	 on	 marriage	 has	 been	 unsuccessful	 in	
superseding	 the	 so-called	 community-based	 law	 in	 the	 form	 of	
localized	 Islam	 and	 adat.	 In	 other	 words,	 social	 acceptance	 has	
prevailed	over	the	state-based	legitimacy.	Legal	processes	in	Islamic	
court	 do	 not	 always	 generate	 significant	 outcomes	 for	 defining	 the	
legal	status	of	a	wife.35		
The	case	cited	above	reveals	 that	Kyai	Karim’s	reasoning	about	
Islamic	marriage	 crystallizes	 in	 the	 notion	 of	 “safeguarding	 Sharia”.	
This	 entails	 at	 least	 two	 aspects:	 legalizing	 (sexual)	 relations	 and	
avoiding	harm	(sinful	 acts).	However,	 the	way	Kyai	Karim	has	been	
coping	 with	 this	 particular	 instance	 of	 polygyny	 deserves	 close	
attention,	 in	 particular	 making	 a	 detailed	 examination	 of	 the	 legal	
reasoning	 he	 used.	 In	 the	 interviews,	 Kyai	 Karim	 stated:	 “Saya	
 
32 Cammack, ‘Islamic Law in Indonesia’s New Order’. 
33 van Huis, ‘Islamic Courts and Women’s Divorce Rights in Indonesia: The Cases of Cianjur and 
Bulukumba’, p. 139. 
34 Grijns and Horii, ‘Child Marriage in a Village in West Java (Indonesia): Compromises between 
Legal Obligations and Religious Concerns’. 
35 Platt, Marriage, Gender and Islam in Indonesia: Women Negotiating Informal Marriage, 
Divorce and Desire, p. 36. 
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mengambil	garis	tengah	pada	kasus	yang	terjadi.	Kalau	mau	disiplin	ya	




this	 sort	 of	 problem.	 Therefore,	 he	 underscored	 the	 notion	 of	 the	
‘middle	 ground’.	 In	 his	 choice,	 he	was	 stressing	 that	 this	was	 not	 a	
typical	case	and	therefore	demanded	an	alternative	legal	settlement.		
What	 he	meant	 by	 ‘middle	 ground’	was	moving	 away	 from	 the	
Shāfi‘ı̄	 School	 to	 another	madhhab	 in	 his	 search	 for	 a	 solution.	 One	
problem	 which	 loomed	 large	 was	 that	 the	 woman	 came	 to	 him	
accompanied	 by	 no	 one	 but	 her	 man/husband.	 It	 was	 not	 clear	
whether	 she	 had	 already	 obtained	 the	 consent	 of	 her	 familial	walī	
(Indonesian,	wali	 nasab).	 In	 an	ordinary	 situation,	 the	wali	 nasab	 is	
allowed	to	delegate	his	role	of	marriage	guardian	to	another	person.	
This	process	is	known	as	tawkil	wali.	Furthermore,	in	addition	to	a	walī	
in	 the	 settlement	 of	 a	 marriage	 contract,	 three	 other	 aspects	 are	

















36 Susan A. Spectorsky, Women in Classical Islamic Law: A Survey of the Sources 






This	 case	 of	 ‘illegal’	 polygyny	 resonates	with	 the	 notion	 of	 the	
internal	 plurality	 of	 a	 law.	 Salim	 quotes	 Menski’s	 concept	 of	 ‘a	
quadrangle	 of	 law’	 which	 has	 been	 essential	 to	 the	 further	
development	of	the	triangle	of	law	introduced	by	earlier	scholars.38	An	
important	 factor	 in	 his	model	 is	 not	 just	 that	 he	 reiterates	 the	 four	
elements	 of	 law	 (state,	 religion,	 society	 and	 international),	 but	 the	
factor	 which	 he	 terms	 ‘plurality	 of	 pluralities’.	 It	 means	 that	 each	





the	 internal	 plurality	 of	 legal	 opinions	 in	 Islamic	 jurisprudence.	 He	
produced	a	creative	legal	reasoning	in	his	attempt	to	shape	his	decision	














37 Muḥammad ibn Yazīd Ibn Mājah, English Translation of Sunan Ibn Majah with Commentary, 
Vol. 3 edition (Riyadh: Darussalam, 2007), p. 78. 
38 Salim, Contemporary Islamic Law in Indonesia: Shari’ah and Legal Pluralism, pp. 25–6. 
39 Bowen, Shari`a, State, and Social Norms in France and Indonesia. 
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society	is	witnessing	a	diversity	of	forms	in	the	increase	in	women’s	
individual	 autonomy.	 Thanks	 to	 the	 improved	 access	 to	 formal	
education	and	the	greater	job	opportunities	for	high-school	graduates,	
girls	now	have	far	more	room	to	exercise	their	agency	in	choosing	their	







After	 finishing	 Islamic	 primary	 school	 (madrasah	 ibtidaiyah),	 Aini	
studied	 in	 a	 prominent	pesantren	 in	 a	 suburban	 area.	 Although	 the	
majority	of	pesantren	have	established	madrasah	with	a	graded-class	
system,	 not	 all	 of	 them	 have	 adopted	 a	 curriculum	 of	 general	






formal	 school,	 instead	 of	 in	 pesantren.	 Eventually	 she	 obtained	 the	
permission	from	her	parents	to	continue	at	a	madrasah	tsanawiyah	in	









before	 Ulum	 proposed	 that	 she	 marry	 him	 but	 said	 that	 he	 was	




came	 to	 see	her	parents,	proposing	 that	 she	be	be	Ulum’s	wife.	The	
proposal	took	her	parents	by	surprise,	even	though	a	situation	like	this	
is	not	unique	to	their	tradition.	Aini’s	parents	happened	to	be	aware	
that	 their	 daughter	 already	 had	 a	 special	 relationship	with	 a	 young	




their	 children	 would	 become	 too	 intimately	 involved	 and	 might	
possibly	bring	some	form	of	social	dishonour	on	the	family.	The	father	




housewife,	 raising	 a	 three-year-old	 daughter.	 I	 talked	 to	 her,	 in	
Javanese	with	Madurese	accent,	about	her	experiences.	In	a	subdued	









Koentjaraningrat	 remarks	 that	 the	 santri	 religious	 system	
provides	 the	 individual	 with	 a	 basic	 feeling	 of	 security	 through	 its	
concept	 of	 an	 intensive	 personal	 relationship	 with	 God.40	 This	
observation	 still	 seems	 pertinent	 to	 Aini’s	 situation.	 I	 asked	 her	
opinion	 about	 her	marriage	being	 arranged	by	her	 parents	 and	 she	
responded	as	 follows:	 “We	had	been	developing	 feeling	of	closeness	
(dekat)	for	a	couple	of	months.	Perhaps	you	could	call	it	pacaran,	but	
 
40 Koentjaraningrat, ‘Family and Religion in Indonesia’, East Asian Cultural Studies, vol. 13, no. 
1/4 (1974), p. 67. 
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it	 was	 not	 the	 usual	 sort.	 The	 two	 of	 us	 never	met	 together	 alone.	
Pacaran	 is	 really	 restrictive,	 but	 kencan	 (meeting	 in	 private)	 is	
considered	out	of	the	question	and	taboo.”	Again,	Islamic	marriage	is	
not	perceived	merely	as	a	contractual	tie.	For	Muslims	in	Sumbersari	
or	 elsewhere	 for	 that	 matter,	 marriage	 serves	 more	 as	 an	 act	 of	





have	 sought	her	 approval	when	 the	marriage	proposal	 from	Ulum’s	
family	was	accepted.	Aini,	therefore,	never	expressed	her	agreement	
or	rejection	of	the	parent’s	decision.	Even	had	she	refused	in	view	of	
the	 traditions	of	her	 society,	 as	her	guardian	her	 father	would	have	
exercised	his	right	to	coerce	her	into	marriage.	Fathers,	or	other	male	
guardians,	 play	 a	 decisive	 role	 in	 controlling	 their	 daughters’	
behaviour41	and	in	determining	the	validity	of	a	marriage	contract.42	






an	 ambivalence	 which	 necessarily	 suggests	 the	 evolution	 of	 sexual	
norms	in	a	traditional	community.	Aini	herself	found	her	spouse,	but	
her	father	decided	the	timing	of	the	marriage.	The	younger	generation	
in	 Sumbersari	 is	 showing	 a	 greater	 tendency	 to	 choose	 their	 own	
husbands	and	wives,	 but	 even	 so	 the	 timing	of	 the	 ceremony	 is	not	
always	 up	 to	 them.	 During	 the	 last	 decade,	 the	 result	 of	 increasing	
access	to	and	the	extended	duration	of	formal	education,	schools	have	
 
41 Ann Black, Hossein Esmaeili, and Nadirsyah Hosen, Modern Perspectives on Islamic Law 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), p. 129. 
42 Muhammad Khalid Masud, ‘Gender Equality and the Doctrine of Wilāya’, in Gender and 
equality in Muslim family law: Justice and ethics in the Islamic legal tradition, ed. by Ziba Mir-




can	meet	 prospective	 partners.	 Girls	 and	 boys	 are	 not	 separated	 in	
schools	 or	 classrooms,	 allowing	 them	 the	 freedom	 to	 interact	 with	
each	 other.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 young	 people,	 especially	 girls,	 are	
becoming	 more	 exposed	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 mutual	 love	 (la	 padeh	
senneng).	 This	 ideal	 of	 mutual	 love	 has	 recently	 become	 more	
instrumental	in	the	shaping	of	local	marriage	behaviour;	the	sexuality	
of	the	young	is	no	longer	a	familial	affair.	






sexual	 advances.43	 This	 outlook	 is	 still	 a	 strong	 reflection	 of	 the	
conservative	understanding	of	gender	relations	in	Islam	and	is	the	one	










obligations	 towards	 his	wife,	 namely:	 treating	 her	well,	 providing	 a	
 
43 Nina Hoel and Sa’diyya Shaikh, ‘Sex as Ibadah: Religion, Gender, and Subjectivity among 
South African Muslim Women’, Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion, vol. 29, no. 1 (2013), 
pp. 69–91. 
44 Bianca J. Smith and Mark Woodward, ‘Introduction, Decolonizing Islam and Muslim 
feminism’, in Gender and power in Indonesian Islam: leaders, feminists, Sufis and pesantren 
selves, ed. by Bianca J. Smith and Mark Woodward (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 
p. 10; Husein Muhammad, Fiqh Perempuan: Refleksi Kiai atas Wacana Agama dan Gender 
(Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2001). 
45 Srimulyani, Women from Traditional Islamic Educational Institutions in Indonesia: 
Negotiating Public Spaces, p. 125. 
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livelihood	 and	 dower,	 as	 well	 as	 guiding	 her	 through	 the	 maze	 of	
rituals	 and	 wifely	 obedience	 to	 the	 husband.	 The	 second	 chapter	















for	 Islamic	 dresses.	 The	 money	 she	 makes	 is	 enough	 to	 give	 small	
daughter	some	pocket	money	(uang	jajan).		
5.	2.	Marry	Me!	Marriage	and	Religious	Piety	
In	 the	 first	months	of	2007,	 I	made	 the	acquaintance	of	 Iin’s	 family.	
Socially,	 it	 can	 be	 considered	 middle-class.	 The	 father	 works	 in	 a	















(Pasuruan	 Industrial	 Estate	 Rembang),	 in	which	 hundreds	 of	major	
transnational	companies	operate.		
As	of	September	2015,	they	have	been	in	a	serious	relationship.	In	
contrast	 to	Aini,	 because	 Iin	worked	outside	 the	home,	 she	has	had	
ample	opportunities	to	meet	Alim	in	private.	In	view	of	her	situation,	
Iin	 acknowledged	 that	 she	 did	 not	 want	 to	 have	 a	 long	 period	 of	
courtship	with	Alim.	Reasons	derived	from	sexuality,	public	morality	
and	 certainty	 (kepastian)	 appear	 to	 have	 shaped	 her	 outlook.	 She	
believed	that	Alim	was	the	man	of	her	destiny	(juddhu)	but	she	feared	
that	their	relationship	would	not	end	in	marriage.	She	therefore	asked	
Alim	 to	marry	 her	 as	 soon	 as	 possible.	 In	 April	 2016,	 Alim’s	 family	
came	to	Iin’s	parents	to	formalize	the	betrothal	(lamaran)	which	would	














choice	 of	 marriage	 partners	 and	 the	 timing	 of	 the	 marriage	 which	
prevailed	in	the	past	is	now	gradually	being	offset	by	the	girls’	agency.	






respectively.	 Their	 consent	 to	 the	 marriage	 is	 dependent	 upon	 the	





Furthermore,	 Iin’s	 views	 on	what	marriage	means	 to	 her	 have	
been	formulated	with	Islamic	doctrines	on	sexuality	and	morality	 in	
mind.	She	proposed	an	array	of	arguments	related	to	sexuality,	saying	
that,	 for	 instance,	 marriage	 would	 preclude	 damaging	 interaction	
(pergaulan	 rusak)	 and	 allay	 her	 concerns	 about	 premarital	 sex.	














essential	 part	 of	 individual	 experience	 and	 as	 the	 cultivation	 of	
spiritual	awareness.46	In	spite	of	framing	marriage	as	a	means	to	avoid	
sinful	acts,	it	is	also	indisputably	regarded	as	an	expression	of	piety.47	
Over	 the	 past	 two	 decades,	 marriage	 as	 a	 step	 on	 the	 right	 road	
towards	piety	has	been	encouraged	as	a	way	to	cultivate	a	pious	self	
among	 Muslims	 who	 have	 not	 enjoyed	 an	 education	 in	 traditional	
Islamic	institutions.48	Scholars	connect	this	phenomenon	to	the	rise	of	
 
46 N. Hoel, ‘Engaging Islamic Sexual Ethics: Intimacy, Pleasure and Sacrality’, Sexualities, vol. 
18, nos. 1–2 (2015), p. 84. 
47 Asma Barlas, ‘Believing women’ in Islam: Unreading patriarchal interpretations of the 
Qurʾan (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2002), p. 153. 
48 Rozario, ‘Islamic Piety against the Family: From “Traditional” to “Pure” Islam’; Rachel 




religious	 piety	 in	 this	 secular	 world.	 Recent	 trends	 in	 the	
anthropological	 study	 of	 Islam	 have	 suggested	 that	 modernization	
does	 not	 necessarily	 result	 in	 secularization	 or	 religious	
desacralization,49	but	instead	gives	rise	to	the	proliferation	of	multiple	







their	 own	 increasing	 agency.	 Even	 the	 agency	 of	 women	 has	 been	
expanding	 and	 opened	up	 a	 range	 of	 possibilities.	 This	 has	 allowed	
them	 to	 navigate	 their	 own	 actions	 in	 their	 quest	 to	 find	 different	
solutions	as	 long	as	 these	sustain	 their	 ideals	of	a	better	 life.	 In	 this	
respect,	 Schielke	 has	 underscored	 that,	 “Muslims’	 engagement	with	
their	religion	is	neither	the	outcome	of	blind	adherence,	nor	the	result	








involved,	 cultural	 norms	 and	 prevailing	 social	 structure	 in	 their	
 
49 Peter L. Berger, ‘The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview’, in The 
Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, ed. by Peter L. Berger 
(Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999), p. 11. 
50 Timothy P. Daniels, ‘Introduction: Sharia Dynamics and the Anthropology of Islam’, in Sharia 
Dynamics: Islamic Law and Sociopolitical Processes, ed. by Timothy P. Daniels (Cham: Springer 
International Publishing, 2017), p. 14. 
51 Kalanges, Religious Liberty in Western and Islamic law: Toward a World Legal Tradition, p. 
4. 
52 Samuli Schielke, ‘Second Thoughts about the Anthropology of Islam, or How to Make Sense 
of Grand Schemes in Everyday Life’, ZMO Working Papers, no. 2 (2010), p. 5. 




localized	 ideals	 of	 chastity	 (kesucian),	 correct	 behaviour	 (apik)	 and	






a	 girl	 and	 her	 high	 moral	 principles.	 In	 Sumbersari,	 the	
implementation	 of	 these	 ideas	 in	marriage	 and	 remarriage	 are	 still	
dependent	on	the	roles	of	the	pengarep	(traditional	marriage-broker)	
and	kyai	 (religious	 leaders),	although	 the	role	of	 the	 latter	might	be	
superseded.		









rationales.	 Kulsum’s	 out-of-court	 divorce	 suggests	 the	 overriding	
importance	of	social	acceptance	compared	to	formal	legal	recognition.	
Likewise,	 practices	 among	 middle-class	 families	 also	 show	 the	
importance	of	this	role.	Fahim	was	married-off	after	her	parents	were	
visited	 by	 a	 pengarep.	 Her	 husband	 is	 a	 santri	 from	 a	middle-class	
family	and	therefore	a	good	catch.	People	were	very	much	afraid	that	








legal	 norm	 which	 exercises	 control	 over	 sexual	 morality	 and	 this	
sometimes	 clashes	with	 the	 state	 legal	 norm.	 In	 addition,	 divergent	
opinions	 in	 traditional	 fiqh	 doctrines	 have	 been	 essential	 to	 the	
construction	of	a	legal	reasoning	which	ties	in	with	people’s	interests.	
The	 ability	 to	 exercise	 legal	 reasoning	 has	 become	 a	 fundamental	
instrument	by	which	kyai	can	maintain	his	legitimate	authority	in	the	
society.	Because	of	the	involvement	of	kyai,	marriage	has	been,	and	is	
still,	 an	 effective	 tool	 by	 which	 to	 tackle	 the	 problems	 of	 religious	
morality	and	female	sexuality.	
Increasing	 participation	 in	 formal	 education	 and	 the	 rise	 in	
women’s	mobility	have	challenged	these	tried	and	tested	practices.53	
Formal	schools	now	provide	a	space	in	which	young	people	can	meet	
prospective	 partners.	 Mutual	 love	 is	 becoming	 more	 important.	
Because	they	now	have	more	room	to	exercise	agency	in	the	selection	
of	a	possible	spouse,	the	role	played	by	pengarep	is	a	diminishing	one.	
Nevertheless,	 for	 girls	 the	 finding	 a	 beloved	 partner	 is	 still	 not	 the	
crucial	factor	in	deciding	when	they	marry.	In	many	cases,	the	decision	
of	 the	 timing	 a	 of	 marriage	 is	 still	 firmly	 subject	 to	 the	 parents’	
authority	 because	 they	 are	 still	 the	 people	 supposed	 to	 exercise	
control	over	their	daughter’s	sexual	morality.	Parents	usually	refer	to	






to	 marry	 her	 to	 a	 new	 spouse,	 despite	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 marriage	
certificate,	 an	 attitude	 found	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 Indonesia	 too,	 like	 in	
Cianjur,	West	 Java.54	 This	 suggests	 that	 religious	 norms	 still	 prevail	
over	other	 legal	norms,	 especially	 in	 remarriage.	 Furthermore,	with	
the	 help	 of	 their	 traditional	 stalwarts,	 the	 kyai	 and	 pengarep,	 the	
villagers	 in	 Pasuruan	 are	 managing	 to	 continue	 to	 observe	 their	
 
53 Gavin Jones, ‘Which Indonesian Women Marry Youngest, and Why?’, Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies, vol. 32, no. 1 (2001), pp. 67–78. 
54 van Huis, ‘Islamic Courts and Women’s Divorce Rights in Indonesia: The Cases of Cianjur and 
Bulukumba’, p. 271. 
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community-based	 legal	 system,	 thereby	 forestalling	 the	 heavy	
involvement	of	state	institution.55	Platt	has	underlined	the	dominant	
influence	 of	 community-based	 law	 which	 saps	 the	 efficacy	 of	 the	
Marriage	Law.56	The	narratives	in	this	chapter	have	revealed	some	of	














55 Grijns and Horii, ‘Child Marriage in a Village in West Java (Indonesia): Compromises between 
Legal Obligations and Religious Concerns’, p. 12. 
56 Platt, Marriage, Gender and Islam in Indonesia: Women Negotiating Informal Marriage, 


























building	 next	 to	 the	 mosque.	 The	 building	 looked	 dirty,	 the	 front	
garden	 was	 untidy,	 but	 the	 entrance	 gates	 stood	 open.	 A	 small	
signboard	reading	‘Kantor	Urusan	Agama’	still	hung	on	the	fence.	The	
leaves	of	a	mango	tree	in	the	corner	of	the	garden	drooped	down	over	
some	 parts	 of	 the	 signboard.	 I	 was	 hesitant	 but	 finally	 decided	 to	
approach	a	young	man	sitting	at	a	warung	(food	stall)	directly	opposite	





been	 unoccupied	 for	 months.	 The	 office	 had	 in	 fact	 been	 moved	 a	
couple	 of	 hundred	 metres	 to	 the	 south,	 taking	 over	 a	 building	
belonging	to	the	sub-district	branch	of	the	NU.	
The	 following	day,	 I	 visited	 the	 ‘new’	office	and	met	 its	highest	
official,	Pak	Yusuf,58	the	kepala	(head)	of	the	KUA,	who	simultaneously	
serves	 as	 the	 Pegawai	 Pencatat	 Nikah	 (PPN,	 the	 official	 marriage	
registrar).	His	position	is	socially	acknowledged	as	the	equivalent	of	
penghulu	 or	 naib.	 Pak	 Yusuf	 briefly	 explained	 that	 they	 had	 had	 to	
move	 because	 major	 parts	 of	 the	 old	 building	 were	 in	 need	 of	
renovation.	He	said	that	the	Provincial	Office	of	Religious	Affairs	has	









to	 have	 extensive	 chats	 with	 Pak	 Rohmat,	 one	 of	 the	 local	 officials	
whose	house	is	just	a	few	dozen	metres	from	the	office.	Pak	Rohmat	is	






* An earlier version of this chapter has been published in Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic studies 
vol. 57 no. 2 (2019): pp. 397-424. 
57 The KUA is a state body at the sub-district (kecamatan) level which is responsible for the 
administration of Muslim marriages. 
58 All names are pseudonyms. 
59 To avoid misunderstanding, herein marriage ceremony refers to akad nikah or ijab kabul, 
the stage at which the woman’s guardian in marriage offers the bride to the groom who then 
declares his acceptance. 
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for	 the	 construction	of	 a	new	KUA	office.	 Some	 local	 religious	elites	
who	knew	about	it	fiercely	opposed	to	the	plan.	They	argued	that	the	
KUA,	whose	 task	 is	 to	deal	with	 Islamic	 affairs,	was	 ideally	 situated	
alongside	 a	 mosque.	 In	 the	 end,	 the	 government	 cancelled	 the	
construction	project.	Later,	after	the	intervention	of	religious	leaders,	
the	 owner	 of	 the	 (rented)	 house	 was	 prepared	 to	 exchange	 his	
property	 for	 the	 allocated	 land.	 Since	 then,	 the	 house	 has	 been	
government	 property,	 even	 though	 the	 exchange	 was	 carried	 out	
unofficially.	As	a	local	villager,	Pak	Rohmat	has	been	assigned	the	job	
of	co-operating	with	village	authorities	to	finalize	its	legal	status.	He	is	
happy	 to	 take	 on	 this	 assignment,	 arguing	 “it’s	 the	 source	 of	 my	
income”.	
This	 narrative	 gives	 a	 very	 good	 impression	 of	 how	 informal	
religious	 leaders	 exercise	 their	 power	 in	 the	 (re)making	 of	 a	 state	
institution.60	 The	 resistance	 to	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 new	 building	
makes	is	quite	clear	that	a	state	 institution	cannot	really	be	isolated	
from	 its	 social	 context.	 Referring	 to	 similar	 situations,	Davis	 argues	
that,	 “informality	 is	 both	 a	mirror	 and	 a	 determinant	 of	 the	 state’s	
formal	reach”.61	Moreover,	it	is	also	obvious	that,	in	the	perception	of	
the	 religious	 leaders,	 the	 KUA	 is	 more	 than	 a	 formal	 institution	
involved	in	the	administration	of	marriage.	Rather,	the	KUA	officials,	









60 Adam White, ‘Introduction. A State-in-Society Agenda’, in The Everyday Life of the State: A 
State-In-Society Approach, ed. by Adam White (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2013), pp. 1–12. 
61 D.E. Davis, ‘Informality and State Theory: Some Concluding Remarks’, Current Sociology, vol. 
65, no. 2 (2017), p. 317. 
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the	 state	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 broader	 social	 context	 in	 which	 it	 is	
embedded”.63	Bearing	this	in	mind,	I	would	like	to	draw	attention	to	a	








the	 KUA	 officials	 have	 to	 negotiate	 their	 authority	 in	 a	 variety	 of	
contexts.	They	personally	considered	that,	for	the	sake	of	stability,	it	
was	 important	 to	 enhance	 their	 good	 relationship	 with	 religious	
leaders	and	local	elites.	It	seems	that	officials	like	Pak	Rohmat,	who	is	
a	local	villager,	play	an	important	role	in	bridging	relations	between	
the	 KUA	 and	 the	 local	 elites,	 including	 modin	 (informal	 religious	
officials	 in	 charge	 of	 marriage	 on	 the	 village	 level).	 Moreover,	
considering	 the	 principle	 of	 the	 ‘dual	 validity’	 of	Muslim	marriages,	
that	is,	the	legal	obligation	of	marriage	registration	and	the	religious	
nature	 of	 the	 marriage	 ceremony,	 the	 flexibility	 of	 KUA	 officers	 in	
interpreting	and	 implementing	the	rules	 is	 the	key	to	 the	success	of	
state-imposed	marriage	registration.		






poised	at	a	 crossroads	between	 the	 interests	of	Muslim	 leaders	and	
 
63 Gerry van Klinken and Joshua Barker, ‘Introduction: State in society in Indonesia’, in State 
of authority: the state in society in Indonesia, ed. by Gerry van Klinken and Joshua Barker 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2009), p. 5. 




left	 much	 to	 be	 desired.65	 Discussing	 their	 contemporary	 delicate	
balancing	 act,	 Nurlaelawati	 has	 remarked	 that	 the	 KUA	 officials,	




Even	more	 interesting	 is	 that,	 as	 she	 suggests,	 the	 KUA	 officials	 in	
particular	areas	adopt	an	ambivalent	position	towards	judicial	divorce	
when	they	go	ahead	with	the	marriage	registration	of	married	couples	
who	 claim	 to	 have	 been	 divorce	 but	 fail	 to	 present	 a	 divorce	
certificate.66		
This	 chapter	 asks	 a	 fundamental	 question:	 In	 what	 ways	 do	
penghulu	 maintain	 their	 authority?	 This	 resonates	 with	 other	
questions,	 such	 as:	What	 language	 do	 they	 use	 in	 their	 struggle	 for	
power	in	society?	What	is	people’s	attitude	towards	them?	What	roles	
do	modin	 play?	 How	 can	 we	 explain	 from	 observing	 the	 everyday	





This	 chapter	 is	 composed	 of	 six	 sections.	 Following	 this	
introduction,	I	briefly	elaborate	the	foundational	framework	on	which	
this	 chapter	 stands.	 The	 next	 section	 seeks	 to	 elucidate	 the	 social	
context	in	which	the	state	is	supposed	to	exercise	its	legal	authority.	
From	her	I	go	on	is	to	address	the	presence	of	state	institutions	in	order	
to	 introduce	 them	 into	 the	core	discussion.	This	 involves	examining	
the	different	attitudes	of	KUA	officials.	Later,	I	expand	my	discussion	
 
64 Hisyam, Caught between Three Fires: The Javanese Pangulu under the Dutch Colonial 
Administration, 1882-1942. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and Identity: The Kompilasi Hukum Islam and Legal 
Practice in the Indonesian Religious Courts, p. 189. 
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of	 the	 image	 with	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 recent	 trend	 in	 marriage	
registrations.	The	sixth	section	examines	the	interaction	between	the	















dried.70	 This	 situation	 inescapably	 gives	 rise	 to	 a	 wide	 range	 of	
competing	 authorities	 and	 discourses.	 Given	 the	 circumstances,	 it	
seems	impossible	to	be	able	to	avoid	the	necessity	of	examining	the	
compound	 relationship	 between	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 state	 and	
everyday	 social	 actors	 in	 order	 to	 comprehend	 their	 multiple	
narratives	 and	 political	 activities	 as	 reciprocal	 processes	 which	
constitute	 one	 another.	 The	 relationship	between	 them	 is	 seen	 as	 a	
dialectical	process.		
 
67 Scott, ‘Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage’, p. 1903. 
68 Recent studies of the state and society have considered informality an analytical point of 
departure for theorizing governance, citizenship and social order. Davis, ‘Informality and State 
Theory: Some Concluding Remarks’. 
69 Among others, Joel Migdal is one of the leading scholars on the subject. His book “State in 
Society” published in 2001 has been fundamental in providing insightful viewpoints to deal 
with the enquiry into the making and the remaking of the state in the face of social realities. 
See Joel S. Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and 
Constitute One Another (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
70 White, ‘Introduction. A State-in-Society Agenda’, p. 3. 
Registering Muslim Marriages: Penghulu, Modin and the Struggle of 
	 189	
This	 ‘state-in-society’	 approach	 leads	 to	 a	 new,	 distinctive	
definition	of	the	state.	It	revisits	that	proposed	by	earlier	scholars	like	
Max	 Weber	 who	 conceptualized	 the	 state	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 its	
institutional	 nature	 as	 a	 powerful	 organization	 which	 allows	 it	 to	
resort	 to	coercion.71	This	 longstanding	understanding	of	 the	state	 is	
encapsulated	in	Weber’s	commonly	cited	definition	“a	state	is	a	human	
community	 that	 (successfully)	 claims	 the	monopoly	of	 the	 legitimate	
use	 of	 physical	 force	 within	 a	 given	 territory”.72	 At	 the	 core	 of	 this	
definition	 clearly	 lies	 the	 notion	 of	 domination	 by	 the	 means	 of	




also	suggests	 that	 the	state	 is	a	power	which	“embodies	an	ongoing	
dynamic,	 a	 changing	 set	 of	 aims”	 as	 the	 consequence	 of	 the	
engagement	of	social	forces.74		
In	 the	 study	 of	 Islamic	 law	 and	 society,	 this	 ‘state-in-society’	
approach	necessarily	brings	me	back	to	a	number	of	works	which	have	
suggested	 the	 so-called	 cultural	 shape	 of	 state	 activity.	 One	 is	 the	
seminal	work	by	Rosen	on	the	practices	of	the	qadi	 in	the	context	of	
Islamic	 law	 and	 Moroccan	 social	 and	 cultural	 life.75	 After	 his	
examination	 of	 the	 local	 sharia	 court	 records	 (sijill)	 in	 the	 town	 of	
Sefrou,	 Morocco,	 he	 found	 that	 the	 oaths	 sworn	 and	 the	 use	 of	
professional	witnesses	are	not	based	on	the	exact	reality;	they	are	the	




71 Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One 
Another, p. 111. 
72 Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, p. 78. 
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74 Ibid., p. 112. 
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shaped	by	 (1)	 the	 image	 of	 a	 coherent,	 controlling	 organization	 in	 a	
territory,	 which	 is	 a	 representation	 of	 the	 people	 bounded	 by	 that	
territory,	and	(2)	the	actual	practices	of	its	multiple	parts.”76	The	first	
aspect,	 the	 state’s	 image,	 assumes	 the	 state	 as	 a	 dominant	 and	
autonomous	 entity	which	 controls	 the	 direction	 taken	 by	 the	 given	
society.	 This	 is	 also	 bound	 up	 with	 how	 the	 state	 has	 become	 an	
integral	 part	 of	 everyday	 social	 relations;	 the	 explanation	 of	why	 it	
continues	to	exercise	a	certain	form	of	authority.77	The	second	aspect,	
the	 practice,	 connects	 with	 the	 ways	 the	 state’s	 image	 is	 either	
reinforced	or	weakened	by	its	own	officials	and	societal	agencies.	In	
short,	it	focuses	on	the	variety	of	practices	which	influence	the	sharp	





point	 is	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 development	 of	 registered	marriage	
from	which	I	move	on	to	analysing	the	practices	of	penghulu	and	of	the	
KUA,	 paying	 particular	 attention	 to	 the	 image	 portrayed.	 In	 my	
construction	of	this	the	image,	I	analyse	the	internal	dynamics	within	
the	KUA	to	understand	how	penghulu	maintain	the	position	of	the	KUA.	





This	 section	 analyses	 the	 behaviour	 of	 KUA	 officials	 and	 their	
interaction	in	the	everyday	running	of	the	KUA.	However,	before	going	
 
76 Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One 
Another, pp. 15–6. 
77 White, ‘Introduction. A State-in-Society Agenda’, p. 13. 
78 Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One 
Another, p. 20. 




head	 (kepala),	 officials	 specifically	working	 on	marriage	 (penghulu)	















occupation	 is	 less	hectic	 than	his	previous	 job	but,	 in	 the	process	of	




servant	 in	 the	Office	of	Religious	Affairs	 in	Pasuruan	 in	1985.	 Since	





Ekonomi	 (SE,	 BA	 in	 Economics).	 In	 the	 past,	 it	 was	 possible	 for	 an	








penghulu	 could	 hold	 a	 structural	 position	 (jabatan	 struktural)	 as	 a	
kepala	 KUA.	 In	 Pak	 Yusuf’s	 case,	 he	 is	 the	 kepala	 but	 he	 is	 not	 a	








crucial	 issue	 in	 Sumbersari.	 Local	 people	 have	 problematized	 his	
educational	 background	 because	 he	 had	 never	 attended	 an	 Islamic	
school.	 Pak	 Yusuf	 has	 also	 not	 been	 adequately	 educated	 in	 Arabic.	
Importantly,	particular	societies,	as	in	Sumbersari,	demand	the	use	of	










the	 top,	 a	 big	 poster	 announces	 the	 regulations	 determining	 the	
mechanism	 of	 the	 marriage	 registration	 fee	 which	 stresses	 the	
difference	between	nikah	di	KUA	(marriage	in	the	KUA)	and	nikah	di	
luar	KUA	(marriage	outside	the	KUA).	Beneath	it,	a	poster	reproduces	
a	 hadith	 on	 the	 roles	 of	 the	 marriage	 guardian	 and	 witnesses	 in	
marriage	 contract.	 This	 hadith	 says	 lā	 nikāḥa	 illā	 biwaliyyin	 wa	


















buku	 bantu	 register	 (back-up	 registration	 book).	 The	 difference	
between	this	book	and	the	buku	register	is	that	that	kept	by	Pak	Zaki	




















serving	 as	penghulu	 in	 another	 sub-district.	When	 he	 took	 over	 his	
brother’s	position,	Pak	Rohmat	shared	the	same	ambition,	to	be	a	civil	
servant	too.	Therefore,	some	years	ago	he	took	a	bachelor’s	degree	in	












We	can	easily	 identify	 the	difference	between	the	civil	 servants	
and	 the	 non-tenured	 officials	 in	 their	 everyday	 performance,	which	
essentially	underlines	their	formal	and	the	semi-formal	positions.	Pak	
Zaki	and	Pak	Yusuf	dress	more	formally,	white	long-sleeved	shirt	on	
certain	 days,	 with	 an	 official	 badge	 pinned	 on	 their	 left	 breast.	 In	
addition,	Pak	Yusuf	always	wears	a	typically	Islamic	cap	(kopyah).	It	
seems	 that	 the	 kopyah	 says	 something	 about	 his	 state-sanctioned	
authority	on	Islamic	matters.	Pak	Rohmat	and	Pak	Hamid	tend	to	dress	
more	informally.		





Although	 Pak	 Rohmat	 and	 Pak	 Hamid	 do	 not	 have	 permanent	
appointments,	their	position	is	important.	Firstly,	as	said,	their	families	
are	genealogically	linked	with	religious	elites	in	the	area.	Secondly,	as	
locals,	 they	 share	 close	 emotional	 ties	 with	 the	modin,	 the	 village	
religious	 leaders	 who	 act	 as	 informal	 marriage	 functionaries.	 The	
majority	of	 them	are	graduates	of	pesantren.	 In	 the	area	 there	 is	an	
overwhelming	 tradition	 that	 a	 marriage	 ceremony,	 particularly	 the	
couple’s	first	marriage,	should	always	be	performed	by	a	modin.	In	this	
position,	 the	 modin	 does	 not	 just	 organize	 the	 administrative	
documents	required	for	the	registration,	he	is	in	charge	of	the	whole	
process.	Thirdly,	if	he	is	unable	to	attend,	Pak	Yusuf	tends	to	assign	one	










Pak	 Zaki	 insists	 that	 the	 couples	 turn	 up	 for	 the	 rafak	 (document	
verification).	The	modin	are	chary	about	rafak	for	several	reasons.	One	
objection	 is	 that	 either	 the	 bride	 or	 groom	 is	 still	 a	 boarder	 in	 a	
pesantren	or	works	out	of	town.	Another	reason	is	that	the	couple	has	
not	 yet	 signed	 the	marriage	 consent	 form.	When	 this	 happens,	 the	









forces	 in	 operation	 behind	 the	 local	 officials	 to	 the	 manoeuvres	 of	
modin,	which	 inhibit	 the	everyday	practice	of	 the	KUA.	Pak	Yusuf	 is	
aware	 of	 this	 situation	 and	 that	 he	 needs	 to	 exercise	 his	 authority,	
albeit	playing	his	power	trump	card	very	carefully.	As	the	PPN,	he	is	
unquestionably	 a	 representative	 of	 the	 state,	 but	 as	 a	 penghulu,	 he	
tends	to	present	himself	in	his	guise	as	a	religious	authority.	Pak	Yusuf	
gives	 the	 local	 officials	 leeway	 to	 play	 a	 role	 in	 bridging	 the	











help	 in	 arranging	 the	 marriage	 ceremony.	 At	 this	 point,	 I	 should	
explain	that	people	usually	go	to	modin	for	the	first	marriage,	that	is,	




is	 no	 guarantee	 that	 modin	 will	 feel	 obliged	 to	 participate	 in	 the	
process.	The	father-modin	interaction	represents	the	initial	process	in	
the	 implementation	of	 the	state	 law	on	marriage.	 In	 the	Sumbersari	
setting,	I	observed	a	conversation	between	a	father	and	modin	which	
ran	as	follows:	
Father	 :	 Pak	 Haji,	 kauleh	 amantuah.	 Senapah	 melleh	 buku	
nikah?	




(Praise	 be	 to	 Allah!	 Your	 daughter	 has	 found	 her	
future	 husband.	Wish	 her	 a	 blessed	 relationship	 in	
this	world	and	in	the	Hereafter.)	
Buku	 nikah	 benne	 juwel	 bellih	 tapeh	 istilanah	
ngurusin,	bedeh	persyaratanah.	Sittung,	koduh	cokop	
omor,	mon	binek	nembeles	taon,	mon	lakek	sangabelles	
taon.	 Duek,	 koduh	 anddik	 Kartu	 Keluarga,	 KTP,	 ben	
ijasah.	
(The	 marriage	 certificate	 is	 not	 something	 to	 be	














(I	 want	 you	 handle	 it,	 Pak	 Modin,	 including	 the	
marriage	ceremony.)	
Modin	 :	 Mon	 pasra	 dek	 kauleh	 biaya	 penguruseneh	 senekah,	
molain	derih	pengetikan,	perjelenen	sampek	mareh.	
(If	 this	 is	 what	 you	 want	 it	 will	 cost	 (a	 certain	
amount),	 covering	 the	 preparation	 of	 all	 the	
documents,	 transport	 costs	 and	 the	 marriage	
ceremony.)	
	
This	 conversation	 clearly	 shows	 that	 the	 villagers	 generally	
perceive	 marriage	 registration	 in	 terms	 of	 “buying	 a	 marriage	
certificate”.	They	argue	 this	 is	because	 they	have	 to	 spend	a	 certain	
amount	of	money	to	obtain	it.	The	modin	usually	tells	them	that	it	is	
not	 a	 matter	 of	 buying	 a	 letter,	 but	 of	 registering	 a	 marriage.	 This	
misperception	 is	 not	 only	 prevalent	 in	 the	 matter	 of	 marriage	






marriage	 certificate,	 when	 we	 look	 at	 the	 figures	 for	 marriages	










199,272	 it	 was	 1,308	 per	 year.	 The	 lowest	 number,	 amounting	 to	




















	This	 chart	 shows	 that,	 since	 2015	 there	 has	 been	 a	 tendency	
towards	 a	 decline	 in	 marriage	 registration.	 When	 I	 consulted	 the	
officials	of	the	KUA	about	this	matter,	they	argued	that	the	decline	was	
caused	by	neither	a	decrease	in	marriages	nor	a	rise	in	unregistered	
marriage.	 Social	 mobility	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 the	 major	 factor	
 
79 BPS Kab. Pasuruan, Kabupaten Pasuruan dalam Angka 2016, p. 232. 
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KUA	 Sumbersari	was	 104.	 Twenty-three	were	 divorces	 initiated	 by	
husbands	 (cerai	 talak),	 while	 the	 remaining	 eighty-one	 were	
requested	by	wives	(cerai	gugat).	Here,	the	ratio	of	divorce	was	18.9	
percent	compared	to	the	number	of	marriages	in	the	same	year.	From	









80 The KUA administration and the civil registration in Indonesia differentiate between janda 
mati (widow) and janda cerai (divorced woman) and between a duda mati (widower) and 
duda cerai (divorced man). 
81 Nurlaelawati, ‘Muslim Women in Indonesian Religious Courts: Reform, Strategies, and 
Pronouncement of Divorce’; Mohamad Abdun Nasir, ‘Islamic Law and Paradox of Domination 
and Resistance’, Asian Journal of Social Science, vol. 44, nos. 1–2 (2016), pp. 78–103. 











in	 the	 previous	 section,	 underscore	 the	 optimism	 felt	 about	 the	
effective	 functioning	 of	 the	 state	 as	 a	 body	 which	 wields	 legal	
authority.	 Does	 this	 mean	 that	 people	 are	 now	 more	 inclined	 to	
surrender	their	religious	affairs	to	a	state	agent?	If	so,	to	what	extent	
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Sometime	 in	 May	 2017,	 a	 family	 in	 a	 Pasuruan	 village	 whose	
daughter	was	about	to	wed	held	a	walimah.	A	walimah	is	a	festive	meal	
organized	 at	 the	 bridegroom’s	 house	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 making	 a	
public	 announcement	 of	 the	 forthcoming	marriage	 ceremony	 (akad	
nikah).	It	is	usually	held	in	the	morning	and	relatives,	neighbours	and	
respected	figures	in	the	village	are	invited.	The	groom	and	a	few	of	his	




the	marriage	 ceremony,	 he	 decided	 to	 register	 it	 as	 a	nikah	 kantor,	
marriage	at	 the	KUA	office.	Haji	Misbah	asked	 the	 father	about	who	
would	serve	as	the	munakkiḥ,82	stating	the	following:	
“I	 told	 the	 father	 that	 the	 obligation	 to	marry	 a	 woman	 is	 the	
responsibility	of	the	wali.	It	is	much	better	if	the	wali	undertakes	
this	 duty	 personally.	 However,	 he	 can	 delegate	 it	 to	 another	
suitable	person	if	he	prefers.	However,	it	is	thought	vulgar	for	the	




nikah	 scheduled	 by	 the	 KUA.	 In	 the	meantime,	 the	 father	 had	 been	
persuaded	by	his	family	to	include	the	akad	nikah	during	the	walimah,	
 
82 Munakkiḥ is the person to whom the marriage guardian delegates his authority to marry off 
his daughter. 
Registering Muslim Marriages: Penghulu, Modin and the Struggle of 
	 203	




pesantren	 tradition,	 the	 locals	still	believe	 in	the	concept	of	barakah	
(blessing),	 a	 quality	 which	 revealed	 in	 the	 performance	 of	 good	
religious	acts	by	people.83	Their	ideal	is	a	marriage	ceremony	blessed	
by	 intermediation	of	Gus	Akib.	Hence	the	 father	raised	the	situation	




led	 to	 a	 circumstance	 called	 akad	 dua	 kali	 (twofold	 marriage	
ceremonies).	




usually	 suggest	 the	 family	 hold	 the	 ceremony	 at	 the	 KUA.	 These	
religious	 leaders	 are	well	 aware	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 a	marriage	






between	marriage	 in	 the	office	 (nikah	kantor)	and	marriage	outside	
the	office	(publicly	known	as	nikah	bedolan).85	The	basic	principle	at	
 
83 In Sufism, one can receive God’s blessing through the intermediary of a holy man such as a 
saint or a murshid. Within the pesantren tradition, students are supposed to respect their 
teachers not only in the classroom but also in all aspects of life. Failure to pay respect can 
cause the loss of the barakah of the teacher. See Martin van Bruinessen, Tarekat 
Naqsyabandiyah di Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan, 1992), p. 215; Dhofier, The Pesantren 
Tradition: The Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of Traditional Islam in Java, pp. 61–2. 
84 This is according to Pak Syukron, a modin in Sumbersari. 
85 Peraturan Pemerintah (Government Regulation) No. 48 Tahun 2014 tentang Perubahan 






applied	 when,	 with	 the	 PPN’s	 agreement,	 a	 bride	 proposes	 her	
marriage	 be	 solemnized	 outside	 the	 KUA	 office.	 Now,	 the	
differentiation	between	nikah	at	the	KUA	and	outside	the	KUA	has	been	
clarified	by	the	introduction	of	a	scale	of	multiple	tariffs.	Those	who	
















This	 section	 has	 demonstrated	 how	 penghulu	 negotiate	 their	
authority	as	they	navigate	the	pressures	exerted	by	various	forces:	the	
state,	 local	 tradition	 and	 their	 own	 interests.	 By	 drafting	 the	 new	
regulation,	it	seems	that	the	state	is	seeking	to	increase	its	power	of	
intervention	 in	 marriage.	 The	 campaign	 for	 nikah	 kantor	 actually	
began	some	years	ago.	In	its	implementation,	the	central	government	
has	 made	 significant	 efforts	 to	 enhance	 the	 status	 of	 KUA	 offices,	
transforming	 them	 into	 ‘ideal	 houses’	 in	 which	 to	 hold	 a	 marriage	
 
Bukan Pajak yang Berlaku pada Departemen Agama (on the Revision of the Government 
Regulation No. 47/2004 on the non-tax revenue of the Department of Religious Affairs). 
86 Peraturan Menteri Agama (Regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs) No. 11/2007 on 
Pencatatan Nikah (MarriageRregistration). 
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ceremony,	 actually	 renaming	 it	balai	nikah	 (marriage	house).	 In	 the	
Sumbersari	setting,	the	first	floor	of	the	office	consists	of	an	open	hall	
which	functions	as	the	balai	nikah	in	which	marriage	ceremonies	are	
concluded.	 The	 existence	 of	 a	 balai	 nikah	 is	 becoming	 increasingly	
important,	 irrespective	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 majority	 of	 them	 still	
provide	 less	 than	 adequate	 facilities.	 Therefore,	 the	 central	
government	 has	 spent	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 its	 budget	 for	 the	
Ministry	of	Religious	Affairs	 to	 renovate	hundreds	of	KUA	buildings	
throughout	Indonesia.87		
Certainly,	 the	 differentiation	 between	 nikah	 kantor	 and	 nikah	
bedolan	 was	 not	 an	 issue	 in	 the	 past	 because	 there	 was	 no	
differentiation	in	the	tariff.	My	observations	in	Sumbersari	show	that	
about	 95	 percent	 of	 marriage	 ceremonies	 prior	 to	 2014	 were	
conducted	 outside	 the	 office.	 By	 2017,	 this	 situation	 had	 changed	
dramatically	and	the	rate	of	nikah	bedolan	was	now	24	percent	of	531	
marriages.	This	pattern	 is	not	 typical	only	of	Pasuruan	villages,	 it	 is	
also	emerging	in	other	areas,	although	the	decline	is	not	as	significant	
as	in	Pasuruan.	Let	us	a	look	at	the	detailed	figures	of	a	KUA	in	an	urban	













87 Kemenag, “Tiga Tahun Jokowi-JK: Kemenag Pemrakarsa Dan Investor Terbesar SBSN,” 
accessed May 7, 2018, https://kemenag.go.id/berita/read/505984/tiga-tahun-jokowi-jk--
kemenag-pemrakarsa-dan-investor-terbesar-sbsn. 
88 This data are calculated from the SIMKAH record which I obtained from a colleague of mine 
who is a penghulu at that KUA. 
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submitting	 all	 marriage	 matters	 to	 him.	 In	 many	 cases,	 it	 is	 the	
penghulu	 who	 conducts	 the	 marriage	 ceremony	 and	 assumes	 he	
responsibility	of	munakkiḥ.	Secondly,	the	tariff	for	nikah	bedolan	is	not	
really	 important	 to	 them.	 Thirdly,	 they	 tend	 to	 hold	 nikah	 bedolan	
because	they	want	to	invite	their	relatives,	neighbours	and	colleagues	
to	witness	 the	 ceremony.	 Fourthly,	 in	 their	 quest	 for	 greater	 social	
recognition,	 some	 families	 hold	 the	 marriage	 ceremony	 in	 a	
prestigious	location,	hotels	or	halls.	When	catering	to	these	interests,	
there	 is	 no	 reason	 not	 to	 invite	 a	 penghulu.	 Nevertheless,	 a	 small	
number	 of	 them	 do	 choose	 to	 have	 nikah	 kantor.	 Their	 reason	 is	
usually	because	they	do	not	want	to	have	to	deal	with	the	complexities	
in	the	official	documents.89		
The	 implementation	 of	 the	 new	 tariff	 has	 certainly	 elicited	
different	reactions	from	members	of	the	society.	Haji	Misbah	argued:	
“The	problem	is	that	the	difference	is	very	big;	Rp.	600,000	is	a	significant	
amount	 for	 villagers.”	 Throughout	 the	 years	 2004-2013,	 marriage	
administration	 costed	 Rp.	 30,000	 for	 either	 nikah	 kantor	 or	 nikah	
bedolan.	 If	 they	 opted	 for	 the	 assistance	 of	 a	modin,	 people	 spent	
around	Rp.	350,000.	As	shown	by	the	above	story,	the	brides’	families	
generally	 preferred	 an	 akad	 nikah	 to	 be	 part	 of	 a	walimah	 as	 this	
arrangement	offered	at	 least	 two	benefits:	 the	participation	of	other	
villagers	and	the	involvement	of	an	honoured	religious	leader.	It	also	
backs	up	 the	 assertion	 that	 a	marriage	 ceremony	has	 emerged	 as	 a	
fundamental	 arena	 in	 which	 religious	 leaders	 can	 exercise	 their	
authority.	
As	is	commonly	found	in	Muslim	communities	across	the	nation,	






89 This is summarized from my interview with Pak Nasrudin, a penghulu in Yogyakarta, August 
2019. 
90 Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial: Islamic Family Law in Iran and Morocco. 
91 Nichols, ‘Religion, Family Law, and Competing Norms’, p. 197. 
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the	 category	 of	 mu‘amalah	 (civil	 contract),	 that	 is,	 pronouncing	 a	
contract	of	 ijab	 (offer)	made	by	 the	woman’s	guardian	 (wali),	qabul	
(acceptance)	 by	 the	 man	 and	 the	 payment	 of	 dower	 (mahr).	 It	 is	
undeniably	a	contract	but	one	which	has	expanded	 its	dimension	to	









argued	 that	 it	 is	 understandable	 that	 people	 tend	 to	 conclude	 a	
marriage	ceremony	at	home.	His	major	concern	revolved	around	the	
religious	capacity	of	a	penghulu.	Religious	leaders	generally	perceive	
penghulu	 to	 be	 ulama,	 whereas,	 in	 fact,	 Pak	 Yusuf	 has	 never	 been	








“I	 have	 heard	 public	 rumours	 that	 the	 penghulu	 is	 less	 than	
competent.	His	lack	of	skill	in	reciting	ayat	(Quranic	verses)	and	
doa	 (prayers)	 tends	 to	 get	 on	people’s	 nerves.	 People	 certainly	
think	twice	about	involving	him	in	a	marriage	ceremony.	Marriage	




92 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, ‘Marriage’, Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World (New York: 
Macmillan, 2004). 
93 Black, Esmaeili, and Hosen, Modern Perspectives on Islamic Law, p. 114. 










bring	 their	 chosen	 munakkiḥ	 to	 the	 office.	 In	 some	 peculiar	
circumstances,	it	is	said	that	there	have	been	families	who	had	felt	they	
had	 to	 perform	 a	 second	 akad	 nikah	 at	 home	 because	 they	 were	











place	 great	 reliance	 (ketergantungan)	 on	kyai,	 and	 this	 dependence	
lies	at	the	heart	of	the	skewed	relationship	between	state	penghulu	and	






underline	 his	 authority	 to	 bestow	 state	 recognition	 on	 religious	
marriage	as	the	means	to	negotiate.	Here	is	an	example:	
“I	 do	not	 like	 them	holding	 a	 traditional	marriage	 ceremony	 at	
home	and	later	having	another	marriage	ceremony	at	the	KUA.	I	




The	 penghulu	 Haji	 Misbah,	 who	 serves	 as	 the	 intermediary	
between	the	state	and	people,	also	finds	himself	in	a	quandary.	He	has	
suggested	 using	 the	 concept	 he	 calls	 ta’kīd	 al-nikāḥ	 for	 the	 second	
marriage	at	the	KUA.	I	have	failed	to	discover	the	origin	of	this	concept.	




an	 akad	 nikah	 at	 the	 KUA	 will	 provide	 state	 authentication	 of	 a	
foregoing	 religious	marriage.	 Interestingly,	 he	 has	 also	 applied	 this	
concept	in	another	context,	underage	marriage.	If	the	bride	has	not	yet	
reached	 the	 legal	 age	 of	 marriage,	 the	 couples	 are	 first	 married	
religiously.	 Later,	 when	 the	 woman’s	 age	 qualifies	 her	 for	 legal	
marriage	registration,	their	marriage	is	registered	at	the	KUA.		
Unsurprisingly,	 the	 issue	 of	akad	 dua	 kali	 has	 been	 raised	 in	 a	
series	of	meetings	between	the	KUA	and	modin.	Pak	Yusuf	has	sternly	
cautioned	 the	modin	 to	discourage	 this	 sort	of	 this	marriage,	 saying	
“Don’t	 ever	 marry	 them	 at	 home!”	 Nor	 do	 his	 troubles	 end	 there.	
Besides	the	thorny	issue	of	competing	authorities,	another	aspect	has	
 
95 Interview with Pak Usman, the head of the Section on Islamic guidance of the Pasuruan 
Office of Religious Affairs, February 2017. 
96 Elsaid M. Badawi and Muhammad Abdel Haleem, ‘ دlكlو  w–k–d’, Arabic-English Dictionary 
of Qur’anic Usage, Leiden edition (Brill, 2008), p. 1044. 
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In	 his	 remark,	 Pak	 Yusuf	 is	 making	 a	 veiled	 reference	 to	 the	





sekali	 untuk	 seumur	 hidup”	 (a	 marriage	 certificate	 is	 for	 life).	







to	perform	nikah	bedolan.	When	 it	 realized,	 the	 central	 government	
decided	 to	 set	 tariffs	 for	nikah	bedolan,	 legally	entitling	penghulu	 to	
supplement	their	income.	This	regulation	means	that,	for	each	nikah	
bedolan,	 penghulu	 receive	 approximately	 Rp.	 100,000	 for	 their	
transportation	and	Rp.	150,000,	or	another	amount	depending	on	the	
KUA	 category,	 as	 an	 honorarium	 (jasa	 profesi).97	 Consequently,	 the	
 
97 Keputusan Direktur Jenderal Bimbingan Masyarakat Islam (the Decree of the Directorate 
General of Islamic guidance) No. DJ.II/748 Tahun 2014 tentang Petunjuk Teknis Pengelolaan 
Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak atas Biaya Nikah atau Rujuk di luar Kantor Urusan Agama 
Kecamatan (on the technical procedure of the organisation of non-tax revenue from the fees 
of marriage or reconciliation outside the sub-district KUA).  









by	 KUA	 in	 the	management	 of	 their	 everyday	 activities	 as	 they	 are	
forced	to	fight	an	uphill	battle,	frustrated	in	their	efforts	by	the	limited	
budget	 allocated	 them	 by	 the	 government.	 He	 argued:	 “The	 new	
regulation	 has	 undermined	 our	 capacity	 to	 act.	 Under	 the	 old	
regulation,	we	could	still	donate	to	social	or	mosque	activities	around	




strengthen	their	 institutional	power.	With	Rp.	0	coming	 in	 for	nikah	
kantor	 and	 the	 incentive	 for	 penghulu	 to	 perform	 nikah	 bedolan	
severely	 curtailed,	 kepala	 KUA	 are	 currently	 besieged	 by	 problems	
arising	 from	 the	organization	of	 the	office.	 In	 their	 attempts	 to	deal	
with	this,	I	witnessed	that	some	KUA	offices	in	other	areas	have	been	






to	 intervene	 in	 the	 making	 of	 the	 state	 practice.	 The	 practice	 now	
provides	what	Peletz	has	called	“the	co-imbrication	of	law,	politics,	and	
religion”.99	Akad	dua	kali	encompasses	a	multiplicity	of	issues,	ranging	
from	state	 authority,	 religious	authority,	 the	 local	 sense	of	 religious	
validity	and	the	penghulu’s	economic	interests.	However,	this	has	been	
 
98 Interview with him, October 2017. 
99 Michael G. Peletz, ‘A Tale of Two Courts: Judicial Transformation and the Rise of a Corporate 
Islamic Governmentality in Malaysia’, American Ethnologist, vol. 42, no. 1 (2015), pp. 144–60. 
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offset	 by	 a	 local	 development	 in	 which	 people	 are	 strategizing	 the	
multiple	tariffs	 for	marriage	by	concluding	akad	dua	kali.	This	tactic	
allows	 them	 to	 maintain	 the	 ideal	 of	 marriage	 ceremony	 which	
incorporates	the	religious	and	social	activities	so	important	to	them.	
This	 is	 their	 response	 to	 their	 perception	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 religious	
competency	 displayed	 by	 penghulu.	 The	 intervention	 of	 traditional	
authority	 is	 embedded	 in	 this	 realm.	 In	 its	 turn,	 this	 ‘deviation’	 has	
become	a	critical	stepping-stone	for	penghulu	to	implement	state	laws	
on	 marriage	 on	 a	 grassroots	 level.	 Subtly,	 the	 tactics	 adopted	 by	
penghulu	never	mount	a	direct	challenge	to	the	traditional	authority.	
Instead,	 they	 tend	 to	 present	 themselves	 as	 state	 agents,	 exercising	








state-in-society	 approach	 has	 been	 helpful	 in	 revealing	 the	
complexities	faced	by	penghulu	and	the	KUA	in	the	implementation	of	
legal	 rules	 on	 marriage	 registration,	 as	 they	 struggle	 in	 a	 web	 of	
pressures	exerted	by	societal	agencies.		
I	 found	 that	 the	 internal	 synergy	between	 the	KUA	officials	has	
been	the	key	to	securing	the	KUA’s	legitimacy.	My	principal	reasons	for	
this	 assertion	 are	 threefold.	 Firstly	 if	 they	 are	 to	 fulfil	 their	 tasks	
satisfactorily,	 the	 kepala	 of	 the	 KUA	 and	 the	 penghulu	 need	 to	
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Pasuruan	 villages,	 local	 people	 regard	 marriage	 registration	 as	 a	
transactional	 relationship	 between	 state-citizen.	Modin	 are	 the	 key	
agents	 in	 this	 brokerage.	 This	 KUA-modin-society	 relationship	 has	
produced	 the	 remarkable	 development	 of	 registered	marriages	 and	





draws	 a	 stricter	 boundary	 to	 be	 drawn	 between	 nikah	 kantor	 and	
nikah	 bedolan	 in	 the	 expectation	 that	 this	 would	 be	 effective	 in	
eradicating	the	custom	of	earning	a	gratification	among	penghulu.	This	








we	have	 also	been	witnessing	 situations	 in	which	penghulu	 are	 still	
challenged	by	accusations	of	their	lack	of	competency	in	Islam.	Given	
their	 blurred	 situation,	 penghulu	 have	 needed	 to	 redefine	 their	
position	if	they	were	to	be	accepted	as	legitimate	agents	competent	to	





important.	 This	 differs	 from	 Nurlaelawati’s	 finding	 in	 West	 Java.	
Penghulu	 in	 East	 Java	 identify	 themselves	 as	 state	 agents,	 wielding	
their	authority	to	provide	state	recognition	of	a	marriage	as	a	resource	
to	 reinforce	 their	 influence.	 This	 suggests	 two	 interrelated	 aspects:	









possible.	 However,	 turning	 to	 the	 nub	 of	 the	 problem,	 the	 fact	 that	





and	 rules	 symbols	 internally	but	 is	nevertheless	vulnerable	 to	 rules	
and	 decisions	 from	 outside	 the	 field.100	 In	 other	words,	 the	 idea	 of	
ta’kīd	al-nikāḥ	has	been	effective	in	touching	the	meaning	of	marriage	
as	 the	 local	people	perceive	 it	 on	 the	one	hand	and	 in	 ensuring	 the	
implementation	 of	 the	 state	 legal	 norms	 on	 marriage	 on	 the	 other	
hand.		
The	 following	 chapter	 will	 problematize	 the	 social	 and	 legal	
meaning	 of	 marriage	 legalization	 for	 villagers	 who	 have	 made	







100 Sally Falk Moore, ‘Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study’, Law and Society Review, vol. 7, no. 4 (1973), p. 720. 














concluded	 traditionally	 and,	 hence,	 not	 registered	 at	 the	 KUA,	 a	
practice	locally	referred	to	as	nikah	sirri.	Therefore,	they	do	not	have	a	




When	 I	 asked	 him	 how	 this	 could	 happen,	 Abdulloh	 replied,	 “I	 just	
received	 it	 from	 the	 village	 official	 (pamong).	 He	 organized	





encountered	 a	 problem	 when	 they	 wanted	 to	 go	 on	 the	 ḥajj	
(pilgrimage).	 The	 KK	 or	 the	 KTP,	 which	 confirmed	 their	 status	 as	
 
101 Interview with Abdulloh, November 2017. 
102 It is worth noting that, in the old KK version, the date of marriage was not mentioned. 
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kawin,	 did	 not	 suffice	 as	 a	 requisite	 document	 for	 the	 ḥajj	 visa	
application.	Under	state	law	they	had	to	submit	a	marriage	certificate	




their	 unregistered	 marriages	 through	 a	 judicial	 procedure	 called	
retrospective	marriage	 legalization	 (isbat	nikah).	Although	 this	 legal	
norm	was	 formulated	 to	 accommodate	marriages	 concluded	 before	
1974	 when	 the	 legal	 obligation	 of	 marriage	 registration	 came	 into	
force,	nowadays	 judicial	practice	 in	 the	 religious	courts	will	 legalize	
unregistered	marriage	whenever	 it	has	been	concluded	as	 long	as	 it	
can	 be	 proven	 that	 the	 wedding	 ceremony	 complied	 with	 Islamic	
precepts.103		
Given	 this	 choice,	 instead	 of	 proposing	 an	 isbat	 nikah,	 Abdulloh	
opted	to	apply	for	marriage	registration	at	the	KUA.	This	meant	that	he	
would	 have	 a	 newly	 registered	 date	 of	 marriage,	 erasing	 any	 prior	





were	 born	 before	 the	 registration	 of	 their	 parent’s	 marriage.	







the	 state-citizen	 relationship	 in	 contemporary	 Indonesia.	 Their	
 
103 Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and Identity: The Kompilasi Hukum Islam and Legal 
Practice in the Indonesian Religious Courts, pp. 202–3. 
104 See Welchman, Women and Muslim Family Laws in Arab States: A Comparative Overview 
of Textual Development and Advocacy, p. 53. 





Harbitz	 and	 Boekle-Giuffrida	 remark	 that	 “every	 day	 in	 any	 given	













One	 interesting	point	 emerging	 from	 this	 story	 is	 that	Abdulloh	




he	 responded	 spontaneously	 “harus	 ditegur	 itu	 KUA	 nya”	 (The	 KUA	
should	be	 rebuked).	His	argument	was	 that	 the	KUA	was	obliged	 to	
reject	Abdulloh’s	application	and	should	have	encouraged	him	to	go	to	




official	 marriage	 certificate”.108	 For	 Abdulloh,	 the	 expedient	 of	
 
105 Mia Harbitz and Bettina Boekle-Giuffrida, Democratic Governance, Citizenship, and Legal 
Identity (New York, 2009), p. 5. 
106 Saudia.com, Hajj Visa, https://www.saudia.com/before-flying/travel-information/hajj-and-
umrah/hajj-visa?sv_lang=en&sv_cn=ID 
107 Interview with Pak Multazam, a penghulu in Jember. 









status	 of	 marriage	 is	 important	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 rights	 to	 state	
services	 for	 family	 members	 and,	 more	 widely,	 to	 ensuring	 public	
order.	Marriage	registration	means	that	women	and	their	children	are	
entitled	 to	 state	 services	 and	 protected	 by	 law	 against	 the	
disadvantageous	consequences	of	a	divorce	or	a	husband’s	death,	such	
as	 being	 unable	 to	 claim	 alimony	 and	 maintenance.	 However,	 it	
appears	 that	 Abdulloh	 was	 not	 interested	 in	 the	 legal	 validity	 of	
marriage.	All	he	wanted	was	state	recognition	of	his	marriage,	in	the	
form	of	a	marriage	certificate,	purely	and	simply	 to	be	able	 to	go	 to	
Mecca.		
In	 his	 case,	 marriage	 registration	 sounds	 as	 if	 it	 is	 a	 purely	
administrative	 affair.	 Nonetheless,	 it	 has	 a	 wider	 dimension.	 A	
marriage	certificate	 is	part	of	a	person’s	 legal	 identity.	 In	Abdulloh’s	
case,	possession	of	a	marriage	certificate	was	the	solution	he	needed	
so	that	he	and	his	wife	could	go	on	the	hajj.	However,	from	the	state	
perspective,	 when	 he	 registered	 his	 marriage	 Abdulloh	 clearly	
(re)negotiated	his	sense	of	self	as	a	citizen.109	In	day-to-day	reality,	the	
absence	of	proof	of	legal	identity	can	disqualify	a	citizen	from	access	to	
rights	 or	 state	 protection.	 Legal	 identity	 is	 as	 much	 about	 being	 a	
citizen	as	about	one’s	sense	of	belonging	and	ability	to	exercise	his	or	
her	 rights	 and	obligations.110	 Consequently,	 legal	 identity	 influences	
citizenship.	 Following	 Van	 Klinken,	 I	 wish	 to	 emphasize	 that	
 
109 Deepta Chopra, Philippa Williams, and Bhaskar Vira, ‘Politics of citizenship: Experiencing 
state-society relations from the margins’, Contemporary South Asia, vol. 19, no. 3 (2011), p. 
243. 
110 Harbitz and Boekle-Giuffrida, Democratic Governance, Citizenship, and Legal Identity, p. 5. 




For	 Abdulloh,	 and	many	 other	 Indonesians,	 religious	 legitimacy	
which	 constitutes	 the	 social	 acceptance	 of	 a	 marriage	 is	 more	
important	 than	 state	 recognition.112	 Sonneveld	 has	 remarked	 that,	
from	a	 legal	point	of	view,	 it	 is	not	difficult	 to	differentiate	between	
formal	marriages	and	 informal	marriages.113	However,	 from	a	social	
perspective,	 the	 difference	 is	 hardly	 visible.	 Platt	 confirms	 this	
statement	when	she	argues	that,	where	the	reach	of	the	state	is	limited,	
marriage	 remains	 largely	 a	 community-based	 affair.114	 Bedner	 and	
Huis	also	claim	that,	 in	West	 Java,	 state	recognition	of	a	marriage	 is	
considered	unimportant	from	a	social	perspective.115	
On	 the	 law-making	 level,	 debates	 about	 family	 law	 in	 Muslim	
majority	countries	have	paid	great	attention	to	the	matter	of	how	the	
state	should	deal	with	religious	norms.	By	contrast,	when	it	comes	to	
marriage	 registration,	 my	 observation	 on	 the	 grassroots	 level	 in	
Pasuruan	 villages	 shows	 that	 these	 issues	 revolve	 around	 the	
significance	 of	 the	 state	 recognition	 of	 marriages	 which	 have	 been	
accorded	social	recognition	based	on	community-based	 legal	norms,	
which	 in	 turn	are	grounded	 in	 religion.	This	begs	 the	question	of	 in	
what	ways	is	the	legal	validity	of	marriage	relevant?	This	is	core	to	this	
chapter.	 I	 argue	 that	 state	 recognition	of	a	marriage	cannot	entirely	
substitute	 community-based	 legal	 norms.	 The	 state’s	 ideas	 of	
recognition	 and	 protection	 might	 diverge	 quite	 sharply	 from	 what	
people	 imagine.	For	Abdulloh,	 registration	served	a	 legitimate	proof	
which	he	could	use	to	claim	certain	rights.	This	reflects	an	emic	point	
 
111 Gerry van Klinken, ‘Citizenship and local practices of rule in Indonesia’, Citizenship Studies, 
vol. 22, no. 2 (2018), p. 114. 
112 In Java, and in Indonesia in general, marriage is performed according to the social norm 
which in practice involves informal religious leaders. Living together outside wedlock is a 
taboo. The local belief is that the extent to which a marriage is valid merely depends on 
whether it has been concluded in conformity with Islamic law.  
113 Sonneveld, ‘Rethinking the Difference Between Formal and Informal Marriages in Egypt’. 
114 Platt, Marriage, Gender and Islam in Indonesia: Women Negotiating Informal Marriage, 
Divorce and Desire, p. 5. 
115 Bedner and Huis, ‘Plurality of marriage law and marriage registration for Muslims in 





Nowadays	 Indonesia	 offers	 an	 array	 of	 mechanisms	 to	 which	
people	can	resort	to	be	able	to	adjust	their	situation	so	that	it	dovetails	
with	the	state	framework.	When	it	issues	legal	documents,	the	state	is	
aiming	 to	 protect	 certain	 rights,	 in	 particular	 those	 of	 women.	
However,	 providing	 certain	 people	 with	 a	 legal	 document	 is	 only	
possible	if	state	marriage	functionaries	are	sympathetic	to	and	flexible	
in	 implementing	 the	 regulation.116	To	a	 certain	degree,	 they	have	 to	
come	up	with	discretionary	policies	and	are	prepared	to	commit	legal	
transgressions.	When	they	do	this,	these	functionaries	feel	privileged	
to	 be	 able	 help	 people	 obtain	 their	 due	 right	 to	 state	 services.	 This	
explains	 why	 Abdulloh’s	 submission	 for	 marriage	 registration	 was	
accepted.	 This	 situation	 necessarily	 relates	 to	 the	 1980	 work	 by	
Michael	 Lipsky.	 His	 book	 Street-level	 bureaucracy:	 Dilemmas	 of	 the	
individual	in	public	services	is	meaningful	as	it	examines	the	behaviour	
of	 frontline	 workers	 in	 policy	 delivery	 agencies.	 He	 refers	 to	 these	
frontline	 workers	 as	 ‘street-level	 bureaucrats’.	 They	 are	 public	
employees	whose	 job	 is	 to	 cope	 directly	with	 citizens	 and	 they	 are	






the	 local	 situation.	 In	 an	 interview,	 Haji	 Hamim,	 a	 village	 religious	
official,	said,	“di	sini	belum	tertib,	masih	kocar-kacir”	(documentation	
here	is	not	yet	well	organized,	it	is	still	a	mess).119	While	the	head	of	
the	KUA	said,	 “di	 sini	 sulit,	 karena	 (mohon	maaf)	SDM	 [sumber	daya	
manusia]	masyarakat	 sini	kurang”	 (It	 is	not	easy	here	because	 (I	do	
 
116 Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services, p. 105. 
117 Ibid., p. 3. 
118 Lars Tummers and Victor Bekkers, ‘Policy Implementation, Street-level Bureaucracy, and 
the Importance of Discretion’, Public Management Review, vol. 16, no. 4 (2014), pp. 527–47. 
119 Interview with Haji Hamim, a modin in Sumbersari, February 2017. 
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apologize)	 local	 human	 resources	 are	 not	 yet	 up	 to	 scratch).	 The	
variety	 of	 problems	which	 arise	 from	 legal	 documents	 have	 had	 to	
have	been	subject	to	discretion	and	negotiation.	This	negotiation	has	
also	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 a	 means	 by	 which	 informal	 marriage-
functionaries	 can	 maintain	 their	 vital	 position.	 In	 these	 sorts	 of	
situations,	 citizens’	 rights	 are	 somehow	 constituted	 by	 the	
intervention	of	these	informal	leaders.	In	their	work,	Berenschot	and	
Van	Klinken	have	underlined	the	importance	of	informal	connections	
in	 the	 shaping	 of	 state-citizen	 interactions.120	 Bedner	 and	 Van	Huis	
have	 dealt	 with	 this	 issue	 too.121	 They	 have	 emphasized	 the	
pragmatism	 which	 inevitably	 underlies	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 state	
officials	prioritize	the	interests	of	the	weaker	party.		
This	 chapter	 demonstrates	 how	 state	 recognition	 of	 a	marriage	
works.	 It	will	address	 the	different	ways	people	strategize	 to	obtain	









chapter.	 Legal	 identity	 and	 citizens’	 rights	 are	 especially	 relevant	 in	
approaching	the	issues	arising	from	marriage	registration.	Section	4	is	
concerned	with	administrative	matters	and	the	discretion	used	by	the	
KUA	 in	marriage	 registration.	 Section	 5	 examines	 the	 ways	 Islamic	
court	handles	cases	of	marriage	legalization.	Sections	6	elucidates	the	
roles	 of	 Islamic	 courts	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 legitimation	 of	 children.	
Section	7	concludes.	
 
120 Ward Berenschot and Gerry van Klinken, ‘Informality and Citizenship: The Everyday State 
in Indonesia’, Citizenship Studies, vol. 22, no. 2 (Routledge, 2018), pp. 95–111. 
121 Bedner and Huis, ‘Plurality of marriage law and marriage registration for Muslims in 








“A	 set	 of	 elements	 and	 characteristics,	 the	 combination	 of	 which	 is	
unique	to	every	person,	which	defines	each	person	and	governs	their	
relationship,	 obligations	 and	 rights	 under	 both	 private	 and	 public	
law.”122	In	simple	terms	it	refers	to	the	recognition	of	an	individual	as	
a	person	before	the	law.	Recognition	of	legal	identity	often	depends	on	
individual	possession	of	 valid	 legal	 identity	documentation	or	other	
forms	of	proof	of	legal	identity.	The	United	Nations	has	incorporated	
legal	 identity	 into	 the	Sustainable	Development	Goal	 (SDG).	Goal	16	
emphasizes	 the	promotion	of	peaceful	 and	 inclusive	 societies	which	
will	encourage	sustainable	development	and	the	providing	of	access	to	
justice	for	all.		
Because	 legal	 identity	 is	an	 important	starting	point	 in	 realizing	
personal	rights,	human	rights	activists	pay	great	attention	to	the	term	





which	 can	 limit	 access	 to	 civil	 rights	 and	 services.	 Some	 of	 their	






stateless	 and	 an	 estimated	 1.1	 billion	 lack	 legal	 identity	
 
122 Insitute on Statelessness and Inclusion, Sustainable Development Goal 16.9: ‘Legal 
Identity’, Nationality & Statelessness (London: Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, 2018), 
p. 7. 
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documentation.	 Having	 to	 live	 undocumented	 lives	 or	 without	
effective	 citizenship	 prevents	 them	 from	 reaching	 their	 full	 human	
potential	as	they	are	cut	off	from	access	to	healthcare,	education	and	
other	 services.	 Making	 sure	 that	 every	 individual	 is	 recognized	 as	
belonging	and	capable	of	accessing	the	documents	to	prove	their	legal	
status	 is	 important,	 multifaceted	 work.	 Documents	 like	 birth	
certificates	 definitely	 serve	 as	 foundational	 proof	 of	 citizenship.	
Marriage	certificates	are	another	inseparable	proof	of	legal	identity.		
Although	marriage	 registration	 and	 citizenship	 are	 two	 distinct	
concerns	 and	 represent	 different	 fields	 of	 enquiry,	 they	 are	
fundamentally	related	to	one	another.	Both	are	about	recognition	of	a	
particular	status	of	 its	 subject	by	 the	state.	Citizenship	concerns	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 state	 and	 its	 citizens.	 It	 is	 of	 utmost	
importance	because	it	provides	citizens	with	a	sense	of	identity	which	
enables	 them	to	exercise	a	wide	range	of	basic	social,	economic	and	
political	 rights.	Without	 a	 doubt,	 people’s	 participation	 in	 acquiring	
legal	 identity	 has	 been	 important	 in	 enhancing	 the	 quality	 of	
citizenship	in	post-reformasi	Indonesia.		
An	 abundance	 of	 scholarly	 works	 has	 underlined	 the	 rise	 in	
citizens’	rights	 in	the	wake	of	the	collapse	of	the	Soeharto	regime	in	
1998.	 Its	 fall	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 democratization	 and	 a	 series	 of	
decentralization	 reforms	which	 extended	 greater	 autonomy	 to	 local	
governments	 and	 introduced	 bureaucratic	 reform.	 This	 change	
seemed	 to	 offer	 great	 opportunities	 to	 transform	 the	 public	
administration	and	public	service.	The	issuance	of	a	series	of	laws	such	
as	 the	Presidential	Regulation	81/2010	on	bureaucratic	 reform	and	
Law	 25/2009	 on	 public	 service	 has	 marked	 this	 transformation.	
However,	 we	 know	 that	 citizenship	 in	 Indonesia	 was,	 and	 is,	 being	
challenged	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 a	 wave	 of	 religious,	 ethnic	 and	 regional	
identity	politics.123	Reformasi	 in	1998	has	allegedly	 intensified	 these	
fragmented	identities.		
 
123 Henk Schulte Nordholt, ‘Identity Politics, Citizenship and the Soft State in Indonesia: an 





The	 insistence	by	 the	state	 that	possession	of	proof	of	 legal	 identity	
defines	certain	rights	which	give	people	with	limited	choices	a	chance.	






a	 rights-to-obtain-the-state-services	 approach	 has	 been	 effective	 in	






Besides	 demonstrating	 the	 insoluble	 relationship	 between	 legal	
identity	 and	 citizenship,	 Abdulloh’s	 case	 also	 reflects	 the	 degree	 of	
pragmatism	 practised	 in	 the	 field.	 My	 close	 reading	 of	 marriage	
registration	 documents	 has	 uncovered	what	 can	 be	 called	 a	 kind	 of	
administrative	transgression	resorted	to	by	penghulu.	The	importance	
of	 administrative	 transgression	 was	 apparent	 in	 the	 everyday	
functioning	of	the	marriage	bureaucracy	at	the	KUA.		
In	order	to	understand	how	administrative	transgression	works	at	
the	 KUA,	 it	 is	 helpful	 to	 have	 a	 picture	 of	 marriage	 registration	
procedure.	 In	1990,	 the	Minister	 issued	 a	 regulation	 setting	out	 the	
obligations	 of	 marriage	 registrar.124	 This	 regulation	maintained	 the	
requirement	 that	 an	 oral	 application	 for	 a	marriage	 to	 to	 be	made.	
More	than	a	decade	later,	KMA	No.	298	of	2003	signified	major	changes	
as	 it	 re-standardized	 the	 documents	 for	 marriage	 registration	
previously	required.	This	KMA	can	be	considered	the	first	regulation	
 
124 PMA No. 2/1990 tentang Kewajiban Pegawai Pencatat Nikah (the obligations of marriage 
registrar). 
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to	use	the	term	pencatatan	nikah	(marriage	registration),	although	it	
was	 amended	 a	 year	 later	 by	 KMA	 No.	 477	 of	 2004.	 125	 Currently,	
marriage	 registration	 is	 undertaken	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 PMA	No.	 11	 on	
marriage	 registration	 of	 2007.	 The	 regulations	 of	 2004	 and	 2007	
stipulated	 that	 an	 application	 for	marriage	must	 be	 submitted	 in	 a	
written	form.	It	set	out	the	requisite	documents	as	follows:		
















invitation	 is	 extended	 after	 the	 KUA	 official	 has	 verified	 their	
documents.	 Sometimes,	 a	 complication	 arising	 from	 the	 verification	
process	means	 that	 the	 couples	 have	 to	 personally	 attend	 the	 KUA	
office.	 According	 to	 PMA	 No.	 11	 of	 2007,	 marriage	 registration	
generally	 requires	 five	steps:	 submission	of	a	proposal	 for	marriage	
registration,	 document	 assessment,	 announcement	 of	 the	 marriage	
ceremony,	 marriage	 ceremony	 (akad	 nikah)	 and	 the	 signing	 of	 the	
marriage	certificate	(penandatanganan	akta	nikah).	The	second	step,	
the	 process	 known	 locally	 as	 rafak	 (pemeriksanaan,	observation)	 is	
crucial.	The	rafak	is	conducted	to	examine	the	conformity	of	the	data	
written	 on	 the	 forms	 with	 the	 documents	 enclosed.	 This	 term	 is	
 





To	support	 the	validity	of	all	 the	 forms,	 the	bride	has	to	enclose	
certain	documents,	namely:	an	identity	card	and	a	birth	certificate	or	a	
diploma.	 In	 Sumbersari,	 not	 all	 the	 brides	 have	 a	 birth	 certificate,	





safe	 to	 assume	 that,	 before	 that	 year,	 numerous	 marriages	 went	











can	refer	 to	 is	 the	copy	of	 the	parents’	marriage	certificate.	This	
cannot	lie.	The	N2	form	of	the	parents	is	noted	on	it;	as	well	as	on	










126 Hisako Nakamura, Perceraian Orang Jawa: Studi tentang Pemutusan Perkawinan di 
Kalangan Orang Islam Jawa (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1990), p. 66. 
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household	 and	 Maimunah	 as	 his	 wife.	 Since	 the	 government	 has	
changed	its	policy,	nowadays,	this	confusion	is	unlikely	to	happen:	if	a	











come	 to	 the	 KUA	 to	 have	 rafak.	 As	 Aisya	 did	 not	 have	 a	 marriage	
certificate	for	her	parents,	the	modin	provided	Aisya	with	two	letters	
from	 the	 village	 administration.	 The	 first	was	 a	 letter	 declaring	 the	
marital	 relationship	 between	 her	 father	 and	 her	 mother	 was	 valid	




fell	 outside	 the	 box.	 As	 a	 street-level	 bureaucrat,	 the	 penghulu’s	
position	is	critical,	as	he	plays	a	crucial	role	in	settling	problems	arising	
from	 these	 citizen	 entitlements.	 He	 either	 directly	 provides	 public	
benefits	 through	 the	 services	 he	 offers	 or	 mediates	 between	
citizens.128	The	immediacy	of	a	change	in	policy	in	his	interaction	with	
citizens	and	its	impact	on	people’s	lives	is	of	vital	importance.129	The	
head	 of	 the	 KUA	went	 ahead	with	 the	marriage	 registration	 on	 the	
basis	 of	 letters	 which	 should	 not	 have	 existed	 according	 to	 the	
standard	 procedure.	 Bedner	 and	 Van	 Huis	 have	 remarked	 that	 the	
 
127 It is interesting to note that the newest version of the KK now includes the date of the 
marriage ceremony. It would be impossible for couples in an unregistered marriage to 
manipulate the data in the KK as happened in the solution to Muhdor’s problem. 
128 Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services, p. 6. 



















130 Bedner and Huis, ‘Plurality of marriage law and marriage registration for Muslims in 
Indonesia: a plea for pragmatism’, p. 187. 











a	 diploma,	 but	 it	 is	 not	 that	 difficult	 to	 change	 the	 data	 in	 the	 civil	
registration	documents	as	long	as	another	legal	proof	can	be	produced.	







official	will	 check	his/her	birthdate	 in	 the	civil	administration	office	
database.	 So,	 if	he	wants	 to	pursue	his	nefarious	purpose,	he	has	 to	







he	said	 that	neither	versions	was	 legally	valid.	The	birthdate	on	 the	
diploma	 had	 been	 noted	 by	 the	 teacher	 at	 primary	 school	 because	
Syamsul’s	parents	had	not	submitted	a	birth	certificate	when	he	was	
first	 registered;	 the	 birthdate	 in	 the	 KK	 had	 been	 entered	 by	 the	
parents.	When	he	wanted	to	marry,	Syamsul	referred	the	birthdate	on	









time	a	penghulu	 has	 to	 commit	 an	administrative	 transgression	and	
turn	a	judicious	blind	eye.	This	transgression	is	an	impromptu	solution	
to	a	particular	situation	which	has	escaped	the	regulations.	Penghulu	










for	 marriage	 registration.	 Without	 this	 transgression,	 marriage	
registration	would	 not	 be	 possible.	 Regardless	 of	 this	 solution,	 as	 I	
mentioned	 earlier,	 people	 in	 marriages	 which	 have	 not	 been	
sanctioned	by	state	legality	can	request	retrospective	legitimization	by	
applying	 for	 isbat	 nikah	 from	 the	 religious	 court.	 This	 section	 will	









marriage.	 Any	 correlations	 with	 economic	 or	 other	 factors	 such	 as	
access	to	the	office	are	not	very	convincing.	No	one	would	that	dispute	
that	marriage	registration	is	not	affordable.	In	Sumbersari,	the	KUA	is	
located	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 sub-district	 and	 it	 is	 not	 that	 difficult	 to	
access	 the	office.	As	 far	as	 I	 could	see,	almost	all	 first	marriages	are	
registered	because	they	are	handled	by	modin.	Most	of	the	time,	non-
registration	 arises	 in	 cases	 of	 remarriage.	 If	 we	 look	 at	 the	 data	 in	
Sumbersari	 in	 2015,	 77.58	 percent	 of	 all	 marriages	 were	 first	
marriages,	while	22.42	percent	were	remarriages	for	either	for	one	or	
both	 spouses.	 In	 2016,	 the	 data	 indicates	 pretty	 much	 the	 same	
number.	First	marriages	made	up	77.07	person	of	all	marriages,	while	
22.93	 percent	 were	 remarriages.	 My	 materials	 indicate	 that	 67.47	






The	 Marriage	 Law	 stipulates	 that	 women	 cannot	 register	 a	
remarriage	as	 long	as	 their	divorce	 from	their	 first	husband	has	not	
been	processed	by	the	court.	Although	people	now	often	register	their	





of	 the	 spouses	 has	 a	 legal	 reason	 not	 to	 register,	 this	 will	 almost	
certainly	 be	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 divorce	 decree.	 Secondly,	 local	 norms	
pertaining	 to	 the	 legality	 of	 marriage,	 derive	 predominantly	 from	
religious	doctrine,	 and	 this	 clearly	 contributes	 to	 the	 reason	 certain	
marriages	 are	 not	 registered.	 It	 seems	 that	 there	 is	 no	 urgency	 to	
register	a	remarriage	as	long	as	it	has	conformed	to	Islamic	principles	
and,	hence,	is	socially	acceptable.		




not	 yet	 registered	 their	 marriage	 as	 required	 by	 the	 marriage	 law	
when	 it	 came	 into	 force.132	 In	 practice,	 however,	 because	 the	
formulation	of	the	provision	in	the	KHI	is	ambiguous,	judges	also	apply	
this	 legal	 norm	 legalize	 marriages	 which	 occurred	 after	 1974	





about	whether	 or	 not	 a	marriage	 is	 valid;	 d)	 a	marriage	 concluded	
prior	to	the	1974	Marriage	Law;	and	e)	a	marriage	concluded	by	those	
 
131 This data is collected from SIMKAH KUA Sumbersari 
132 Bedner and Huis, ‘Plurality of marriage law and marriage registration for Muslims in 
Indonesia: a plea for pragmatism’, p. 187. 
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who	 have	 no	 legal	 impediment	 according	 to	 the	 Marriage	 Law.	
Nurlaelawati	has	noted	that	these	provisions	are	phrased	ambiguously	
and	are	indecisive	about	who	is	qualified	for	registration	by	the	Islamic	
court.	 She	 argues	 that	 the	 loose	 implementation	 of	 the	 marriage	
registration	 provisions	 contradicts	 the	 stated	 goal	 of	 marriage	
registration	 itself	 because	 non-registration	 can	 easily	 be	 registered	
retroactively.133	
5.1.	Polygynous	Marriage	




















course,	 this	 contravened	 the	 conditions	 enshrined	 in	 the	 KHI.	 The	
purpose	 of	 isbat	 nikah	 is	 not	 to	 legalize	 a	 polygynous	 marriage.	
Nevertheless,	 the	 modin	 went	 ahead	 with	 all	 the	 necessary	
arrangements	 to	make	 this	mission	 possible.	 A	 letter	 of	 application	
 
133 Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and Identity: The Kompilasi Hukum Islam and Legal 
Practice in the Indonesian Religious Courts, pp. 202–3. 
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(surat	 permohonan)	was	 drawn	 up	 to	 expedite	 this	 purpose.	 In	 the	
letter,	the	status	of	both	Salim	and	Samsia	is	declared	to	be	unmarried	
(perjaka	or	perawan).	The	letter	clearly	states	that	the	applicants	need	
















Most	 court	 hearings	 are	 usually	 quite	 short,	 around	 15-20	
minutes,	 and	 the	 judgement	 is	 read	 out	 directly	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	
hearing.	However,	perhaps	because	 I	was	attending	 the	hearing,	 the	
judges	tended	to	stick	to	the	procedure	more	strictly.	The	hearing	was	
then	adjourned	for	a	week	before	being	reconvened	to	hear	the	result	










134 Interview with Haji Misbah, January 2019. 
Unregistered Marriage and the Search of State Recognition 
	 235	
which	marriage	or	sexual	intercourse	would	be	considered	illegal.	Pak	






before,	 the	modin	 had	 coached	 them	 in	 potential	 questions	 and	 the	
answers	 they	 needed	 to	 give.	 The	 judges	 invited	 them	 to	 enter	 the	
courtroom	one	by	one.	After	they	had	taken	the	oath,	the	judges	asked	
for	their	identity	and	about	their	relationship	with	the	applicants.	After	
this,	 the	 judges	 asked	 if	 they	 had	 known	 about	 and	 attended	 the	




the	 applicants.	 This	 was	 followed	 by	 questions	 about	 the	 religious	
status	of	the	applicants;	whether	or	not	they	were	converts	to	Islam.	










by	 the	 applicants	 and	 the	witnesses.	 The	 decision	 asserted	 that	 the	
marriage	 had	 been	 conducted	 according	 to	 both	 Islamic	 law	 and	
national	 law,	had	no	 relationship	with	other	marriages	 and	had	not	
been	concluded	within	 the	period	of	 ‘iddah	 (waiting	period).	 It	 then	
affirmed	that	the	family	led	a	harmonious	existence	and	that	a	son	had	
 
135 Verdict no. 0091/Pdt.P/2018/PA.Bgl. 
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been	 born.	 As	 its	 legal	 basis,	 the	 decision	mentions	 Article	 2	 of	 the	
Marriage	 Law	 which	 states	 a	 marriage	 is	 valid	 when	 it	 has	 been	












proved	 to	 have	 been	 concluded	 between	 people	who	 have	 no	 legal	
impediment	to	their	matrimony,	the	judges	must	accept	it.	Indonesian	
legal	 scholars	 have	 problematized	 this	 point	 because	 they	 see	 it	 as	
conflicting.137	Point	d	clearly	sets	the	limits	for	isbat	nikah	at	marriages	
concluded	prior	to	the	legal	obligation	of	marriage	registration	came	
into	 force	 .	 The	 Law	 on	 Religious	 Courts	 also	 limits	 isbat	 nikah	 to	
marriages	before	1974.	However,	in	this	case,	the	verdict	ignored	this	
limitation	and	sought	 confirmation	by	 citing	Point	e	Article	7	of	 the	
KHI.	Point	e	opens	the	door	for	all	marriages,	without	any	restrictions,	





136 This fact confirms Nurlaelawati’s finding that, in the judicial practice of Islamic courts, a 
fiqh book is important in the decision making. She claims that some judges argue that, 
because the KHI has not been accorded statutory status, its legal position is the same as that 
of the fiqh books. In this reference to the fiqh books, the judges seem to have elevated the 
KHI to the status of an unwritten source, like that of the fiqh books, and they feel that the fiqh 
books embrace a more certain legal position. Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and 
Identity: The Kompilasi Hukum Islam and Legal Practice in the Indonesian Religious Courts, p. 
163. 
137 Euis Nurlaelawati, ‘Pernikahan Tanpa Pencatatan: Isbat nikah Sebuah Solusi?’, Musâwa, 
vol. 12, no. 2 (2013), pp. 261–77. 
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the	 problems	 of	 citizenship	 and	 child	 protection.	 In	 this	 particular	
instance,	 the	 judges	 also	 used	 the	 Law	 No.	 23	 of	 2002	 on	 Child	
Protection	 to	 legitimate	 their	 decision.	 The	 elucidation	 to	 this	 law	
states	that	parents,	family	and	society	are	responsible	for	protecting	
children	and	providing	 facilities	 for	 them.	 It	was	drawn	up	with	 the	
idea	 of	 ensuring	 the	 best	 life	 for	 children	 so	 as	 to	 make	 them	
potentially,	 capable	 citizens	 whose	 nationalism	 is	 based	 on	 good	
behaviour.	 The	 judges	 concurred	with	 the	 reason	 submitted	 by	 the	
applicant	 that	 the	 isbat	 nikah	was	 required	 in	 order	 to	 seek	 a	 birth	
certificate,	presented	as	a	guarantee	of	the	protection	of	a	child.	Quite	
clearly,	 the	 judges	 incorporated	 citizens’	 rights	 into	 their	 judicial	
practice.		
The	accommodation	of	citizens’	rights	in	the	judicial	decision	has	
been	 a	matter	 of	 heated	debate	 among	 scholars.	 Judicial	 practice	 in	
religious	 courts	 in	 Indonesia	 has	 undergone	 significant	 changes.	
Although	Van	Huis	looks	at	the	decline	of	the	fiqh	tradition,	that	is	khul’,	
in	 the	 legal	 practice	 of	 divorce	 in	 religious	 courts,138	 he	 does	 not	
overlook	the	fact	that	fiqh-based	divorce	mechanisms	can	still	play	a	
significant	role.	This	finding	is	quite	similar	to	Nurlaelawati’s	study	in	
which	 she	 found	 the	 judges	 are	 committed	 to	 fiqh	 as	 the	 right	 and	






In	 the	Bangil	Religious	Court,	 isbat	 nikah	 cases	 are	 few	and	 far	
between.	 There	were	 six	 cases	 in	 2016,	 none	 in	 2017	 and	 seven	 in	
2018.	 In	 interviews,	 the	 head	 of	 Bangil	 Religious	 Court	 said:	
“Kebutuhan	 masyarakat	 dilayani	 saja”	 (we	 just	 there	 to	 serve	 the	
people’s	 needs).139	 He	 qualifies	 isbat	 nikah	 as	 one	 of	 these.	 He	
expounded	on	his	 view	by	 saying	 that	 in	principle	 the	 court	 cannot	
 
138 Stijn van Huis, Khul‘ over the Longue Durée: The Decline of Traditional Fiqh-Based Divorce 
Mechanisms in Indonesian Legal Practice, vol. 25 (2018), pp. 1–25. 












of	 the	qadi’s	construction	 and	 the	 result	 of	 a	 process	 of	 negotiation	
which	 allows	 him	 to	 make	 convenient	 decisions.141	 His	 finding	
therefore	situated	the	qadi	in	a	wider	cultural	dimension	in	the	city.	In	
Bangil,	 the	 judges	 were	 perfectly	 well	 aware	 that	 unregistered	
marriages	are	a	common	practice.	The	state	has	no	choice	but	to	accord	
them	legal	recognition	when	it	is	requested.	Any	application	of	a	strict	




Isbat	nikah	 appears	 to	be	a	 legitimate	 solution	 to	 the	 legalization	of	
unregistered	marriages.	The	above	case	demonstrates	how	isbat	nikah	
was	used	to	 legitimize	a	polygynous	marriage.	 In	the	following	case,	
we	 see	 isbat	 nikah	 was	 also	 an	 effective	 instrument	 in	 legalizing	 a	
marriage	 which	 contravened	 the	 law	 because	 the	 groom	 was	









140 Lawrence Rosen, Law as Culture: An Invitation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2006). 
141 Rosen, The Anthropology of Justice: Law as Culture in Islamic Society. 





Article	 7	 of	 the	 Marriage	 Law	 provides	 leeway	 for	 those	 who	
entered	 into	 underage	marriages	 to	 request	marriage	 dispensation.	
However,	 there	 is	 a	 tendency	 in	 Islamic	 courts	 not	 to	 make	 this	
dispensation	 too	 easy	 to	 acquire.	 In	 my	 interview	 with	 Wahyu	











by	 complaints	 from	women	 activists	 who	 say	 that	 they	 are	 far	 too	
ready	 to	 grant	 the	 dispensation.	 In	 his	 view,	marriage	 dispensation	
should	only	be	granted	if	the	bride	has	been	proven	to	be	pregnant	on	
the	basis	of	a	letter	from	a	doctor.144		






all	 marriages	 submitted	 for	 their	 consideration.	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 the	
verdict	 declares	 that	 such	 a	 marriage	 is	 eligible	 for	 state	 legal	
protection.	Furthermore,	 it	also	confirms	that	the	Law	on	the	Age	of	
Marriage	 is	 intended	 to	 protect	 the	 rights	 of	 children	 as	 stated	 in	
 
142 Verdict no. 33/Pdt.P/2014/PA.Bgl. 
143 Interview with Wahyu Widiana, November 2018. 


















judges	 did	 accept	 the	 application	 and	 granted	 legalization	 of	 the	
marriage.		
Legal	 anthropologists	 emphasize	 the	multiplicity	 of	 legal	 bases	
and	 institutions	 which	 co-determine	 the	 structure,	 norms	 and	
interpretations	 of	 the	 law.145	 Isbat	 nikah	provides	 a	 space	 in	which	
judges	can	exploit	the	plurality	of	legal	orders.146	The	judges	examined	
‘the	 dialectic,	 mutually	 constitutive	 relation	 between	 state	 law	 and	
other	normative	orders’.147	 Legal	pluralism	 is	 justified	on	pragmatic	
grounds	as	a	 technique	of	 governance.148	 From	 the	decision	handed	
down,	we	 see	 that	 the	 law	 offers	 a	 legitimate	 frame	 of	 reference	 in	
which	political,	economic	and	legal	interests	can	be	defended.149	The	
judges	also	 found	 it	 important	 to	be	able	 to	consult	a	different	 legal	
 
145 Fernanda Pirie, The Anthropology of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
146 Arskal Salim, ‘Dynamic Legal Pluralism in Indonesia: Contested Legal Orders in 
Contemporary Aceh’, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, vol. 42, no. 61 (2010), pp. 
1–29. 
147 Sally Merry, ‘Legal pluralism’, Law and Society Review, vol. 22 (1988), pp. 869–896. 
148 John Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’, The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 
vol. 24 (1986), p. 5. 
149 Keebet Von Benda-Beckmann, ‘Transnational Dimensions of Legal Pluralism’, in Begegnung 
und Konflikt – Eine kulturanthropologische Bestandsaufnahme, ed. by Wolfgang Fikentscher 
(Munich: C. H. Beck, 2001), p. 44. 
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norm,	 that	 is,	 traditional	 fiqh	or	 theological	doctrines.	However,	 this	




Is	 it	 possible	 for	 Abdulloh’s	 children	 who	 were	 born	 before	 their	
father’s	 registered	marriage	 to	 acquire	 legal	 status	 as	 a	 ‘legitimate’	
child?	 The	 answer	 is	 definitely	 yes.	 As	 I	 have	 mentioned	 earlier,	
spouses	in	a	marriage	which	has	lately	been	registered	at	the	KUA	can	
still	make	an	application	to	have	the	status	of	the	children	legalized.	
This	 is	 pursued	 through	 a	 legal	 procedure	 called	 legitimation	 of	
children	 (asal	 usul	 anak).	 I	 have	 observed	 that	 this	 tendency	 has	




born	 in	an	unregistered	marriage.	 In	 the	Bangil	Religious	Court,	 the	
number	of	the	case	of	asal	usul	anak	does	not	differ	much	that	of	isbat	





application	 was	 submitted	 by	 Nizar	 and	 Jubaidah.151	 They	 were	
married	religiously	on	30	April	2003	and	later	had	two	children.	The	
first	child	was	born	in	2005,	while	the	second	was	born	in	2007.	On	9	
December	2016	they	applied	 for	a	registered	marriage	at	 their	 local	
KUA.	 Bringing	 with	 them	 their	 children’s	 birth	 certificates	 (surat	
keterangan	 kelahiran)	 issued	 by	 the	 village	 administration,	 they	
submitted	a	request	 for	 the	children	 to	be	 legitimated	by	 the	Bangil	
religious	court.	
 
150 See the Elucidation of the Law No. 3/2006 on Religious Courts Number 37 Point (a). 







later,	 Nizar	 submitted	 a	 request	 for	 isbat	 nikah	 to	 validate	 his	
remarriage	to	the	Bangil	Islamic	Court.	The	court	rejected	his	request	
because	 he	 could	 not	 be	 recognized	 as	 legally	 divorced.	 The	 judges	
considered	 his	 marriage	 to	 Jubaidah	 was	 not	 a	 remarriage,	 but	 a	
polygynous	marriage.	The	 judges	took	only	written	 legal	proofs	 into	




It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that,	 before	 the	 1974	 Marriage	 Law	 was	
implemented,	polygynous	marriages	did	not	require	the	permission	of	
an	 Islamic	 court.	 Marriages	 and	 polygynous	 marriages	 had	 to	 be	
registered,	but	this	registration	was	just	considered	an	administrative	
obligation,	not	a	requirement	for	a	valid	marriage.	In	my	interviews,	
one	of	 the	 judges	argued	 that	he	and	his	colleagues	often	rejected	a	
request	for	isbat	nikah	because	the	marriage	had	been	concluded	prior	
to	 the	 issuance	 of	 a	 divorce	 certificate	 terminating	 the	 previous	
marriage.152	He	acknowledged	that	this	was	tricky	situation,	especially	
when	 it	 happens	 to	 the	 woman,	 because	 a	 wife	 cannot	 have	 two	
husbands	at	the	same	time.		
Although	nikah	 sirri	 is	 not	 legally	 recognized	 in	 the	 Indonesian	
legal	 system,	 the	 judges	 still	 thought	 it	 important	 to	 examine	 the	
religious	validity	of	 this	marriage,	 to	discover	whether	or	not	 it	has	





152 Interview with Pak Rasid, a judge of Bangil Religious Court, January 2018. 











The	 judges	 also	 asked	 them	 the	 reason	 they	 wanted	 this	
legitimation	of	their	children.	Their	verdict	states	that	they	wanted	to	
acquire	the	birth	certificates	of	their	children.	This	reason	was	more	
than	 enough	 for	 judges	 to	 go	 ahead	 with	 the	 hearing.	 The	 judges	
referred	to	Article	49	in	the	Law	3/2006	on	Religious	Courts	and	its	






(wa	 al-ḥajaru	 li	 al-‘āhir).”	 The	 judges	 also	 considered	 the	 common	
good	(maṣlaḥa)	as	well	as	the	harm	(mudarat)	which	might	ensue	in	
the	future	if	they	did	not	accept	this	petition.		
The	 judges	 confirmed	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 the	 children	 with	 a	
reference	to	Article	99	in	the	KHI	which	stipulates	“a	legal	child	is	who	
is	born	within	or	as	a	consequence	of	a	valid	marriage”.	In	another	case,	
the	 judges	 also	 referred	 to	 Article	 103	 of	 the	 KHI.	 This	 article	 is	
specifically	about	asal	usul	anak	(the	legal	origin	of	the	child).	It	says	
that	asal	 usul	 anak	 is	 proved	 by	 a	 birth	 certificate.	However,	 in	 the	
absence	of	a	birth	certificate,	the	religious	court	might	be	able	to	issue	
 
153 van Huis and Wirastri, ‘Muslim Marriage Registration in Indonesia: Revised Marriage 
Registration Laws Cannot Overcome Compliance Flaws’; van Huis, ‘Islamic Courts and 
Women’s Divorce Rights in Indonesia: The Cases of Cianjur and Bulukumba’, p. 97. 
154 van Huis, ‘Islamic Courts and Women’s Divorce Rights in Indonesia: The Cases of Cianjur 







the	 last	resort	 for	a	 family.	The	decision	made	by	religious	courts	 is	






has	 interpreted	 the	 1974	 Marriage	 Law	 and	 the	 1991	 KHI	 in	 a	
relatively	 liberal	 way.	 This	 progressive	 stance	 is	 believed	 to	 have	
considerable	influence	on	their	legal	reasoning.	It	is	relevant	to	relate	
this	situation	 to	Bowen’s	remarks	 that	gender	equality,	 fairness	and	









emphasized	 how	 much	 more	 heavily	 the	 significance	 of	 social	
acceptance	weighs	 than	considerations	of	 state	 legality.156	However,	
they	are	brought	back	down	to	earth	about	the	need	for	a	legalization	
of	 marriage	 when	 their	 children	 require	 a	 birth	 certificate	 which	
cannot	 be	 issued	 without	 the	 marriage	 certificate	 of	 their	 parents.	
Several	paths	are	open	to	them.		
 
155 Bowen, Islam, Law, and Equality in Indonesia: An Anthropology of Public Reasoning, p. 257. 
156 Sonneveld, ‘Rethinking the Difference Between Formal and Informal Marriages in Egypt’; 
Bedner and Huis, ‘Plurality of marriage law and marriage registration for Muslims in Indonesia: 
a plea for pragmatism’. 











to	 the	 Islamic	court.	 In	 fact,	 isbat	nikah	 is	an	 important	construct	 to	
legalize	a	marriage,	a	process	which	would	be	otherwise	 impossible	
according	 to	 standard	procedure	 set	 out	 in	 state	 law.	 This	 category	
includes	polygynous	and	underage	marriages.	Of	course,	such	matters	
require	the	utmost	discretion	of	the	judges,	who	tend	to	work	pretty	
much	 in	 line	 with	 the	 procedural	 law.	 However,	 the	 decision	 to	
approve	 a	 legalization	 is	 principally	 based	 upon	 whether	 or	 not	 a	
marriage	 has	 been	 concluded	 in	 line	 with	 Sharia	 law	 coupled	 with	





a	 request	 to	 the	 religious	 court	 asking	 that	 their	 children	be	 legally	
recognized.		
The	 registration	 is	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 KUA	 while	 the	




nikah	 works	 is	 closely	 interwoven	 with	 Nurlaelawati’s	 finding.	 She	
remarks	that,	in	many	cases	judges	find	it	hard	to	apply	the	rules	which	
they	should	formally	abide	by.	Because	these	judges	do	not	have	the	
power	 to	 force	 society	 to	 adhere	 to	 the	 state	 law,	 they	 show	 the	
 
157 Bedner and Huis, ‘Plurality of marriage law and marriage registration for Muslims in 
Indonesia: a plea for pragmatism’, p. 187. 
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bureaucracy’s	 strategy	 to	 regulate	 marriage	 and	 family.	 Those	
administering	government	on	a	 lower	 level	are	aware	that	the	strict	
imposition	of	a	legal	norm	on	the	legal	obligation	to	register	a	marriage	
has	 been	 far	 from	 successful.	Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 leave	
unregistered	marriage	as	it	is.	Therefore,	in	order	to	protect	citizens’	
rights,	 these	 different	 solutions	 have	 been	 made	 available.	
Furthermore,	checking	on	a	marriage	by	the	state	is	an	tricky	task	in	a	
country	like	Indonesia	in	which	there	is	a	wealth	of	perception	of	both	
the	 national	 law	 and	 Islamic	 law	 current	 in	 Muslim	 society.	 In	
response,	the	Indonesian	legal	system	provides	a	wide	playing-field	of	
ample	 legal	 and	 judicial	 opportunities	 to	 solve	 the	 problems	which	
arise	 as	 long	as	 these	 support	 its	 effort	 to	 control.	When	 it	 is	 set	 in	
motion,	 these	 opportunities	 lead	 not	 only	 to	 administrative	
transgressions	 and	 the	 exercise	 of	 judicial	 discretion,	 but	 also	 to	
overlapping	 authorities.	 Both	 the	 judges	 of	 Islamic	 courts	 and	 the	
penghulu	 of	 the	KUA	 are	 street-level	 bureaucrats	who,	 according	 to	







158 Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and Identity: The Kompilasi Hukum Islam and Legal 
Practice in the Indonesian Religious Courts, p. 224. 















at	 the	 law	as	perceived	and	 implemented	by	different	actors	on	 the	
lower	 strata	 of	 society,	 namely:	 ordinary	 people,	 judges,	 marriage	
registrars	 and	 religious	 leaders.	 Following	 Sally	 Moore,	 I	 have	
simultaneously	 looked	at	 the	rules,	 the	occasions	on	which	 they	are	
communicated	and	 invoked	what	actual	behaviour	 they	have	had	to	
address,	 the	 contexts	 in	 which	 this	 takes	 place	 and	 the	 ideas	 and	
assumptions	which	 have	 accompanied	 their	 introduction.1	 This	 has	
yielded	a	number	of	insights	which	I	have	discussed	in	the	chapters	of	






colonial	 states	 like	 Indonesia,	 the	 experience	 of	 state-citizen	
interaction	depends	not	just	on	the	content	of	the	law	but	also	on	the	
 
1 Sally Falk Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1983), p. 3. 
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strength	 of	 personal	 connections.2	 This	 informality	 has	 certainly	
shaped	the	practice	of	marriage	registration,	which	initially	presented	
a	major	problem	as	 it	has	 inexorably	 led	to	the	bureaucratization	of	
Muslim	marriage.3	The	idea	of	marriage	registration	as	an	element	of	
social	reform	militates	against	the	convictions	of	conservative	Muslims	
who	 believe	 that	 Muslim	 marriage	 should	 be	 regulated	 by	 ulama	
(religious	 leaders)	 only,	 not	 by	 the	 state.	 In	 this	 study,	 I	 have	
discovered	 that	 this	 informality	 has	 produced	 a	 mediating	 sphere	
which	 contains	 the	 potential	 to	 align	 state	 law	 and	 religious	 law,	
allowing	 people	 to	 adjust	 their	 religiously	 oriented	 attitudes	 to	 the	
state	law.	Informal	religious	leaders,	represented	by	modin	(informal	
religious	leaders	on	the	village	level	who	are	in	charge	of	marriage)	are	







actors	 in	 place	 in	 order	 as	 it	 is	 realized	 that	 they	 assist	 in	 aligning	
people’s	behaviour	with	the	state	legal	framework.		
Put	 in	 more	 general	 terms,	 the	 legal	 reform	 introduced	 in	 the	
marriage	 law	 was	 intended	 to	 facilitate	 state	 control	 of	 marriage	
practice	 and	 reinforce	 state	 authority,	 one	 part	 of	 which	 was	
eradicating	 informality.	 The	 central	 government	 assumes	 that	 the	
lower	 levels	 of	 government	 are	 capable	 of	 building	 a	 direct	
relationship	 with	 ordinary	 people	 without	 necessarily	 involving	
intermediaries.	 However,	 in	 practice,	 it	 does	 not	 work	 that	 way.	
Effective	 marriage	 registration	 needs	 these	 intermediaries,	
particularly	in	communities	in	which	religious	leaders	command	great	
respect.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 Marriage	 Law	 still	 defines	 marriage	 as	 a	
religious	 ceremony.	 In	 these	 communities,	 marriage	 registration	
includes	 two	 inseparable	 dimensions.	 Firstly,	 it	 is	 just	 an	
 
2 Berenschot and van Klinken, ‘Informality and Citizenship: The Everyday State in Indonesia’. 




related	 to	 the	 religious	 validity	 of	 a	 marriage	 and	 the	 proper	




While	 these	 findings	 might	 seem	 to	 indicate	 a	 competition	
between	state	and	local	religious	leaders,	I	want	to	underline	that	the	
relationship	between	the	state	and	religion	 in	Muslim	marriage	–	at	
least	 in	 the	 cases	 I	 examined	 -	 is	 actually	 a	 matter	 of	 mutual	
adjustment.	 Religious	 authorities	 do	 indeed	 accept	 the	 state’s	
intervention	in	marriage	law,	if	this	is	limited	to	marriage	registration.	
Simultaneously,	 local	 people	 are	 increasingly	 eager	 to	 register	
marriages	 as	 this	 makes	 them	 eligible	 to	 have	 access	 to	 the	 state	
services.	Of	course,	there	is	a	small	segment	of	religious	leaders	who	
oppose	 the	 state	 law,	 especially	 those	 who	 do	 not	 accept	 the	
democratic	foundation	of	the	nation-state	and	propagate	the	idea	of	a	
so-called	Islamic	state’.	However,	the	large	majority	can	accept	some	
level	 of	 intervention	 of	 the	 nation-state	 in	 Muslim	marriage	 if	 two	
conditions	 are	 met.	 Firstly,	 the	 state	 law	 cannot	 challenge	 the	
fundamental	 principles	 of	 Sharia	 law	 or	 introduce	 something	
impermissible	according	to	classical	understanding	of	Sharia	law,	such	
as	 allowing	 same-sex	 marriage	 or	 totally	 prohibiting	 polygyny.	
However,	this	is	hardly	ever	the	case	in	Indonesia	as	to	a	large	extent	




law	 is	 applied.	 To	 local	 people,	 religious	 law	 is	 a	 more	 responsive	
instrument	 for	 handling	 problems	 of	 sexual	 morality	 such	 as	 zina	
(extra-marital	 sexual	 relations)	 and	 teenage	 pregnancy.	 They	
prioritize	 the	 religious	 validity	 of	 marriage	 rather	 than	 its	 legal	
validity.		





sub-district	 office	 of	 Muslim	 marriage	 registration	 and	 the	 Islamic	
courts,	 are	 amenable	 to	 adopting	 a	 lenient	 approach	 towards	
regulations	 on	marriage.4	 They	do	not	 interpret	 and	 implement	 the	
rules	strictly.	This	attitude	is	of	great	assistance	to	those	people	who	
want	to	seek	state	recognition	of	their	marriages	so	that	they	can	have	
access	 to	 their	 citizens’	 rights.	 The	 lenient	 approach	 applies	 in	
particular	 in	 two	 conditions.	 Firstly,	 as	 a	 street-level	 bureaucrat	 of	
marriage	registration,	penghulu	at	the	KUA	(Kantor	Urusan	Agama,	the	
Office	 of	 Religious	 Affairs)	 are	 willing	 to	 register	 an	 unregistered	
marriage.	Their	acquiescence	means	that	people	do	not	have	to	file	a	
formal	request	for	the	legalization	of	their	unregistered	marriage	with	
Islamic	 courts	as	decreed	by	 the	 law.	Here,	penghulu	 transgress	 the	
rules	 on	 marriage	 registration	 in	 the	 name	 of	 humanity.	 Secondly,	
judicial	practice	also	shows	that	judges	resort	to	judicial	discretion	in	
the	 case	 of	 isbat	 nikah	 (retrospective	 marriage	 legalization)	 to	
prioritize	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 weaker	 party.	 5	 These	 differences	 in	
interpretation	between	the	central	government	and	the	lower	levels	of	
government	 lead	 to	 legal	 plurality	 within	 the	 state.	 However,	 the	




The	 willingness	 of	 the	 state	 officials	 to	 give	 a	 less	 than	 strict	
interpretation	of	 legal	 rules	on	personal	 status	has	become	a	major	
trend	 in	 other	 Muslim	 countries	 as	 well.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Tunisia,	
Voorhoeve	remarks	that,	despite	the	‘progressive’	direction	of	the	legal	
reform	 of	 its	 family	 law,	 the	 state-promoted	 family	 law	 is	 relative	




4 van Huis, ‘Islamic Courts and Women’s Divorce Rights in Indonesia: The Cases of Cianjur and 
Bulukumba’, p. 263. 
5 It is worth noting that the procedure for isbat nikah as set out in the KHI was initially meant 
to be a transitional article for those who had not yet registered their marriage prior to the 
ratification of the Marriage Law. Bedner and Huis, ‘Plurality of marriage law and marriage 
registration for Muslims in Indonesia: a plea for pragmatism’, p. 187. 
6 Voorhoeve, ‘Judicial Discretion in Tunisian Personal Status Law’. 
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shows	 a	 move	 towards	 increased	 standardization	 in	 the	




on	 rules	 on	 marriage,	 the	 reform	 on	 the	 bureaucracy	 of	 marriage	















Islamic	 marriage	 law	 by	 the	 state	 should	 not	 reduce	 the	 religious	
character	of	marriage.		
Historically	 speaking,	 family	 law	 reform	 in	 Indonesia	 has	
addressed	 sensitive	 issues	 such	 as	 polygyny,	 the	 minimum	 age	 of	
marriage	and	the	legal	obligation	of	marriage	registration.	Under	the	
 
7 Sarah Vincent-Grosso, ‘Maktub: An Ethnography of Evidence in a Tunisian Divorce Court’, in 
Family Law in Islam: Divorce, Marriage and Women in the Muslim World, ed. by Maaike 
Voorhoeve (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), pp. 171–98. 
8 Monika Lindbekk, ‘Inscribing Islamic Shari‘a in Egyptian Divorce’, Oslo Law Review, vol. 3, no. 
2 (2016), pp. 103–35. 





have	 more	 than	 one	 wife.	 Regarding	 minimum	 age,	 the	 Law	 has	
introduced	the	prescription	that	the	bride	must	not	be	younger	than	
sixteen	 years	 and	 the	 groom	 must	 be	 at	 least	 nineteen	 (now	 both	
changed	to	nineteen	years).	Before	this	law	came	into	force,	these	two	
issues	 blew	 up	 into	 a	 heated	 debate	 between	 female	 activists	 and	
religious	 leaders	 in	the	early	years	of	 the	twentieth	century.10	Up	to	
now,	 the	 norms	 concerning	 polygyny	 and	 minimum	 age	 remain	 a	
subject	 of	 deliberation	 and	 negotiation	 involving	 state	 officials,	
religious	 leaders,	 feminist	 activists	 and	 other	 interested	 parties.	
Turning	 to	 the	question	of	 registration,	 the	Marriage	Law	stipulates	
that	 marriage	 must	 first	 be	 solemnized	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	












to	 introduce	 legal	 sanctions	 on	 those	 who	 do	 not	 register	 their	
marriage.	This	reform	led	to	a	public	debate	and	certain	Islamic	groups	
urged	 people	 to	 resist	 it.	 The	 upshot	 is	 that	 the	 reform	 ended	 in	 a	
deadlock.		
Earlier,	 the	 Civil	 Administration	 Law	 has	 introduced	 legal	
sanctions	 in	 the	 form	 of	 fines	 for	 those	 who	 fail	 to	 register	 their	
 
10 Susan Blackburn, Women and the State in Modern Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004); Susan Blackburn and Sharon Bessell, ‘Marriageable Age: Political 
Debates on Early Marriage in Twentieth-Century Indonesia’, Indonesia, vol. 63 (1997), pp. 
107–41. 





and	 Wirastri	 have	 argued,	 legal	 sanctions	 are	 never	 a	 sufficient	
deterrent	 to	 stop	 people	 opting	 for	 unregistered	 marriages.12	
Ironically,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	Ministry	 of	Home	Affairs	 drafted	 a	
regulation	which	assists	people	 in	unregistered	marriages	 to	obtain	
birth	 certificates	 for	 their	 children	 mentioning	 the	 names	 of	 both	
parents.	 Once	 again,	 this	 shows	 the	 ambiguity	 of	 the	 state	 when	 it	
comes	to	dealing	with	informality.	
The	debate	on	 legal	 reform	also	 involved	ulama.	 They	use	 their	
organizations	 and	 fatwas	 to	 claim	 and	 reinforce	 their	 religious	
authority.	 Their	 fatwas	 demonstrate	 how	 the	 concept	 of	 maṣlaḥa	
(public	 good)	 in	 Islamic	 law	 has	 become	 increasingly	 important	 in	










bureaucracy	 have	 been	 busy	 securing	 this	 goal.	 At	 this	 point,	 the	
discourse	on	Muslim	marriage	no	longer	hinges	on	the	religious	and	
legal	validity	of	marriage	but	 is	about	the	consequences	of	marriage	
registration	 for	 citizens’	 rights.	 I	 classify	 this	 new	 direction	 as	 a	
citizens’	 rights	 approach.	 In	 this	 approach,	 both	 members	 of	 the	
judiciary	and	the	civil	service	are	key	actors.	One	important	feature	has	
concerned	 the	 judiciary’s	 examination	 of	 the	 legal	 status	 under	 the	
Constitution	 of	 children	 born	 out	 of	 legal	 wedlock.	 Court	 decisions	




12 van Huis and Wirastri, ‘Muslim Marriage Registration in Indonesia: Revised Marriage 




















in	 Indonesia.	 Instead	of	 reforming	 the	 content	of	 the	Marriage	Law,	
which	inevitably	ignites	heated	debates,	the	government	has	adopted	
a	 citizens’	 rights	 approach	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 problems	 arising	 from	
unregistered	marriage.	Far-reaching	reforms	of	the	rules	on	marriage	
have	been	achieved	without	secularizing	the	main	elements	of	Muslim	
family	 law.	 These	 reforms	 are	 indirectly	 improving	 the	 position	 of	
women	 in	 the	 matrimonial	 sphere	 and	 protecting	 the	 rights	 of	




have	 arisen	 as	 the	 citizen’s	 approach,	 as	 I	 explained	 earlier,	 is	
undermining	the	importance	of	the	marriage	certificate.	Nevertheless,	





13 Peletz, Islamic Modern: Religious Courts and Cultural Politics in Malaysia. 
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shifted	 from	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 validity	 of	 Muslim	 marriage	 to	 the	
problems	for	citizens’	rights	caused	by	the	consequences	of	marriage	
registration.	Since	its	implementation	of	the	citizens’	rights	approach,	




The	 second	 important	 set	 of	 findings	 of	 this	 study	 is	 related	 to	 the	
bureaucratization	 of	 marriage	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 government	





the	 registration	 of	 Muslim	 marriage.	 In	 the	 past,	 no	 special	
qualifications	 were	 needed	 to	 be	 appointed	 a	 PPN.	 Now,	 only	 a	
penghulu	(a	state	religious	authority	who	is	responsible	for	concluding	
a	 marriage)	 can	 act	 as	 a	 PPN,	 a	 move	 which	 is	 part	 of	 the	 state’s	
strategy	to	boost	the	legitimacy	of	the	KUA.		
Over	the	past	few	years,	in	efforts	to	improve	its	performance,	the	
government	 has	 attempted	 to	 introduce	 bureaucratic	 reform	 in	 the	
KUA.	This	bureaucratic	reform	has	been	devised	for	the	simultaneous	
attainment	of	two	objectives:	the	government	wants	all	its	citizens	to	
register	 their	 marriages	 and	 that	 this	 registration	 should	 not	 be	
dependent	on	religious	actors	operating	outside	the	state	framework.	
This	reform	was	introduced	after	an	incident	in	East	Java	in	which	a	












However,	 the	 matter	 of	 extra-legal	 payment	 has	 not	 yet	 been	
properly	solved.	It	is	particularly	complicated	because	it	also	linked	to	
the	position	of	the	modin	who,	in	the	past,	acted	as	the	PPPN	or	P3N	
(Pembantu	Petugas	 Pencatat	Nikah,	 assistant	 of	marriage	 registrar).	










aspect	 of	 the	marriage	 registration.	 This	 kind	 of	 situation	 arises	 in	
most	areas	in	East	Java.	Grijns	and	Horii	have	demonstrated	that	amil	
play	a	similar	role	in	West	Java.15	
A	 similar	 reform	 has	 been	 the	 integration	 of	 the	 marriage	
registration	 into	 the	 civil	 administration.	 The	 thinking	 behind	 this	
reform	was	to	prevent	any	modification	of	the	ages	of	couples,	usually	
of	 the	 brides,	 to	 make	 these	 comply	 with	 the	 Marriage	 Law.	 This	
reform	has	caused	new	problems.	Although	a	bride	might	be	 legally	
underage,	 she,	 or	 her	 family,	 still	 seek	 state	 recognition	 of	 her	
marriage.	 Currently	 the	 government	 officials	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	
prepared	 to	 negotiate	 in	 this	 situation	 because	 the	 system	uses	 the	
data	 filed	 under	 a	 single	 identification	 number	 (NIK,	 Nomor	 Induk	
Kependudukan)	to	calculate	her	age.	If	her	age	does	not	comply	with	
the	 legal	 requirement,	 the	 system	 will	 automatically	 reject	 the	
registration.	Once	again,	modin	are	able	to	alleviate	this	situation	by	
performing	a	religious	marriage	with	a	delayed	registration,	meaning	
that	 the	 marriage	 will	 be	 registered	 as	 soon	 as	 the	 spouses	 have	
reached	the	required	minimum	age.	
 
14 To become P3N, modin were appointed by the village head and then confirmed by the head 
of the KUA to assist the PPN in his work. 
15 Grijns and Horii, ‘Child Marriage in a Village in West Java (Indonesia): Compromises between 
Legal Obligations and Religious Concerns’. 
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This	 series	 of	 reform	 lead	 us	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 central	
government	 is	 heavily	 influenced	 by	 the	 idea	 of	 rationalization	 as	
defined	 by	 Weber.16	 In	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 government,	 modern	
bureaucratic	reform	simply	means	eliminating	values	embedded	in	a	
religious/ethical	 context.	 Efficiency	 and	 effectiveness	 have	been	 the	
keywords	 from	 the	 government’s	 point	 of	 view.	 However,	 as	 I	
explained	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 Muslim	 marriage	 can	 never	 be	 completely	
rational	 in	Max	Weber’s	 sense,	 since	 it	must	 invariably	be	based	on	
core	 Islamic	norms	and	values	 if	 it	 is	 to	 retain	 its	 Islamic	character.	
Indeed,	the	success	of	the	reform	is	indeed	dependent	on	the	situation	
prevailing	 in	 each	 society.	 For	 Pasuruan	 people	 in	 general,	 the	
involvement	of	a	modin	 is	 fundamental	because	people	consider	 the	
religious	 elements	 of	 a	 marriage	 more	 important	 than	 any	



















16 Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters, ‘Max Weber’s Sociology in the Twenty-first Century’, in 
Weber’s rationalism and modern society new translations on politics, bureaucracy, and social 
stratification, ed. by Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 
p. 4; Max Weber, Economy and society: An outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. by Guenther 
Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 889. 
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religion	 and	 the	 state.	 This	 social	 configuration	 appears	 to	 have	
infiltrated	and	influenced	political	life	too.	
Furthermore,	 Sumbersari,	 the	 area	 in	 Pasuruan	 in	which	 I	 have	









Pesantren	 have	been	expanding	 their	 curricula	 to	 respond	 to	 a	new	
aspiration,	i.e.	providing	general	knowledge	and	practical	skills.	This	is	
coincident	 with	 the	 development	 on	 the	 national	 level	 which	 has	
shown	 a	 growing	 tendency	 for	 Islamic	 schools	 to	 be	more	 open	 to	
change.	
	
4. Everyday	 Practice	 of	 Marriage	 and	 the	 Functioning	 of	 the	
Bureaucracy	of	Marriage	




these	 aspects	 into	 the	 same	 category	 because	 both	 relate	 to	 how	
marriage	 is	 practised	 by	 local	 people.	 It	 encompasses	 how	 people	
perceive	a	marriage	and	determine	whom	and	when	to	marry	as	well	
as	how	they	perceive	marriage	registration.		
In	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 people	 of	 Sumbersari,	 and	 many	 others	 in	
Indonesia,	marriage	is	a	purely	religious	affair.	It	is	a	sacred	ceremony	
people	 set	 tremendous	 store	 by	 the	 involvement	 of	 religious	
authorities,	far	more	than	they	are	bothered	about	state	involvement.	
Nevertheless,	despite	the	homogenous	tradition	of	Islam	in	the	area,	I	






discourses	 circulating	 within	 traditional	 Islam.	 These	 ideas	 include	
preserving	 chastity	 (kesucian)	 and	 playing	 according	 to	 the	 rules	
(apik).	Pesantren	play	an	important	role	in	maintaining	this	fiqh-based	
understanding	 of	marriage.	 Being	 a	 santri	 (student	 of	 pesantren)	 is	
taken	as	a	guarantee	of	the	purity	and	good	morals	of	a	girl.		
Marriage	 practice	 in	 Sumbersari	 shows	 that	 the	 negotiations	 in	
which	 these	 ideas	 are	 dominant	 are	 dependent	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	
pengarep	(traditional	marriage	broker).	Entrusted	with	the	principal	
role	of	mediating	 the	communication	of	 the	 two	 families	concerned,	
the	 work	 of	 pengarep	 is	 mainly	 important	 to	 those	 families	 whose	
daughters	 have	 been	 educated	 in	 pesantren.	 In	 these	 families,	 girls	
have	 limited	agency	and	restricted	room	when	 it	comes	to	 finding	a	
suitable	future	husband.	It	is	the	parents,	not	always	the	father,	who	
determine	to	whom	and	when	they	will	be	married	to.	The	upshot	is	
that	arranged	marriage	 is	quite	 common.	 In	 this	 situation,	marriage	
has	become	a	marketplace	in	which	a	pengarep	is	essential	to	achieving	
the	expectations	of	the	parents.		
Another	 key	 actor	 in	marriage	 is	 the	 kyai.	 Marriage	 practice	 in	
Sumbersari	 shows	 the	 on-going	 centrality	 of	 the	 role	 of	 kyai	 in	 the	
production	of	an	Islam-based	legal	norm	to	safeguard	sexual	morality.	
This	is	a	tricky	point	as	a	decision	based	on	these	norms	sometimes	
conflicts	with	 the	 state	 legal	norms.	 “Preventing	harm	(extramarital	
sex	 and	unwanted	pregnancy)	 should	be	 the	priority”	 is	 always	 the	















is	 subject	 to	 the	parents’	 authority.	 This	 is	 grounded	on	 the	 idea	of	






in	 Cianjur,	 West	 Java.17	 Furthermore,	 the	 centrality	 of	 religion	 and	
cultural	norms	corroborates	earlier	research	findings.	These	issues	are	






the	 state	 apparatus.	 In	West	 Java,	Grijns	 and	Hori	 suggest	 the	 same	
development.19	Platt	has	also	underlined	that	the	dominant	influence	




the	 KUA.	 Their	 undiminished	 authority	means	 that	 the	 KUA	 cannot	







17 van Huis, ‘Islamic Courts and Women’s Divorce Rights in Indonesia: The Cases of Cianjur and 
Bulukumba’, p. 271. 
18 Smith-Hefner, ‘The New Muslim Romance: Changing Patterns of Courtship and Marriage 
Among Educated Javanese Youth’, p. 458. 
19 Grijns and Horii, ‘Child Marriage in a Village in West Java (Indonesia): Compromises between 
Legal Obligations and Religious Concerns’, p. 12. 
20 Maria Platt, Marriage, gender and Islam in Indonesia: women negotiating informal 




people	 as	 a	 commercial	 relationship	 between	 the	 state	 and	 society.	
Their	argument	is	simple:	the	state	provides	recognition	by	the	means	
of	a	marriage	certificate	and	people	have	to	spend	a	sum	of	money	to	
acquire	 this	 document.	 Given	 this	 perception,	penghulu	 consistently	
find	 they	 run	 into	 complications	 when	 they	 try	 to	 implement	 the	
central	 government	 regulation	 which	 differentiates	 between	 nikah	
kantor	and	nikah	bedolan.	Before	this	policy	came	into	force,	nearly	all	
marriage	 ceremonies	 were	 concluded	 at	 home	 (nikah	 bedolan).	 By	
making	nikah	bedolan	much	more	expensive,	 the	 state	pressures	 its	
citizens	 have	 their	marriage	 ceremony	 performed	 in	 the	 office.	 The	





and	 a	 marriage	 ceremony	 as	 an	 administrative	 process	 in	 which	 a	
penghulu	plays	a	role.	People	do	not	want	to	spend	much	money	on	
conducting	a	nikah	bedolan,	which	is	why	there	has	been	a	tendency	to	




the	state	and	society,	modin	play	an	 important	 role	 in	 this	and	 they	
have	 constructed	 a	 religious	 argumentation	 to	 justify	 this	 people’s	
choice.	Their	solution	is	the	idea	of	a	ta’kīd	al-nikāḥ	(authenticating	a	
marriage,	 pengukuhan	 pernikahan)	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 second	marriage	
ceremony	 in	 the	KUA.	They	have	needed	 to	 invent	such	a	new	 legal	
norm	to	sustain	their	intermediating	role.	The	idea	of	ta’kīd	al-nikāḥ	is	






















led	to	a	situation	 in	which	religious	 leaders	 in	West	 Java	denied	the	
state	 authority	 in	 Islamic	 matters.24	 This	 outcome	 suggests	 two	




penghulu	 consistently	 advocate	 state	 recognition	 of	 a	 marriage,	
arguing	it	contributes	to	the	protection	of	citizens’	rights.	The	fact	that	
penghulu	 are	 not	 always	 successful	 in	 persuading	 society	 to	marry	
according	to	the	state	law	in	the	first	place	suggests	that	they	do	not	
yet	enjoy	a	solid	position	in	society.	When	it	is	all	said	and	done,	the	
legitimacy	of	a	penghulu’s	 authority	 to	control	people’s	behaviour	 is	
dependent	upon	the	extent	to	which	modin	play	their	roles.	Modin	are	
 
21 Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services. 
22 Moore, ‘Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate 
Subject of Study’, p. 720. 
23 Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and Identity: The Kompilasi Hukum Islam and Legal 
Practice in the Indonesian Religious Courts, p. 189. 
24 van Huis, ‘Islamic Courts and Women’s Divorce Rights in Indonesia: The Cases of Cianjur and 
Bulukumba’, pp. 139–40. 
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marriage	 or	 birth	 certificates	 mentioning	 the	 names	 of	 both	 the	
parents.	The	KHI	decrees	that	unregistered	marriage	can	be	legalized	
retrospectively	 by	 following	 the	 process	 of	 isbat	 nikah	 in	 Islamic	





they	 approach	 a	 penghulu	 to	 register	 it	 at	 the	 KUA	 office.	 In	 other	
words,	the	choice	between	isbat	nikah	in	Islamic	courts	or	registering	





the	 help	 of	 penghulu.	 The	 penghulu	 at	 the	 KUA	 acquiesce	 in	 the	
legalization	 although	 they	 know	 it	 is	 a	 violation	 of	 the	 law.	 Their	
justification	 is	 that	 they	 are	 simply	helping	 the	people	 to	procure	 a	
required	document.	Penghulu	usually	demand	the	couples	present	a	
letter	from	the	village	administration	declaring	that	their	marriage	has	
never	been	 registered.	Of	 course,	 this	marriage	 registration	will	not	






permissible	 under	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 Marriage	 Law,	 that	 is,	 illegal	
polygyny	and	underage	marriage.	In	cases	of	polygyny,	judges	do	not	
put	 much	 effort	 into	 uncovering	 how	 the	 marriage	 ceremony	
concerned	 was	 performed.	 They	 just	 consider	 that	 according	
legalization	is	more	important	for	the	sake	of	children’s	legal	status.	In	
other	words,	isbat	nikah	is	accepted	on	humane	grounds.	The	judges	
make	 use	 of	 Article	 7	 (2)	 e	 “marriage	which	 is	 concluded	 between	
those	 who	 do	 not	 have	 any	 impediment	 according	 to	 the	Marriage	
Law”,	 but	 they	 interpret	 it	 more	 widely.	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 two	
mechanisms,	 the	 Indonesian	 law	 now	 provides	 another	 legal	
opportunity	for	people,	who	do	not	request	 isbat	nikah	 from	Islamic	
courts	or	 register	unregistered	marriage	 in	 the	KUA,	 to	validate	 the	
legal	status	of	children.	This	is	done	by	submitting	a	proposal	for	the	
children’s	legalization	(asal	usul	anak)	to	an	Islamic	court.		
This	 sort	 of	 isbat	 nikah	 supports	 Nurlaelawati’s	 finding	 that,	 in	








and	 the	 penghulu	 at	 the	 KUA,	 seem	 aware	 that	 the	 judicial	 norm	






their	 judicial	 discretion	 and	 the	 penghulu	 at	 the	 KUA	 deliberately	
transgress	 the	 law	 in	 order	 to	 help	 citizens	 comply	 with	 the	
requirements	 of	 the	 state	 legal	 framework.	 The	 implementation	 of	
 
25 Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and Identity: The Kompilasi Hukum Islam and Legal 







into	 Indonesian	 society.	 Instead	 of	 reforming	 the	 substance	 of	 the	
marriage	law,	which	would	only	stir	up	controversy	and	debates,	the	
government	has	used	a	citizens’	rights	approach	to	control	marriage	




legal	 validity	 remains	 an	 issue,	 many	 marriages	 will	 remain	
unregistered.	Furthermore,	 the	central	state	 is	also	endeavouring	 to	





have	 also	 witnessed	 the	 decision	 by	 judges	 of	 Islamic	 courts	 and	
penghulu	 at	 the	KUA	 to	 adopt	 a	 lenient	 approach	 towards	 the	 rules	
governing	marriage.	 In	 certain	 cases,	penghulu	 are	willing	 to	 turn	 a	
blind	eye	to	the	rules,	while	the	judges	are	ready	to	exercise	judicial	
discretion	to	enable	them	to	grant	state	recognition	to	a	marriage.	This	
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Islamic	 law	 that	 serves	 as	 a	 reference	 for	
judges	in	Islamic	courts	
kitab	kuning	 (lit.	means	‘yellow	books’)	Islamic	literatures,	
mainly	 in	Arabic	 and	other	 local	 languages,	
like	 Javanese	 and	 Malays,	 that	 refer	 to	 the	
traditional	set	of	the	Islamic	texts	used	by	the	






















Masyumi	 was	 a	 major	 Islamic	 political	 party	
in	Indonesia	during	 the	Liberal	 Democracy	
Era	 in	 Indonesia	 (17	 August	 1950-	 5	 July	
1959)	 and	 was	 eradicated	 in	 1960	 by	
President	Sukarno	for	 supporting	
the	PRRI	rebellion	
modin	 a	 village	 religious	 official;	 in	 marriage,	 it	
refers	 to	person	whose	authority	was	given	
by	 the	 state	 as	 P3N	 (Pembantu	 Petugas	
Pencatat	 Nikah,	 assistant	 of	 marriage	
registrar);	 currently	 they	 are	 not	 officially	
recognized	
mompong	 good	fortune	
Muhammadiyah	 A	 reformist	 organisation	 and	 the	 second	
biggest	 Indonesian	 Muslim	 organisation	
founded	by	Ahmad	Dahlan	(d.1923)	in	1912	






























penghulu	 a	 religious	 scholar	 and	 a	 leader	 of	










PNI		 Partai	 Nasional	 Indonesia,	 the	 Indonesian	
National	 Party	 that	 had	 existed	 before	
Indonesia’s	independence	
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PKI	 Partai	 Komunis	 Indonesia,	 the	 Communist	
Party	 of	 Indonesia,	 	was	 a	communist	
party	in	Indonesia	during	 the	 mid-20th	













Pengadilan	 Agama	 Bidang	 Perkawinan,	 the	
Bill	 of	 Islamic	 Court’s	 Material	 Law	 on	
Marriage	
sadd	al-dharī‘a	 blocking	the	means	to	unexpected	evil	
santri	 Students	 of	 Islamic	 boarding	 schools	
(pesantren);	 it	 also	 refers	 to	 an	 orthodox	
form	 of	 Islam	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 syncretic	
abangan	
sijill	 court	records	






























Aligning	 religious	 law	 and	 state	 law:	 Street-level	







This	 thesis	 discusses	 the	ways	 in	which	 local	 officials	 deal	with	 the	
tensions	 concerning	 the	 regulations	 on	Muslim	marriage	 and	 social	
practices	that	emerge	as	a	response	to	such	regulations.	In	so	doing,	it	
addresses	 these	 questions:	 How	 does	 the	 Indonesian	 state	 regulate	
Muslim	 marriage?	 How	 do	 local	 people	 in	 Pasuruan	 practice	 and	
negotiate	the	state	regulations	on	Muslim	marriage,	in	the	light	of	the	
variety	of	norms	 imposed	on	 them?	How	do	 local	officials	deal	with	
their	practices?	What	role	do	intermediaries	play	in	this	process	in	the	
context	of	East	Javanese	society?	
The	 first	 chapter	provides	an	overview	of	 the	political,	 religious	
and	legal	debates	about	how	Muslim	marriage	in	Indonesia	should	be	
governed	after	the	1998	Indonesian	reformasi.	The	laws	on	marriage	
have	 increasingly	 been	 an	 arena	 of	 contestation	 between	 different	
groups	 in	 Islam.	 On	 the	 sub-national	 level,	 we	 come	 across	 the	
politicization	 of	 Islamic	 issues.	 Several	 Islam-based	 regional	
regulations	covering	ruling	on	public	morality	have	been	enacted	and	
these	 have	 complicated	 the	 procedure	 of	 Muslim	 marriage	 as	
stipulated	by	the	national	law.	For	instance,	a	local	regulation	obliges	










power	 to	 control	Muslim	marriage	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 the	 rights	 of	
women	and	children.	Therefore,	legal	reform	is	still	work	in	progress.	
Recent	legal	reforms	reveal	that	the	judiciary	and	the	civil	bureaucracy	
have	 been	 busy	 securing	 this	 goal.	 At	 this	 point,	 the	 discourse	 on	
Muslim	marriage	no	longer	hinges	on	the	religious	and	legal	validity	of	
marriage	but	 is	about	 the	consequences	of	marriage	registration	 for	
citizens’	 rights.	 I	 classify	 this	 new	 direction	 as	 a	 citizens’	 rights	
approach.	In	this	approach,	both	members	of	the	judiciary	and	the	civil	
service	 are	 key	 actors.	 One	 important	 feature	 has	 concerned	 the	




directly	 contravenes	classical	 Islamic	 law.	The	civil	bureaucracy	has	
also	 been	 seriously	 addressing	 the	 consequences	 a	 of	 unregistered	
marriage	for	the	registration	of	the	birth	of	a	child.	Its	efforts	have	led	
to	 the	 mapping	 out	 of	 a	 new	 policy,	 namely:	 letters	 of	 absolute	
responsibility	 (surat	 pernyataan	 tanggungjawab	 mutlak)	 which	
declare	the	religious	validity	of	the	marital	relationship	of	the	parents	
and	hence	the	legitimacy	of	the	child.	
The	 second	 set	 of	 findings,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 second	 chapter,	




sued	 for	 corruption	 just	 because	 he	 recorded	 the	 customary	 extra-
legal	 payment	 he	 collected	 for	 conducting	 a	 marriage	 ceremony	
outside	 the	 office	 (nikah	 bedolan).	 The	Ministry	 of	 Religious	 Affairs	
(MoRA)	 introduced	 the	 differentiation	 of	 tariffs	 of	 nikah	 kantor	
(marriage	 in	 the	 office)	 and	 nikah	 bedolan.	Nikah	 kantor	 is	 free	 of	
charge	because	a	marriage	 certificate	 is	 treated	 in	 the	 same	way	as	
other	 civil	 documents.	 For	 nikah	 bedolan,	 people	 have	 to	 pay	 Rp.	








assistant	 of	 marriage	 registrar).	 The	 dismissal	 of	 P3N	 caused	 no	







the	 civil	 administration.	 This	 reform	 has	 caused	 new	 problems.	




comply	 with	 the	 legal	 requirement,	 the	 system	 will	 automatically	
reject	 the	 registration.	 In	 this	 case,	modin	 are	 able	 to	 alleviate	 this	






significance	 of	 informality	 in	 the	 legal	 implementation.	 This	
informality	is	important	as	it	offers	the	capacity	to	make	a	compromise	
between	people’s	deep	interest	in	religious	law	and	state	law.	It	opens	
a	 door	 for	 the	 roles	 played	 by	 informal	 actors	 in	 helping	 ordinary	
people	simultaneously	negotiate	their	desire	to	observe	their	religion	
with	all	propriety	and	to	seek	state	recognition.	On	the	central	state	
level,	 this	 informality	 is	 frowned	upon	 as	 it	makes	 inroads	 into	 the	
government’s	ideas	of	establishing	clean	governance.		










a	 distinct	 sub-culture	 called	 pedalungan	 or	 pendhalungan.	 This	
community	 has	 been	 established	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 patron-client	
relationships	 in	 which	 kyai	 or	 the	 leaders	 of	 pesantren	 act	 as	 the	
patron.	 The	 commitment	 to	 practising	 Islamic	 traditions	 and	 the	
strongly	inculcated	obedience	to	religious	leaders	(kyai)	have	led	to	a	
complicated	 relationship	between	 religion	 and	 the	 state.	This	 social	
configuration	appears	to	have	infiltrated	and	influenced	political	 life	
too.	
Additionally,	 Sumbersari,	 the	 area	 in	 Pasuruan	 in	 which	 I	 have	









Pesantren	 have	been	expanding	 their	 curricula	 to	 respond	 to	 a	new	
aspiration,	i.e.	providing	general	knowledge	and	practical	skills.	This	is	
coincident	 with	 the	 development	 on	 the	 national	 level	 which	 has	
shown	 a	 growing	 tendency	 for	 Islamic	 schools	 to	 be	more	 open	 to	
change.	
The	 fourth	 set	 of	 findings	 in	 this	 study,	 discussed	 in	 the	 fourth	
chapter	and	the	fifth	chapter,	is	centred	on	two	issues:	the	everyday	
practice	 of	 marriage	 in	 a	 rural	 society	 and	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	
marriage	 registration	 bureaucracy	 -	 which	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 its	
bureaucratization,	which	I	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.		




affair.	 It	 is	 a	 sacred	 ceremony	 people	 set	 tremendous	 store	 by	 the	
involvement	of	religious	authorities,	far	more	than	they	are	bothered	
about	 state	 involvement.	 Nevertheless,	 despite	 the	 homogenous	
tradition	of	Islam	in	the	area,	I	encountered	internal	heterogeneity	of	
the	relationship	between	agency	of	the	actors	involved,	cultural	norms	
and	 the	 social	 structure	 in	 the	 selection	 of	 whom	 to	 marry.	 It	 is	
important	 to	note	 that,	 in	all	 social	 classes,	 the	 ideas	about	an	 ideal	
spouse	 have	 been	 shaped	 by	 the	 discourses	 circulating	 within	





The	 negotiations	 of	 these	 ideas	 are	 dependent	 on	 the	 role	 the	
pengarep	(traditional	marriage	broker).	Entrusted	with	the	principal	
role	of	mediating	 the	communication	of	 the	 two	 families	concerned,	
the	 work	 of	 pengarep	 is	 mainly	 important	 to	 those	 families	 whose	
daughters	 have	 been	 educated	 in	 pesantren.	 In	 these	 families,	 girls	
have	 limited	agency	and	restricted	room	when	 it	comes	to	 finding	a	
suitable	future	husband.	It	is	the	parents,	not	always	the	father,	who	
determine	to	whom	and	when	they	will	be	married	to.	The	upshot	is	
that	arranged	marriage	 is	quite	 common.	 In	 this	 situation,	marriage	
has	become	a	marketplace	in	which	pengarep	is	essential	to	achieving	
the	expectations	of	the	parents.		
Another	 key	 actor	 in	marriage	 is	 the	 kyai.	 Marriage	 practice	 in	
Pasuruan	 shows	 the	 on-going	 centrality	 of	 the	 role	 of	 kyai	 in	 the	
production	of	an	Islam-based	legal	norm	to	safeguard	sexual	morality.	
This	is	a	tricky	point	as	a	decision	based	on	these	norms	sometimes	
conflicts	with	 the	 state	 legal	norms.	 “Preventing	harm	(extramarital	
sex	 and	unwanted	pregnancy)	 should	be	 the	priority”	 is	 always	 the	














local	 elites	 if	 they	 want	 to	 maintain	 their	 power.	 In	 addition,	 non-
tenured	workers	at	the	KUA,	who	are	local	villagers,	play	a	significant	
role	 in	 bridging	 the	 distance	 between	 penghulu	 and	 the	 local	
population.		
In	 Pasuruan,	 marriage	 registration	 is	 regarded	 by	 the	 common	
people	 as	 a	 commercial	 relationship	 between	 the	 state	 and	 society.	
Their	argument	is	simple:	the	state	provides	recognition	by	the	means	
of	a	marriage	certificate	and	people	have	to	spend	a	sum	of	money	to	
acquire	 this	 document.	 Given	 this	 perception,	penghulu	 consistently	
find	 they	 run	 into	 complications	 when	 they	 try	 to	 implement	 the	
central	 government	 regulation	 which	 differentiates	 between	 nikah	
kantor	and	nikah	bedolan.	Before	this	policy	came	into	force,	nearly	all	
marriage	 ceremonies	 were	 concluded	 at	 home	 (nikah	 bedolan).	 By	
making	nikah	bedolan	much	more	expensive,	 the	 state	pressures	 its	
citizens	 have	 their	marriage	 ceremony	 performed	 in	 the	 office.	 The	












pernikahan)	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 second	marriage	 ceremony	 in	 the	 KUA.	











documents,	 such	 as	 marriage	 or	 birth	 certificates	 mentioning	 the	
names	 of	 both	 the	 parents.	 The	 KHI	 decrees	 that	 unregistered	
marriage	can	be	legalized	retrospectively	by	following	the	process	of	
isbat	 nikah	 in	 Islamic	 courts.	 Consequently,	 isbat	 nikah	 is	 the	 only	
judicial	 procedure	 available	 to	 people	 to	 legalize	 unregistered	
marriages	retrospectively	and	 is	 the	only	possible	 legal	way	to	cope	
with	unregistered	marriages.	
In	practice,	people	have	yet	another	way	to	have	their	unregistered	
marriages	 legalized.	 Instead	 of	 going	 to	 the	 Islamic	 court,	 they	
approach	penghulu	to	register	it	at	the	KUA	office.	In	other	words,	the	
choice	 between	 isbat	 nikah	 in	 Islamic	 courts	 or	 registering	










of	 marriage	 registration	 has	 not	 been	 entirely	 successful.	 Many	
Indonesian	 still	 prioritize	 religious	 validity	 and	 are	 not	 particularly	
bothered	 about	 the	 legal	 validity	 of	 marriage.	 They	 are	 willing	 to	
comply	with	the	state	law	only	when	they	are	in	need	of	state	services.	
The	 state	 has	 devised	 the	 isbat	 nikah	 procedure	 to	 cope	 with	 this	
situation.	 Judges	of	 the	 Islamic	courts	have	 to	exercise	 their	 judicial	
discretion	and	the	penghulu	at	the	KUA	deliberately	transgress	the	law	
in	 order	 to	 help	 citizens	 comply	with	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 state	
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legal	 framework.	 The	 implementation	 of	 these	 procedures	 is	 an	
important	leverage	in	edging	people	towards	the	state.		




that	 the	 lower	 levels	of	government	are	capable	of	building	a	direct	
relationship	 with	 ordinary	 people	 without	 necessarily	 involving	
intermediaries.	 However,	 in	 practice,	 it	 does	 not	 work	 that	 way.	
Effective	 marriage	 registration	 needs	 these	 intermediaries,	
particularly	in	communities	in	which	religious	leaders	command	great	
respect.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 Marriage	 Law	 still	 defines	 marriage	 as	 a	
religious	 ceremony.	 In	 these	 communities,	 marriage	 registration	
includes	 two	 inseparable	 dimensions.	 Firstly,	 it	 is	 just	 an	
administrative	matter.	The	second	dimension	has	to	do	with	aspects	
related	 to	 the	 religious	 validity	 of	 a	 marriage	 and	 the	 proper	




While	 these	 findings	 might	 seem	 to	 indicate	 a	 competition	
between	state	and	local	religious	leaders,	I	want	to	underline	that	the	
relationship	between	the	state	and	religion	 in	Muslim	marriage	–	at	
least	 in	 the	 cases	 I	 examined	 -	 is	 actually	 a	 matter	 of	 mutual	
adjustment.	 Religious	 authorities	 do	 indeed	 accept	 the	 state’s	
intervention	in	marriage	law,	if	this	is	limited	to	marriage	registration.	
Simultaneously,	 local	 people	 are	 increasingly	 eager	 to	 register	
marriages	 as	 this	 makes	 them	 eligible	 to	 have	 access	 to	 the	 state	
services.	Of	course,	there	is	a	small	segment	of	religious	leaders	who	
oppose	 the	 state	 law,	 especially	 those	 who	 do	 not	 accept	 the	
democratic	foundation	of	the	nation-state	and	propagate	the	idea	of	a	
so-called	Islamic	state.	However,	the	large	majority	can	accept	some	
level	 of	 intervention	 of	 the	 nation-state	 in	 Muslim	marriage	 if	 two	
conditions	 are	 met.	 Firstly,	 the	 state	 law	 cannot	 challenge	 the	




as	 allowing	 same-sex	 marriage	 or	 totally	 prohibiting	 polygyny.	
However,	this	is	hardly	ever	the	case	in	Indonesia	as	to	a	large	extent	




law	 is	 applied.	 To	 local	 people,	 religious	 law	 is	 a	 more	 responsive	
instrument	 for	 handling	 problems	 of	 sexual	 morality	 such	 as	 zina	
(extra-marital	 sexual	 relations)	 and	 teenage	 pregnancy.	 They	




the	 substance	 of	 the	 marriage	 law,	 which	 would	 only	 stir	 up	
controversy	and	debates,	 the	government	has	used	a	citizens’	rights	
approach	to	control	marriage	practice.	This	citizens’	rights	approach	is	
helpful	 in	 guiding	 people	 towards	 compliance	 with	 the	 state	 legal	
framework.	In	order	to	obtain	requisite	legal	documents,	people	have	
no	 option	 but	 to	 legalize	 their	 marriages.	 However,	 as	 long	 as	 the	
dualism	of	religious	validity	and	legal	validity	remains	an	issue,	many	
marriages	will	remain	unregistered.	Furthermore,	the	central	state	is	
also	 endeavouring	 to	 remove	 all	 forms	 of	 informality	 from	 the	
procedures	 involved.	 Nevertheless,	 although	 the	 government	 has	
officially	 removed	 the	 authority	 to	 act	 informally	 from	 marriage	
functionaries,	 in	practice	 it	seems	it	 is	an	uphill	battle	to	reduce	the	
latter’s	intervention.	Similarly,	we	have	also	witnessed	the	decision	by	
judges	of	 Islamic	courts	and	penghulu	 at	 the	KUA	to	adopt	a	 lenient	
approach	 towards	 the	 rules	 governing	 marriage.	 In	 certain	 cases,	
penghulu	are	willing	to	turn	a	blind	eye	to	the	rules,	while	the	judges	
are	ready	to	exercise	judicial	discretion	to	enable	them	to	grant	state	













Harmonisatie	 van	 religieus	 en	 statelijk	 recht:	













de	 lokale	 bevolking	 in	 Pasuruan	 van	 deze	 regulering	 van	 het	
Islamitische	huwelijk	en	hoe	gaat	men	hiermee	om?	En	hoe	reageren	
lokale	ambtenaren	hier	weer	op?	
In	 het	 eerste	 hoofdstuk	 wordt	 een	 overzicht	 gegeven	 van	 de	
politieke,	 religieuze	 en	 juridische	 debatten	 over	 de	 regulering	 van	
Islamitische	huwelijken,	vanaf	de	Indonesische	reformasi	die	begon	in	





deze	 verordeningen	 hebben	 de	 nationaalrechtelijke	 procedure	 met	
betrekking	tot	huwelijkssluiting	moeilijker	gemaakt.	Een	plaatselijke	







van	 Islamitische	 rechtbanken.	Het	doel	 van	deze	wetshervorming	 is	
om	sancties	op	te	kunnen	leggen	aan	stellen	die	hun	huwelijk	niet	laten	
registreren.	 Deze	 hervorming	 heeft	 een	 openbaar	 debat	 op	 gang	
gebracht	en	sommige	Islamitische	groeperingen	hebben	de	bevolking	









rechten	 van	 burgers.	 In	 mijn	 proefschrift	 benoem	 ik	 deze	 nieuwe	
richting	als	‘bevordering	van	burgerrechten’.		
Een	 belangrijk	 aspect	 is	 de	 juridische	 status	 van	 kinderen	 die	
buiten	een	huwelijk	geboren	worden.	Door	rechterlijke	uitspraken	die	
zich	beroepen	op	de	Grondwet	kunnen	buitenechtelijke	kinderen	door	
de	 vader	 erkend	 worden	 als	 er	 voldoende	 bewijs	 is	 dat	 zij	
bloedverwantschap	met	hem	hebben,	een	beslissing	die	rechtstreeks	
indruist	tegen	het	klassieke	Islamitische	recht.	De	overheid	heeft	zich	
ook	 serieus	 beziggehouden	 met	 de	 consequenties	 van	 een	 niet-
geregistreerd	 huwelijk	 voor	 de	 registratie	 van	 een	 kind.	 Deze	
inspanningen	 hebben	 geleid	 tot	 het	 ontwerpen	 van	 nieuw	 beleid,	
namelijk	 ‘brieven	 van	 absolute	 verantwoordelijkheid’	 (surat	
pertanggungjawaban	 mutlak)	 die	 de	 religieuze	 geldigheid	 van	 het	
huwelijk	bewijzen,	en	daarmee	de	officiële	status	van	het	kind.	
In	 het	 tweede	 hoofdstuk	 wordt	 een	 tweede	 reeks	
onderzoeksbevindingen	 uiteengezet	 die	 betrekking	 hebben	 op	 de	
bureaucratisering	 van	 het	 huwelijk.	 Deze	 gaan	 over	 de	
bureaucratische	 hervormingen	 binnen	 het	 Kantor	 Urusan	 Agama	
(KUA,	Bureau	voor	Religieuze	Zaken).	Deze	instantie	houdt	zich	bezig	
met	de	registratie	van	het	Islamitische	huwelijk.	De	eerste	hervorming	
houdt	 verband	 met	 een	 incident	 in	 Oost-Java.	 Hierbij	 werd	 een	
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penghulu	 (hoofd	 van	 de	 KUA)	 beschuldigd	 van	 corruptie,	 enkel	 en	
alleen	 omdat	 hij	 de	 gebruikelijke,	 maar	 buitenwettelijke,	 kosten	
registreerde	 die	 hij	 had	 geïnd	 voor	 het	 uitvoeren	 van	
huwelijksceremonies	buiten	een	officiële	trouwlocatie	van	de	overheid	
(nikah	bedolan).	Om	dit	probleem	op	te	lossen	heeft	het	Ministerie	van	







Het	 geschil	 over	 de	 buitenwettelijke	 betaling	 is	 echter	 nog	 niet	
naar	behoren	opgelost	omdat	de	kwestie	gerelateerd	is	aan	de	positie	
van	 de	modin.	Deze	 treedt	 op	 als	 PPPN	 of	 P3N	 (Pembantu	 Petugas	
Pencatat	 Nikah),	 assistent	 van	 de	 penghulu,	 maar	 heeft	 nu	 geen	
officiële	positie	meer.	De	tweede	hervorming	is	namelijk	de	afschaffing	
van	 de	 P3N.	 De	 afschaffing	 van	 de	 P3N	 heeft	 weinig	 problemen	
opgeleverd	 in	 een	 stedelijke	 gemeenschap	 als	 Yogyakarta	 waar	 de	
afhankelijkheid	van	de	modin	niet	bijzonder	groot	was,	maar	in	rurale	
gebieden	 zoals	 Pasuruan	 is	 de	 afschaffing	 een	 probleem.	 Door	 een	
modin	 te	 betrekken	 bij	 de	 huwelijksceremonie	 accepteert	 men	 de	





nieuwe	 problemen	 gecreëerd.	 Overheidsambtenaren	 zijn	 namelijk	
waarschijnlijk	 niet	 langer	 bereid	 tot	 onderhandeling	 als	 de	 bruid	
volgens	de	wet	minderjarig	is.	Het	systeem	maakt	voor	de	berekening	
van	 de	 leeftijd	 gebruik	 van	 gegevens	 die	 onder	 één	
identificatienummer	 (NIK,	 Nomor	 Induk	 Kependudukan)	 zijn	










betekenis	 van	 informaliteit	 in	de	 toepassing	 van	het	 overheidsrecht	
scherper	 in	beeld	hebben	gebracht.	Deze	 informaliteit	 is	van	belang	
omdat	 het	 een	 uitweg	 biedt	 voor	 mensen	 in	 de	 vorm	 van	 een	
compromis	 tussen	 het	 religieuze	 recht,	 die	 belangrijk	 zijn	 voor	
mensen,	en	het	statelijk	recht,	dat	nog	steeds	vaak	ver	van	hen	af	staan.	
Informele	 actoren	 helpen	 (gewone)	 mensen	 om	 de	 religieuze	
gewoonten	met	betrekking	tot	het	huwelijk	na	te	leven	en	daarnaast	
ook	 erkenning	 van	 het	 huwelijk	 door	 de	 staat	 te	 verkrijgen.	Op	 het	








traditionele	 islam	 van	 Nahdlatul	 Ulama	 volgen.	 Deze	 religieuze	
oriëntatie	wordt	versterkt	door	het	feit	dat	de	historische	wortels	van	
veel	 inwoners	 van	 Pasuruan	 op	 het	 eiland	 Madura	 liggen.	 Deze	
migranten	hebben	de	Javaanse	cultuur	geassimileerd,	wat	heeft	geleid	
tot	 een	 tot	 een	 aparte	 subcultuur	 die	 pedalungan	 of	 pendhalungan	
wordt	 genoemd.	Pedalungan	 is	 gebaseerd	 op	patroon-cliënt	 relaties	
waarin	 kyai	 of	 de	 leiders	 van	 pesantren	 de	 rol	 van	 patroon	
(beschermheer)	 op	 zich	 nemen.	 Het	 streven	 naar	 handhaving	 van	










gevestigde	 formele	 onderwijssysteem	 heeft	 geleid	 tot	 een	 centrale	
positie	van	de	zogenaamde	pesantren.	Pesantren	bieden	een	alternatief		
onderwijssysteem	 dat	 wordt	 gezien	 als	 passend	 voor	 de	
opleidingsbehoeften	van	de	bevolking,	omdat	ze	niet	alleen	de	kennis	








In	 de	 vierde	 reeks	 onderzoeksbevindingen,	 die	 in	 het	 vierde	 en	
vijfde	hoofdstuk	 van	dit	 proefschrift	worden	besproken,	 staan	 twee	






mensen	 hechten	 zeer	 veel	 waarde	 aan	 de	 betrokkenheid	 van	 de	
religieuze	 autoriteiten	 bij	 een	 huwelijk	 –	 veel	meer	 dan	 dat	 ze	 zich	
bezighouden	 met	 de	 betrokkenheid	 van	 de	 staat.	 Ondanks	 de	
homogene	traditie	van	de	Islam	in	deze	regio,	kwam	ik	toch	als	het	ging	
om	de	selectie	van	huwelijkspartners	verschillen	tegen.	Deze	hadden	
betrekking	 op	 de	 ‘agency’	 van	 de	 betrokken	 personen,	 de	 culturele	
normen	en	de	sociale	structuur.	Het	is	belangrijk	om	op	te	merken	dat	
in	alle	sociale	klassen	de	ideeën	over	een	ideale	echtgeno(o)t(e)	zijn	
gevormd	 door	 de	 opvattingen	 binnen	 de	 traditionele	 Islam.	 Deze	
ideeën	 omvatten	 ook	 het	 behoud	 van	 kuisheid	 (kesucian)	 en	 het	
respecteren	 van	 de	 regels	 (apik).	 Pesantren	 (godsdienstscholen)	
















Een	andere	 centrale	 actor	bij	 het	 sluiten	van	een	huwelijk	 is	de	
kyai.	 	De	praktijk	van	de	huwelijksvoltrekking	 in	Pasuruan	 laat	 zien	
hoe	belangrijk	deze	is	bij	de	vastlegging	van	een	wettelijke,	op	de	Islam	
gebaseerde,	 regel	 om	de	 seksuele	moraal	 te	waarborgen.	 Dit	 is	 een	
gevoelige	kwestie,	omdat	beslissingen	gebaseerd	op	deze	regels	soms	
botsen	met	de	regels	van	het	statelijke	recht.	Het	richtsnoer	is	vooral	
‘schade	 voorkomen’,	 dat	 wil	 zeggen	 geen	 buitenechtelijke	 seks	 en	
ongewenste	zwangerschap.	Verschillen	van	inzicht	in	traditionele	figh	
doctrines	 zijn	 belangrijk	 voor	 het	 construeren	 van	 een	 juridische	
redenering	 van	 de	 kyai	 die	 beantwoordt	 aan	 de	 belangen	 van	 de	
betrokken	 personen.	 Vanuit	 sociaal	 perspectief	 is	 het	 religieuze	
huwelijk	 een	 effectieve	 manier	 om	 problemen	 aan	 te	 pakken	 die	
voortkomen	uit	het	 verenigen	van	 religieuze	moraal	 en	vrouwelijke	
seksualiteit,	als	het	statelijke	recht	die	mogelijkheid	niet	biedt.	
In	hoofdstuk	vijf	wordt	beschreven	hoe	de	bureaucratie	rond	de	
huwelijksregistratie	werkt.	Uit	 het	 onderzoek	blijkt	dat	 er	 sprake	 is	
van	 een	 voortdurende	 bemoeienis	 van	 religieuze	 leiders	 met	
(re)organisatie	 van	 de	 KUA.	 Vanwege	 het	 gezag	 dat	 ze	 in	 de	




in	 het	 overbruggen	 van	 de	 afstand	 tussen	 penghulu	 en	 de	 lokale	
bevolking.	
In	 Pasuruan	 wordt	 de	 huwelijksregistratie	 door	 de	 bevolking	
beschouwd	 als	 een	 commerciële	 kwestie.	 Hun	 redenering	 is	
Samenvatting 
	 311	
eenvoudig:	 de	 staat	 zorgt	 voor	 erkenning	 in	 de	 vorm	 van	 een	
huwelijksakte	en	om	dit	document	te	verkrijgen	moet	je	een	geldsom	
betalen.	 Dit	 maakt	 het	 lastig	 voor	 penghulu	 om	 bepaalde	
overheidswetgeving	 uit	 te	 voeren,	 bijvoorbeeld	 de	 regels	 die	 een	
onderscheid	maken	tussen	nikah	kantor	en	nikah	bedolan.	Voordat	dit	
beleid	van	kracht	werd,	werden	bijna	alle	huwelijksceremonies	bij	de	







De	 meest	 gebruikelijke	 oplossing	 om	 wel	 een	 nikah	 bedolan	 te	
houden	 maar	 er	 niet	 veel	 geld	 aan	 uit	 te	 geven	 is	 akad	 dua	 kali	
(tweevoudige	 huwelijksceremonies).	 De	 eerste	 huwelijksceremonie,	
die	 thuis	 wordt	 gehouden,	 is	 die	 waarin	 huwelijksparen	 aan	 hun	
religieuze	 verplichtingen	 kunnen	 voldoen	 terwijl	 de	 tweede	
huwelijksceremonie	 uitsluitend	 vanwege	 de	 registratie	 bij	 de	 KUA	
wordt	 gehouden.	 Als	 bemiddelaars	 tussen	 staat	 en	 samenleving	
vervullen	 modin	 hierbij	 een	 belangrijke	 rol.	 Zij	 hebben	 ook	 een	
religieuze	 argumentatie	 geconstrueerd	 om	 de	 keuze	 van	 de	
betrokkenen	 te	 rechtvaardigen.	 Dit	 is	 de	 idee	 dat	 de	 tweede	




De	 laatste	 reeks	 onderzoeksbevindingen,	 die	 in	 het	 zesde	
hoofdstuk	 beschreven	wordt,	 betreft	 het	 proces	 van	 legalisatie	 van	
niet-geregistreerde	huwelijken.	De	vraag	is	hoe	men	omgaat	met	een	
niet-geregistreerd	 huwelijk,	 dat	 wil	 zeggen	 een	 huwelijk	 dat	 is	
gesloten	 volgens	 de	 religieuze	 voorschriften	 maar	 dat	 niet	 is	
geregistreerd	bij	de	KUA.	De	reden	voor	legalisering	heeft	een	‘emic’	
oorzaak,	 namelijk	 de	 noodzaak	 (kebutuhan)	 om	 vereiste	 juridische	




geregistreerde	 huwelijken	 kunnen	 worden	 gelegaliseerd	 door	 het	
proces	 van	 isbat	 nikah	 te	 volgen	 bij	 Islamitische	 rechtbanken.	 Isbat	
nikah	 is	 de	 enige	 formeel	 beschikbare	 procedure	 om	 niet-
geregistreerde	huwelijken	met	terugwerkende	kracht	te	legaliseren.					
In	 praktijk	 hebben	 betrokkenen	 echter	 nog	 een	 andere	
mogelijkheid	 om	 hun	 niet-geregistreerde	 huwelijk	 te	 legaliseren.	 In	
plaats	 van	 naar	 de	 Islamitische	 rechtbank	 te	 gaan,	 kunnen	 zij	 zich	






die	 beide	 ouders	 vermeldt.	 Als	 zij	 hun	 niet-geregistreerde	 huwelijk	


















De	 hervorming	 van	 de	 huwelijkswetten	 was	 bedoeld	 om	 de	
controle	van	de	overheid	op	de	huwelijkspraktijken	te	versterken	en	
het	 staatsgezag	 te	 bevorderen.	 Het	 uitroeien	 van	 alle	 vormen	 van	
informaliteit	 was	 hier	 een	 onderdeel	 van.	 De	 centrale	 overheid	
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veronderstelt	 dat	 de	 lagere	 bestuursniveaus	 in	 staat	 zijn	 om	 een	
directe	 relatie	 op	 te	 bouwen	 met	 de	 lokale	 burgers,	 zonder	 de	
noodzaak	tot	bemiddeling	van	tussenpersonen.	In	de	praktijk	werkt	dit	
dus	 niet	 zo.	 Voor	 een	 effectieve	 huwelijksregistratie	 zijn	 deze	
tussenpersonen	 nodig,	 vooral	 in	 gemeenschappen	 waar	 religieuze	
leiders	 veel	 respect	 genieten.	 In	 deze	 gemeenschappen	 heeft	
huwelijksregistratie	 twee	 onlosmakelijk	 met	 elkaar	 verbonden	
dimensies.	 Ten	 eerste	 is	 de	 huwelijksregistratie	 een	 zuiver	







Hoewel	 deze	 onderzoeksbevindingen	 lijken	 te	 wijzen	 op	 een	
concurrentiestrijd	 tussen	de	staat	en	 lokale	religieuze	 leiders,	wil	 ik	
benadrukken	dat	de	relatie	tussen	staat	en	religie	met	betrekking	tot	
het	islamitische	huwelijk	–	in	ieder	geval	in	Pasuruan	–	een	kwestie	is	
van	 wederzijdse	 aanpassing.	 Religieuze	 leiders	 staan	 open	 voor	
interventie	 van	 de	 staat	 in	 het	 huwelijksrecht	 zolang	 deze	 beperkt	
blijft	 tot	 registratie	 van	 het	 huwelijk.	 Tegelijkertijd	 is	 de	 lokale	


















Ten	 tweede	wordt,	wanneer	het	 staatsrecht	 te	 rigide	 is	 om	met	
bepaalde	 sociale	 en	 religieuze	 praktijken	 om	 te	 gaan,	 het	 religieuze	
recht	toegepast.	 In	de	ogen	van	de	 lokale	bevolking	 is	het	religieuze	
recht	 een	 beter	 toegankelijk	 en	meer	 aanvaardbaar	 instrument	 om	
met	problemen	om	te	gaan	op	het	gebied	van	de	seksuele	moraal,	zoals	
zina	 (buitenechtelijke	 seksuele	 relaties)	 of	 tienerzwangerschappen.	
Daarom	 geeft	 men	 prioriteit	 aan	 de	 religieuze	 geldigheid	 van	 een	
huwelijk	boven	de	geldigheid	volgens	het	statelijke	recht.	
Verder	zien	we	een	voortdurend	proces	van	uitbreiding	van	het	




te	 controleren.	 Deze	 benadering	 van	 burgerrechten	 is	 nuttig	 om	
mensen	in	de	richting	van	het	juridische	kader	van	de	staat	te	bewegen.	
Om	 de	 vereiste	 juridische	 documenten	 te	 verkrijgen,	 hebben	
betrokkenen	 geen	 andere	 keuze	 dan	 hun	 huwelijk	 te	 legaliseren	
conform	het	statelijke	recht.		
Zolang	 het	 dualisme	 tussen	 religieuze	 geldigheid	 en	 wettelijke	






perken.	 Zo	 laat	 dit	 onderzoek	 ook	 zien	 dat	 zowel	 rechters	 van	
Islamitische	 rechtbanken	 als	 penghulu	 van	 de	 KUA	 zich	 flexibel	
opstellen	 ten	opzichte	 van	de	 statelijke	 regels	 rond	het	huwelijk.	 In	
bepaalde	 gevallen	 zijn	 penghulu	 bereid	 om	 de	 regels	 te	 omzeilen	







belang	 om	 het	 functioneren	 van	 het	 statelijke	 recht	 te	waarborgen,	
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